In the earlier versions of B&C’s Principles, the principles were seen as midlevel constructs, in-between ethical theory and action rules. According to this view, ethical theories are the highest levels of abstraction. Principles are then supported by the ethical theories. In their turn, principles are used to specify ethical rules. Lastly, rules are used to justify concrete moral judgments and actions. For example, in their second edition a diagram of this sort appears (Beauchamp &
Childress 1983, p. 5):
Diagram 4.1: From B&C 2nd Edition (format modified, content the same)
This diagram is accompanied by the following explanation (Beauchamp & Childress 1983, p. 5):
“According to this diagram, judgments about what ought to be done in particular situations are justified by moral rules, which in turn are justified by principles, which ultimately are justified by ethical theories.”
This is therefore a deductivist way of thinking about the role of the principles: the principles are deduced from ethical theories. From the principles rules are deduced. And from the rules, particular judgments and actions are deduced. According to B&C, it does not matter which theory one would place in position (4) on the diagram: deontological or consequentialist theories would all lead to support for the same four principles they have identified. Thus, even though there is
(4) Ethical theories
(3) Principles
(2) Rules
(1) Particular judgments and actions
127 sustained controversy around which ethical theory is to be preferred, and no single ethical theory enjoys universal support in moral philosophy, we can all agree on the validity of the four principles. People from different ethical backgrounds would all support the four principles, B&C argued. Competing moral theories would each lead us to support the validity of the four principles. Therefore, discussions on rules and on particular judgments rightly start with the principles. In fact, Beauchamp and Childress apparently are adherents of different moral theories – one deontological, the other utilitarian – and the implication is that both of these competing theories lead to support for the four principles of bioethics.
In later editions (such as the 7th edition which I used as the basis for this work), B&C move away from the deductivist mode of thinking in favour of the reflective equilibrium method of justification, which I have described above. Thus, the principles are not to be applied deductively.
Instead, they are to be used for specification and practical judgments in a process of back-and-forth application and pruning, until a balance is achieved between principles and judgments that allows the greatest amount of coherence possible between moral beliefs.
In addition to this, B&C have also moved the grounding of the principles to the common morality. Instead of the claim that the principles are deduced from ethical theories, with different theories all leading to the same principles, the claim is now that the principles are directly found in the common morality. To understand this claim, one has to first understand B&C concept of the common morality. I shall here briefly outline two different discussions of the common morality; the first from two different editions of Principles, and the other from the essays of Beauchamp.
The common morality of B&C (Beauchamp & Childress 2001, p. 2-4, 401-408;
Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 3-5, 410-423)
The common morality can be thought of as follows. There are areas of great agreement between people who live a moral life, even though their moral commitments may be based on different ethical theories or different cultural backgrounds. There are a set of moral norms that would be agreed to by Kantians, utilitarians, Catholics, virtue adherents and human rights theorists – people who have widely disparate theoretical commitments and backgrounds. This set of moral norms that everyone would agree on, no matter their theory of persuasion, is the common morality.
Within the common morality, there are various action guides, for example: (1) Do not kill, (2) Do not cause suffering, (3) Prevent harm, (4) Rescue those in danger, (5) Tell the truth, (6) Nurture the young and the dependent, (7) Keep your promises, (8) Do not steal, (9) Do not punish the innocent, and (10) Obey just laws [1, p.3]. The common morality also contains moral character traits, or virtues. Within the common morality is also found principles and human rights. Various different types of moral norms find a place within the common morality, all of these agreed on by everyone who is serious about living a moral life.
128 Based on the work of Frankena and Ross, B&C identify the following features of common morality theories (Beauchamp & Childress 2001, p. 402-403; Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p.
410-411): (1) The common morality relies on every day, shared moral beliefs and judgments for its starting point. (2) If an ethical theory cannot be made consistent with the contents of the common morality, this theory is suspect. (3) The common morality is pluralistic, containing two or more principles that are not absolute (prima facie) nor reducible to a single one.
Thus, the common morality can be thought of as pre-theoretical. It is not based on a specific moral theory, and it is not dependent on the validity of a specific moral theory. In fact, the common morality provides support for theories. An ethical theory that contradicts the norms of the common morality is not a feasible ethical theory. Note also that the common morality has at least two (and in fact more) principles that confer a prima facie duty. In keeping with the work of Ross (1930), these prima facie duties have to be weighed to find the actual duty of a person.
B&C state that the four principles of bioethics are found within the common morality, and derive their binding force from the common morality rather than any specific ethical theory (Beauchamp
& Childress 2013, p. 13). Thus, the validity of the four principles is based on our shared moral judgments, so that everyone who is serious about living a moral life can recognize the moral force of the four principles without appealing to a specific moral theory. B&C argue that there is no single ethical theory that enjoys universal consensus or that is widely accepted as the standard moral theory (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 411-412). There is no single moral theory that enjoys the wide acceptance that the norms in the common morality does. The closest we get to such an ideal, are four principles. The common morality is therefore, according to B&C, the correct starting point and grounding for the four principles.
The implication of these arguments is that a unified ethical theory does not hold a central place in practical bioethics, at least according to the principlism paradigm. The correct starting point is not theory, say B&C, but the common morality – from which the four different principles are derived. It is not possible to find a single theory that would deliver these insights or enjoy the same amount of moral consensus as the common morality and the four principles do. Thus, to say that the principles should be derived from a specific theory would be to “put the cart in front of the donkey” (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 411). The common morality is the appropriate starting point, and the appropriate grounding for any theory. Not the other way around.
B&C therefore argue for four different principles, derived from the common morality, as the starting point for bioethical reflection rather than a single unified ethical theory. In their view, an ethical theory would not allow the same amount of nuance and depth as the four principles do, a single theory would not enjoy the same amount of validity and binding force, and a single theory would always come second to the shared judgments found in the common morality.
It is clear from their work that B&C have been markedly influenced by the work of Ross (Beauchamp & Childress 2001, p. 402) and that their account of the common morality relies heavily on Ross. To recall, Ross (1930) argued for the existence of a set of irreducible moral
129 principles that can be intuitively seen as being valid. Each of these principles confer a prima facie duty on a person. There is no hierarchy and there is no rule for deciding between them in times of conflict; rather, one determines one’s actual duty through weighing the demands of the principles against each other.
Thus, we can see this theme in B&C’s common morality account as well: a set of principles that we can all recognize to be self-evidently true and valid. They are not reducible to one another, and there is no hierarchy between them. Each principle confers prima facie duties in a given situation; to arrive at one’s actual obligation one has to enter into a process of weighing.
So, the four principles each have a different ethical focus and bring about a different set of ethical duties. They are derived from the common morality, a set of pre-theoretical and universally valid moral judgments we can all see intuitively to be true. In a sense, a unified ethical theory is superfluous and does not add anything to bioethical reflection. Rather, the more appropriate starting point is the four principles of bioethics.
The common morality in the essays of Beauchamp (Beauchamp 2010b, p. 43-44;
Beauchamp 2010e, p. 155; Beauchamp 2010f]
Beauchamp in his essays affirm that the source of the four principles is the common morality.
He conceives of the common morality as “the morality that all reasonable persons share and acknowledge – common-sense ethics, as it is sometimes called” (Beauchamp 2010e, p. 155). He repeats the claim that the common morality is a universal morality, and that it contains moral norms by which the actions of individuals are rightly judged. However, he takes a slightly different route towards the grounding of the common morality.
In the B&C account previously mentioned, the argument was that the common morality consists of those moral norms that is agreed upon by everyone serious about living a moral life. This appeals to either a Ross-like intuition, where we all can intuitively see the value of the norms within the common morality, or to a broadly shared consensus, namely that everyone who thinks about moral matters come to these same conclusions. In his essays, Beauchamp does not appeal to consensus among those who are morally serious or to Ross-like intuitionism. Instead, he starts with something he calls “the objectives of morality” (Beauchamp 2010b, p. 43; Beauchamp 2010f, p. 176).
Beauchamp modifies the concept of the common morality slightly, to be “the set of norms shared by all persons committed to the objectives of morality” (Beauchamp 2010f, p. 176). What are the objectives of morality? Beauchamp specifies one overall goal of morality: To promote human flourishing by counteracting conditions that cause the quality of people’s lives to worsen (Beauchamp 2010b, p. 43; Beauchamp 2010f, p. 176). The norms of the common morality prevent deterioration of the quality of people’s lives by working against the things that cause such deterioration: things such as indifference, conflict, scarce resources, and limited information. Where we see indifference, hostility, conflict, scarce resources and so on, we see
130 that people’s lives fall into misery and confusion. The goal of morality is protect human flourishing by working against the forces that lead to misery and suffering. Over time, claims Beauchamp, the norms within the common morality have shown themselves to be the most suited for this purpose. The norms of the common morality are therefore the surest anti-dote to the evils that would bring misery and suffering. The common morality is the best set of norms to ensure that human flourishing is protected. If another set of norms could be found that would do this job better, that set of norms should be preferred. But there is no such set of norms; the common morality is the best we have (Beauchamp 2010b, p. 43; Beauchamp 2010f, p. 176-177).
Here are three paragraphs taken from Beauchamp’s essay on the common morality (Beauchamp 2010f) to illustrate his views in his own words:
“I understand the common morality as the set of norms shared by all persons committed to the objectives of morality. The objectives of morality, I will argue, are those of promoting human flourishing by counteracting conditions that cause the quality of people’s lives to worsen” (p. 176).
“The common morality is not merely a morality that differs from other moralities. It is applicable to all persons in all places, and all human conduct is to be judged by its standards” (p. 176).
“In every well-functioning society norms are in place to prohibit lying, breaking promises, causing bodily harm, stealing, fraud, the taking of life, the neglect of children, and failures to keep contracts. These norms occupy a central place in the moral life because they have proven that they successfully achieve objectives of morality. This success in the service of human flourishing accounts for their moral authority” (p. 177).
Beauchamp’s work in these essays seem to base the norms of the common morality on different ground than consensus or intuition. Instead, Beauchamp argues that the common morality is justified by the objectives of morality. This argument appears almost consequentialist in nature, like a type of rule-utilitarianism. Utilitarians argue that morality is concerned with assuring the greatest happiness for the greatest number (Mill 2010b); rule-utilitarians like Mill hold that we should recognize those moral rules that promotes the greatest happiness for the greatest number. As an example of this, Mill argues for a strong conception of liberty on the basis of the principle of utility (Mill 2010a). Beauchamp’s argument for the common morality has that kind of look to it – we should endorse those norms that bring about human happiness (which he calls flourishing, presumably after Aristotle). Beauchamp’s claim is that this morality is a universal morality, and that everyone can see the value of this fact.