Groups align with the agenda

This section uses bill introductions as a dependent variable and the number of bills intro- duced in that policy area as the independent variable to evaluate the hypotheses. Specifi- cally, this section will try to answer two questions: 1) What do differences in the relative size

of the interest group communities do to the agenda? 2) Does an additional group lobbying affect the number of bills that are introduced in that policy area?

First, I will use the five cross-sections to evaluate the relationship between the size of the interest group community and the number of bills on the agenda. This model will have indicators for the different time periods in this data, but does not impose any more structure in the data. I use a logarithmic transformation of the number of bills and groups, in order to address the diminishing marginal returns to lobbying in the previous section. I also control for differences in the relative size of the lobbying community, for example, California’s health sector is likely to be larger than Rhode Island’s, by controlling for the lagged observation of the lobbying community in that state.

In order to determine the effect of an additional group registering to lobby, I use fixed effects to leverage the panel structure of the data. The models specified with fixed effects allow the intercept to vary for each policy area in each state. This model detects the marginal changes in the group population and agenda, and accounts for differences in the levels of group and legislative activity.

The equation is as follows:

Billsp,s,t=αp,s,t+β1Groupsp,s,t+β2Groupsp,s,t−1+β3P rof essionalizations

+β4P rof.XGroupsp,s,t+β5P rof.XGroupsp,s,t−1+µi,s,t

(3.1)

where p is one of 15 policy areas, s is one of the fifty states, t is one of five temporal periods. Theα is a combination of temporal, policy and state level fixed effects for the 750 state/policy groups that are used in different specifications. For professionalization, I use a single estimate of each state’s professionalization scores from Bowen and Greene (2014), which uses legislative session days, legislator compensation, and expenditures per legislator

missing data concerns (the estimates do not go until the end of the period under study and have missing observations within their period of study), I collapse their measure to a single estimate per state. In later models I use an interaction between professionalization and the number of groups. Because professionalization is fixed within states, its main effect is collinear in models with state fixed effects.

Results

Table 2 includes both the contemporaneous and a lagged observation of the logged number of groups in 15 different policy areas in each state. Column (2) shows that with both of these measures, the number of groups in a policy area positively associates with the number of bills in that policy area. This allows me to reject a null hypothesis of no effect between the size of the interest group community and the agenda discussed in the first prediction. Column (3) of this table includes an interaction between these two measures of the interest group community with professionalization. Of note, there is a negative interaction effect between professionalization and the contemporaneous observation of groups, while there is a positive interaction between groups in the previous period and professionalization. These coefficients are consistent with the logic of the third hypothesis that a lack of policy capacity will encourage groups to helicopter in to a legislative venue and affect the agenda. The positive interaction between professionalization in the lagged period suggests that in high capacity states, groups establish and maintain operations, which makes them more likely to influence subsequent agendas. It seems that in these highly professionalized states, groups precede the agenda.

However, this relationship could be driven by variables not within this parsimonious model; such as the size of the economy in each sector7_{, alignment of the parties in government or}

real world events. As a result, in columns (4-6) and (7-9) I employ a large number of fixed effects so that the models are measuring changes within a policy area in a single state.

7

Including sector GSP and its squared value per the specification in Gray and Lowery (1995) does not change the result.

Table 2: Lobbying organizations are associated with bills introduced in the states: 2007-14

DV: Bills (log)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Fixed Effects: Session Session/Policy/State

Groups 0.41∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.11 0.11 (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) Groups (T-1) 0.71∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.37∗∗ -0.00 -0.01 0.00 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) Professionalization 0.07∗ 0.06 0.11 (0.04) (0.04) (0.12) Prof. X Groups -0.10∗∗ -0.04 (0.04) (0.03) Prof X Groups (T-1) 0.09∗∗ 0.02 (0.04) (0.03) Constant 0.82∗∗ 0.62∗∗ 0.60∗∗ 3.55∗∗ 3.15∗∗ 3.12∗∗ (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.16) (0.21) (0.22) Observations 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000

No. of Fixed Effects 4 4 4 754 754 754

Notes: The number of groups are logged.

Robust standard errors, clustered by state, in parentheses.

Column (5) shows that in terms of the coefficients for groups and lagged groups, including temporal and policy/state fixed effects makes the coefficient statistically indistinguishable from zero. If groups were only engaging in positive agenda promotion, this coefficient would be positive. If groups were only engaging in negative blocking this coefficient would be zero. The lack of clear effect in these results could suggest that both of these dynamics are at play.

In columns (1) and (4), the model is run without the contemporaneous observation of groups. There is a positive relationship in column (1), but the relationship is indistinguishable from zero in column (4). This result suggests that with the fixed effects, lagged lobbying does not have a direct impact on the number of bills that are being introduced but rather that the effect of lagged lobbying is mediated by the number of bills introduced in the contemporary period. Figure 3 shows the proposed relationship that these findings provide evidence for.8

Figure 3: Proposed mediation pathway