Having oneself before God

In all three forms of temptation, one is directed towards something which is taken as a delight. In all these forms, however, the temptation is seen as centered around “false happiness,” which threatens true happiness (174-175 [233-234]). With respect to the search for God (or the vita beata), this means that life is pulled down, it is entangled with dealings and the with-world. But where lies true happiness?

The significance [Bedeutsamkeit] in relation to oneself, of which one can dispose is a donum Dei [gift of God]. (175 [234]).

The genuine relation to oneself is that of before God as a gift of God. Not as an objective relation, but as a how of experiencing. It is not a state in which one stands and looks at things from a higher perspective. Rather it is being open and refraining from securing oneself. It is a manner of relating in which one stands in a relation to oneself by giving oneself over to the facticity of one’s own life. As such, it is a mode of relating which differs from previously described modes of relating and yet is connected to them. In what sense it is different from relating through self-importance (the only one of previous modes in which

519126-L-bw-Kustassoo 519126-L-bw-Kustassoo 519126-L-bw-Kustassoo 519126-L-bw-Kustassoo Processed on: 2-5-2018 Processed on: 2-5-2018 Processed on: 2-5-2018

Processed on: 2-5-2018 PDF page: 145PDF page: 145PDF page: 145PDF page: 145

Kierkegaard in Heidegger’s lecture course “Augustine and Neoplatonism” | 137

the self actualizationally articulates itself) becomes apparent in Heidegger’s consideration of four possibilities of falling (178-180 [237-241]).

That is, according to Heidegger, relating to oneself as a gift of God is different from relating which takes its importance from what one does or has done in which the good is appropriated by oneself. It is also different from creating the good by oneself or even from assuming self-importance by uplifting oneself as worthy of the gift. And it is different in separating oneself from others, whereby one is objectively cut off from oneself. In this way all these forms are to be seen as possibilities and modes of one’s own factical life, in which, however, one does not authentically have oneself. At the same time, to have oneself is to have these possibilities (178-179 [238-239]). In this respect, authentic relating is brought out by Heidegger as overcoming [Überwindung].

Heidegger determines overcoming as “[a] genuine enacting or understanding of enactment [Echtes Vollziehen bzw. Vollzugsverstehen]. Explicatively: tentatio as an existential complex of expression” (180 [240]). This says that what is opened is not suddenly cut off from temptations. Rather, the experiential complex in its possibilities becomes visible. Overcoming is not a sudden leap into clarity, but is rather described as intensified concern and refers to coming over from. As Heidegger stresses, one can be led to self-revelation by overcoming tentatio (179 [240]). More specifically, it is said to ‘leap off’ in a self-importance (180 [240]). It is a movement described as a “groundless dive” and “authentic losing oneself” – a difficulty which creates anxiety, in which factical life itself has this “anxiety-producing-character” (180 [241]). That is, factical life itself has the possibilities – it can! In this way, Heidegger insists that in life itself there is a possibility to lose proper access to oneself and a possibility to win it. He articulates life as giving to itself these possibilities in the last hours of the lecture course in terms of “having-of-oneself” [Sichselbsthabens] and by explicating the possibility of losing and winning in terms of “the more life lives, the more life comes to itself” (181-182 [241-243]).

That is, for Heidegger, the tendency to lose is there in life itself insofar as life in itself has the tendency to pull down or endanger itself. This is what is expressed through “the more life lives.” It means that the more fully life is lived in all of its directions and the more engaged the concern is, the more life is pulled down. By ‘pulling life down’ the factical life is actualized in the manner of endangering itself by itself. In contrast, what is expressed through “the more life comes to itself” is that life also is somehow attained. It is the experiencing in life that life itself, its being [Sein], is what is at issue and at risk. There is

519126-L-bw-Kustassoo 519126-L-bw-Kustassoo 519126-L-bw-Kustassoo 519126-L-bw-Kustassoo Processed on: 2-5-2018 Processed on: 2-5-2018 Processed on: 2-5-2018

Processed on: 2-5-2018 PDF page: 146PDF page: 146PDF page: 146PDF page: 146

138 | Paths Towards Philosophy

the possibility to win the being of life (182 [243-242]). As such, having-of-oneself in concrete actualization “gives itself at the same time the full, concrete, factical ‘opportunity’ to arrive at the being of its ownmost life [Sein des eigensten Lebens]” (183 [244]). However, it should be noticed that ‘having oneself’ is not winning oneself, but the how of having oneself plays itself out in concrete actualization. Having-of-oneself is “the concern for the being of itself” (183 [245]). How this concern is actualized is different. It can be enacted in the manner of losing oneself or of winning oneself. What is had in winning oneself is one’s life in its directedness.

In this tendency toward a radical factical historical having-of-oneself in its specific self-clarity, the concrete “worldly” experiential complex of enactment [Erfahrungsvollzugszusammenhang] first becomes fully visible (cf. tentatio). The directions of experience as directions of experience, their possibilities as possibilities of this factical experience in its own enactment [eigenvollzugshaft], and that means the sense of molestia, are determined by the authentic [eigentlichen] How of life itself. (182 [244])

Thus, what becomes apparent in the authentic mode of relating is what is hidden in human being, its directions and possibilities, the ways life forms itself. Insofar as it is a manner of relating whereby one stands in a relation to oneself by giving oneself over to the facticity of one’s own life, it is not a relation to an object. Rather, grasping the proper direction of concern is grasping oneself as questionable. Thus, at the end of the lecture course, Heidegger arrives back at the beginning. “What am I?” he asks. I am the “‘[q]uestionable’ in the experiential directions, in experiencing and having myself” (184 [246]). What is decisive is the motivational ground for entering into questioning. Facing the unknown!

5.4. Kierkegaard’s explicit presence in Heidegger’s lecture course on

Augustine

The lecture course Augustine and Neoplatonism as a published text which is available for the reader has been put together by the editor Claudius Strube. As Strube brings out in his afterword (1995: 259-263 [345-351]), the original text of the lecture course consists of 19 handwritten pages (folio format). As was Heidegger’s usual practice, he wrote the progressive text of the lecture on the left side of the pages and added different notes on the right side of the page. In the original text, there are a high number of notes on each page which often lack clarity concerning the connection with the continuous text (ibid.). As published, the text of the lecture course consists of (1) Heidegger’s manuscript of the lecture course; (2) supplements, which are thought to belong to the lecture course, but which were found in a different collection of papers gathered by Heidegger for preparing a

519126-L-bw-Kustassoo 519126-L-bw-Kustassoo 519126-L-bw-Kustassoo 519126-L-bw-Kustassoo Processed on: 2-5-2018 Processed on: 2-5-2018 Processed on: 2-5-2018

Processed on: 2-5-2018 PDF page: 147PDF page: 147PDF page: 147PDF page: 147

Kierkegaard in Heidegger’s lecture course “Augustine and Neoplatonism” | 139

later seminar on Augustine; and (3) notes from his student Oskar Becker. With regard to Kierkegaard’s presence in the lecture course, this is significant.

In the text as published, Heidegger is seen to mention Kierkegaard directly in this lecture course on six separate occasions. Mostly he does so through quotations. There are altogether seven clearly marked passages from two of Kierkegaard’s treatises: The Sickness unto Death and The Concept of Anxiety. However, on one occasion Heidegger simply names Kierkegaard without directly saying anything further in the written source available to us. The passages quoted by Heidegger from Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto Death stem from the second part of the book, “Despair is Sin.” The passages quoted by Heidegger from Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety derive from the third and fifth chapter of the book respectively. From the six separate occasions where we find Kierkegaard in the text of the lecture course as it is given in the Gesamtausgabe, two are marked as found in the margins of the lecture manuscript. On the other four occasions Kierkegaard is to be found in the sketches which have been added to the published text of the lecture course in “Appendix I”

(in Notes and Sketches for the Lecture Course). Thus, Heidegger has not named

Kierkegaard in the running text of the lecture course. In addition, throughout the lecture course Heidegger does not say anything about Kierkegaard. And yet, it can be claimed that Kierkegaard is constantly by Heidegger’s side and through this presence, Heidegger tacitly credits Kierkegaard with utmost importance.

The first (1) reference to Kierkegaard is already made by Heidegger in his opening of the interpretation. That is, in the margin of the discussion about the motivation for confessing, Heidegger has added a quotation from Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto Death: “[t]o comprehend is the range of man’s relation to the human, but to believe is man’s relation to the divine” (GA 60:130 [178]; SuD: 95 [XI 206]).144 _{In this way, Kierkegaard} enters the discussion about the significance of the motivational ground in the search for access. In the second (2) reference found in the margin of the text of the lecture course Heidegger has named Kierkegaard within the context of the problematic of the search (GA 60: 141 [192]).145 _{Since there is no explanation for this insertion of Kierkegaard’s name in} this case, the only direct conclusion which can be drawn from this reference is that Kierkegaard is somehow on Heidegger’s mind within the consideration of the search and the turnedness towards oneself therein.

144 _{See the reference (1) in chapter 5.3.1.} 145 _{See the reference (2) in chapter 5.3.2.}

519126-L-bw-Kustassoo 519126-L-bw-Kustassoo 519126-L-bw-Kustassoo 519126-L-bw-Kustassoo Processed on: 2-5-2018 Processed on: 2-5-2018 Processed on: 2-5-2018

Processed on: 2-5-2018 PDF page: 148PDF page: 148PDF page: 148PDF page: 148

140 | Paths Towards Philosophy

In the notes and sketches added to the lecture course in “Appendix I,” there are four additional references to Kierkegaard. One of them (3) is linked by the editors to the same context as the first of the previously mentioned marginal notes. In this case Heidegger has marked out two quotations of Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto Death. The quotations Heidegger has added are the following (GA 60: 185 [248]; SuD: 79, 80 [XI 191, 192])146_:

“The criterion for the self is always: that directly before which it is a self, but that in turn is the definition of ‘criterion.’” [S. Kierkegaard, Die Krankheit zum Tode, übersetzt v. H. Gottsched, G. W. Bd. 8, Jena 1911, S.76.]

“The greater the conception of God, the more self there is; the more self, the greater the conception of God.” [A. a. O., S. 77.]

These quotations may well be read in the context of the motivational considerations, but meaning-wise the passage also refers to the problematic of the search and of the ‘having-of- oneself’. The fact that Kierkegaard had Heidegger’s attention when he considered the possibility of the authentic manner of relating in having-of-oneself can be concluded also from the two following explicit references. Both of these cases are to be found in the notes and sketches and in both of them Heidegger appends quotations from Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety. According to the editors, the first of these (4) are made by Heidegger in connection with the discussion about “Light.” The quotations appear as follows (GA 60: 192 [257]; see CA: 109 [IV 378]):

“Guilt is a more concrete conception, which becomes more and more possible in the relation of possibility to freedom.” [S. Kierkegaard, Der Begriff der Angst, übers. v. Chr. Schrempf, G. W. Bd. 5, Jena 1912, S. 107] “But whoever becomes guilty also becomes guilty of that which occasioned the guilt. For guilt never has an external occasion, and whoever yields to temptation is himself guilty of the temptation.” [Ebd.]

These quotations can be linked to Heidegger’s claim that the manner of searching makes up one’s concern for facticity, as well as with the final part of Heidegger’s consideration on the manners of having-of-oneself. Heidegger’s next reference (5) is not connected to any concrete part of the text of the lecture course by the editors. In this case Heidegger has added the following quotation from Kierkegaard on a loose page (GA 60: 202 [268]; see CA: 159 [IV 425]): “[a]nxiety discovers fate.”147 _{This reference to Kierkegaard can be} linked to the final chapters of the lecture course, where Heidegger briefly touches upon the subject of anxiety. All in all, the references to Kierkegaard are thus to be found in many

146 _{The quotations (3) appear right after the following remark: “[h]ow the self wins its existence, and in what}

existence consists, already through the searching: placing oneself somehow before God or vita beata [the happy life]. In searching, it places itself in the absolute distance, and tries to win the distance. Explicated phenomenologically?” (185-186 [248])

147 _{The quotation is marked with the reference “S. Kierkegaard, Der Begriff der Angst, a.a.O., S. 160” (GA}

519126-L-bw-Kustassoo 519126-L-bw-Kustassoo 519126-L-bw-Kustassoo 519126-L-bw-Kustassoo Processed on: 2-5-2018 Processed on: 2-5-2018 Processed on: 2-5-2018

Processed on: 2-5-2018 PDF page: 149PDF page: 149PDF page: 149PDF page: 149

Kierkegaard in Heidegger’s lecture course “Augustine and Neoplatonism” | 141

different thematizations. The question to be asked is: how do all these references come together?

Considering how the references mentioned previously are found in Heidegger’s lecture course, it is at first sight highly problematic to conclude with full confidence anything about Kierkegaard’s significance for Heidegger. First of all, because initially the certainty of the above-mentioned reference belonging to the concrete lecture course can be questioned in three cases out of the five.148 _{Secondly, because the two references which} clearly were made in the margin of the text of the lecture course are not very helpful: the first of them might be simply supportive, and nothing much can be said about the significance of the second reference. Nevertheless, I will claim that the references can in fact be connected with the lecture course and this, indeed, in the manner of how they appear. I base the claim on the sixth occasion on which Heidegger has mentioned Kierkegaard. Although I concede that this occasion is also not to be found in Heidegger’s manuscript of the lecture course, it can clearly be shown to belong to the preparation of the lecture course. Furthermore, it can be shown that Heidegger was heavily engaged with Kierkegaard during this lecture course and especially with the second part of his The Sickness unto Death.

On this sixth occasion (6), the reference to Kierkegaard is found on another loose page, which has been added to the lecture course. On this loose page (198-199 [264-265]), with the heading “Sin” [Sünde], Heidegger has marked one sentence as a quotation stemming from Kierkegaard.149 _{I claim that this loose page, in which a concrete quotation} from Kierkegaard is to be found, is nothing less than Heidegger’s summary of his reading of the second part of Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto Death. The fact that so far this page has not been recognized as a summary of Kierkegaard’s treatise lies in Heidegger’s failure to use quotation marks. However, when compared to the 1911 German translation of Kierkegaard’s treatise which Heidegger used at the time (a fact which is confirmed by the references to the quotations he has clearly marked), it can be shown that Heidegger in this paper simply sums up and quotes Kierkegaard (see Appendix One). Furthermore, I claim,

148 _{As the editor says, these belong to the preparation of the lecture course “with reasonable certainty” (Strube}

1995: 260). Thus, the possibility that Heidegger did not really make these references during the time of the lecture course must be considered.

149 _{The quotation from Kierkegaard explicitly presented by Heidegger in this context (6) is the following:}

“[t]herefore, interpreted Christianly, sin has its roots in willing, not in knowing, and this corruption of willing embraces the individual’s consciousness.” [S. Kierkegaard, Die Krankheit zum Tode, übers. u. mit einem Nachwort von H. Gottsched, Jena 1911, S. 93.] (GA 60: 199 [265]; SuD: 95 [XI 206])

519126-L-bw-Kustassoo 519126-L-bw-Kustassoo 519126-L-bw-Kustassoo 519126-L-bw-Kustassoo Processed on: 2-5-2018 Processed on: 2-5-2018 Processed on: 2-5-2018

Processed on: 2-5-2018 PDF page: 150PDF page: 150PDF page: 150PDF page: 150

142 | Paths Towards Philosophy

that this loose page reveals Heidegger’s center of interest with respect to Kierkegaard in this lecture course.

In my opinion, in the present lecture course Heidegger focuses mainly on Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto Death. However, although it can be shown that Heidegger’s references to the The Concept of Anxiety, as well as the loose page entitled “Anxiety” (201-202 [268]), were clearly created during the time when the lecture course on Augustine was held (this fact becomes apparent through textual similarities), in my opinion Heidegger’s attention to this treatise by Kierkegaard does not yet reach its full strength here. Rather, I insist that the full importance of the notion of anxiety and Kierkegaard’s treatise The Concept of Anxiety to Heidegger becomes apparent in his next lecture course. With this reasoning, I will turn to this treatise by Kierkegaard in the following chapter and concentrate in this chapter on his The Sickness unto Death. Thus, in what follows, I will make an excursion to Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto Death in order later on to bring out Heidegger’s extensive engagement with this treatise of Kierkegaard as well as the clear structural similarities between the writings of the two thinkers.

5.5. Excursion: “Sin is ignorance” – Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto Death

In The Sickness unto Death [Sygdommen til Døden] (1849) Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous author Anti-Climacus considers this sickness, despair, as a sickness of the self. According to Kierkegaard this sickness is universal – everybody who has not become a Christian is in despair.150 _{Thus, this sickness is to be overcome. Until one overcomes the sickness,} whether one is aware of it or not, one is in one way or another in despair. Overcoming despair means becoming one’s self, that is, becoming Christian. In this way, becoming one’s self designates a form of relating to oneself.151 _{The aim of the book can be seen as an} unfolding of the theme of becoming one’s self through the analysis of different forms of