Toy Library Survey ResultsA
Question 16 If you have not heard about a Toy Library, would you be interested in knowing about it?
155 The connection between mind/body Hume said is like that of constant conjunction like in the case of a pear (mental act) and pear (physical event). However, because there are no impressions of any connectivity between mind and body for one to have knowledge of them, Hume doubted their existence. The connection between them cannot be empirically verified and so cannot be known, (phenomenalism).
However it is pertinent to know that Hume‟s radical empiricism (phenomenalistic epistemology) affected the whole of his philosophical thought.
Over now to Hume‟s notion of personal identity.
4.7. Phenomenalistic Epistemology in Hume’s Idea of Personal identity; it can therefore
156 important if we must talk about the immateriality or otherwise of the soul, for the soul is thought to be a substance.
The idea of the self or personal identity rests on the notion of the immateriality of the soul.
The idea of substance comes to us because we can define it, according to Hume but the definition we have of substance as „„something which may exist by itself‟‟ raises some problems. According to Hume, this definition of substance fitted everything conceivable, for whatever is clearly and distinctly conceivable can exist by itself in the order of possibility. If this is the case, the definition will not serve to distinguish substance from accident or soul from perceptions. He went further to argue that the idea of substance involved inhesion in something. And „„inhesion in something is supposed to be requisite to support the existence of perception, we have therefore, no idea of inhesion‟‟44
Hume argued that „we have no idea of inhesion, it logically followed we have no idea of substance. Perception cannot therefore, inhere either in the body, for that would require localization or in an immaterial substance or soul, for that would amount to meaninglessness for Hume, we are confined to the world of perception and all we know is perception – if there are things other than perceptions, we cannot know what they are. This presupposition shows that the theory of the soul as an immaterial substance is indistinguishable from perceptions. Hume therefore concluded that „„the question concerning the substance of the soul is absolutely unintelligible. All our perceptions are not susceptible of a local union, either with what is extended or unextented.‟‟45 Hume‟s denial of substance and immateriality of the soul consequently has implications for a theory of human nature as regards personal identity. It is obvious that Hume is compelled to deny that we have any idea of the self distinct from our perceptions. Hume therefore argued against philosophers
157 who were wrong to imagine that we are always conscious of the self as something which remains in a permanent state of self- identity. But if we have any clear and intelligible idea of the self, Hume argued it must be derived from an impression and this is evident in this quote thus;
Self or person is not any impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, through the whole cause of our lives, since self is supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable…
and consequently there is no idea of substance.46
Hume finally came to the conclusion about the idea of the self and personal identity that the mind is nothing but a combination of all manner of perceptions. He therefore denied that the mind has simplicity or identity seen as the seat of personal identity. He identified mind or soul as nothing but; „„A kind of theatre where several perceptions successively make their appearance, pass, reposes, glide away and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time or identity in different. They are the successive perceptions only that constitute the mind.‟‟47
In as much as the idea of the self has no rational justification, man nevertheless has the tendency to attribute identity and simplicity to the mind. This tendency in man to attribute identity and simplicity to the mind, Hume attributed to memory without which according to Hume, „all questions about personal identity are to be regarded rather as a grammatical as philosophical difficulties‟. Once we give in to memory, our perceptions are linked by association in the imagination and we attribute identity to what in fact is an interrupted succession of perceptions.
158 Hume‟s‟ position on the issue of personal identity obviously is a difficult one to sustain. His position can neither be said to be one of the materialist nor the idealist type. This however led him to skepticism when he said „„for my part, I must plead the privilege of a skeptic and confess that thus this difficulty is too hard for my understanding.‟‟48
Since Hume denied the notion of substance, it becomes obvious that he will also deny the notion of personal identity. He saw personal identity as nothing but psychological experience and not anything physical to be perceived or observed to generate impressions.
This is the reason he claimed he could not find any soul, mind, and unchanging entity within him called self, when he goes in himself. We cannot arrive at the notion of continued existence of bodies independent of perception. This stemmed from Hume‟s phenomenalism that we can only have impressions of objects of the senses or phenomena and the perceptions we have of them are distinct and separate from one another, the mind cannot be said to interact with the body because they are both distinct from each other and if there is any relation between them, Hume maintained it cannot be perceived because it is not an object of perception, it is only but a causal relations. Also we cannot infer the existence of anything from perception because perception can only generate impressions and in this case, impressions we have of things do not guarantee their existence. Again, there are no bodies distinct from our perceptions, if there are, our senses do not reveal them to us. Therefore, in Hume‟s phenomenalistic epistemology, only impressions appear to the mind, we do not perceive anything body when we regard our limbs and members but certain impressions. His theory of association of ideas led to his denial that the mind has simplicity or identity seen as the self, rather he saw it as a combination of all manner of perceptions and any relations about these distinct perceptions are as a result of combination of these ideas by the memory
159 which deals with simple ideas. So the idea of self is derived from experience and not anything outside experience.
However, it is pertinent to note that the whole of Hume‟s empiricist theory ran throughout his philosophical thought.
Now on Hume‟s thought on Ethics/ Morality.