Though the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940 provided legislation that established alternative service for the conscientious objector, there were still more questions than answers about the form alternative service should take. Lewis Hershey, serving as the Acting Director, Deputy Director, and then Director of Selective Service, did much during the crucial years of 1940-1941 to develop, administer, and shape the direction of conscientious objection and alternative service. There are many instances during these years of Hershey making decisions, suggestions, or appointments with lasting effects on conscientious objection. As he began to exert his authority, his personal ideology concerning alternative service shaped the entire dynamic that
continued throughout the war. His suggestion for better organization from the Historic Peace Churches, the establishment of Selective Service’s Camp Operations Division, and his ongoing negotiations with the churches were but some of the many efforts of
Hershey, both small and large, as the central figure in conscientious objection during World War II.
Hershey was not always at the forefront in these years, though. Seeking to maintain civilian control over the Selective Service, President Roosevelt named Clarence Dykstra as Director of Selective Service in October. Though Hershey was not technically the head of the Selective Service, he was definitely the foremost expert on manpower procurement for the military in the United States, and, for all intents and purposes, he served as the director even during Dykstra’s short tenure. That said, there was one significant instance when Dykstra negotiated with Roosevelt over what exactly COs should be doing. Hershey still worked on the issue with Dykstra, and when Hershey took over for Dykstra, it was completely his show to run in all matters. What unfolds in the following pages is exactly how Hershey managed to do this and what his beliefs were considering the nature of Civilian Public Service.
Prior to the Selective Service Act of 1940, interwar planners did not see much of a need to change the wording of the law or the provisions set forth from the First World War in regards to conscientious objection. However, the deliberations over the issue during the summer of 1940 and the testimony of many supporters of conscientious
objection made people realize that something needed to be done. What emerged from the 1940 law was legislated civilian control and an alternative form of service in the arena of “national importance.” Though the Act was much more liberal than its World War I counterpart, it was not without its faults. For instance, the Act did not direct who (or what) was to be responsible for administration.1
Nor did it provide a means of funding or determine where the boundaries of jurisdiction and control existed. The Act was not
clear on how far civilian control went. There was also a question of just how “civilian” the Selective Service really was, as the Selective Service was equal parts civilian bureaucracy and military institution.
As conscientious objection was a multifaceted issue, there were a number of problems that needed to be addressed. One group of COs, the absolutist objectors who objected to any form of government service, presented special problems, but the
provisions in the Selective Service Act neglected to address them. There were precedents overseas for dealing with absolutists, such as the British system of conscription, which provided for them, but the United States did not have such a mechanism in place.2
It was Hershey’s belief that all must serve in some capacity, so he contended that the absolutist either had to serve in CPS or go to prison. Furthermore, the National Service Board for Religious Objectors (who dealt directly with Hershey and is a major focus of this study) saw the absolutists as outside of their realm. As M. R. Zigler, Chairman of NSBRO and member of the Church of the Brethren said, “We did not feel that it was our responsibility to work for that group. However, we did not work against them on their position. We felt they should organize themselves, as we were, and if the government granted them
2Along with alternative service for those who objected to military service, the
British government also provided complete deferments for absolutists who objected to any form of government service. Britain also possessed a stronger precedent than the United States for dealing with COs, as the British government provided alternative service during the First World War. See Sibley and Jacob, 2-7.
privilege, okay.”3
Though there would be a few discussions of the absolutists, the overwhelming concern was with civilian servant objectors in Civilian Public Service.
Of the three groups of conscientious objectors, noncombatants had the simplest means of gaining recognition. An executive order issued by President Franklin Roosevelt on December 6, 1940 thoroughly defined noncombatancy and what jobs in the army fell under those parameters. Roosevelt defined noncombatant service as,
(1) Service in any unit which is unarmed at all times (2) Service in the medical department wherever performed
(3) Service in any unit or installation the primary function of which does not require the use of arms in combat, provided the individual’s assignment within such unit or installation does not require him to bear arms or to be trained in their use4
He further clarified the issue by stating that noncombatant training was to mirror regular military training with the notable exceptions of “marksmanship, combat firing, target practices, and those subjects relating to the employment of weapons.”5
In practice, this meant that noncombatant COs labored in the quartermaster corps, decontamination units, the signal corps, or engineering units until Secretary of War Henry Stimson declared in January 1943 that all noncombatant COs were to serve in the medical corps.6
3M.R. Zigler, "The Organization and Functioning of CPS: M.R. Zigler," in We
Have Just Begun to Not Fight: An Oral History of Conscientious Objectors in Civilian Public Service During World War II, ed. Heather Frazer and John O'Sullivan (New York:
Twayne, 1996), 5.
4U.S. President, Executive Order 8606. (Document printed in Conscientious
Objection, 5.)
5Ibid. 6Eller, 28.
Roosevelt’s executive order took care of the noncombatant CO, but there was still much work to be done for the civilian servant. Indeed, much had been going in for months prior to the noncombatant executive order. Planning for a program of civilian alternative service began almost immediately following passage of the Selective Service Act. On September 17, Harold Evans, Clarence Pickett, Ray Wilson, Ross Murphy, and Paul French of the Friends War Problems Committee visited Hershey and Frederick Osborne (of President Roosevelt’s advisory board). Hershey made it clear that he would like to establish an advisory board to deal with conscientious objectors and leave all CO matters to it. There were also discussions among the Friends War Problems Committee about the specifics of an alternative service program, ranging from questions on pay to registration.7 At this point in time there appeared to be more questions than answers, and
it was only through cooperative efforts could anything be solved.
Clearly, there were problems to fix and they needed to be remedied quickly. A memorandum dated September 24, 1940 circulated around the National Headquarters of the Selective Service calling for an “informal conference” of a number of “national agencies” such as the Works Progress Administration (WPA), the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), and the Public Health Service to outline plans for administering COs in their national service. The earliest planning for alternative service occurred in the Manpower Division of the Selective Service. The Manpower Division decided quickly that the best way to implement programs in the shortest amount of time was to use agencies and projects that already had infrastructure in place. The most obvious
candidate was the Civilian Conservation Corps from the New Deal, with its soil
conservation and forestry programs. In outlining their plans, there was much cooperation between the CCC, the War Department, the Department of Agriculture, and the
Department of the Interior, among others.8
Most of the initiative for institutional development and direction came from Hershey, particularly in his early personal meetings with Paul French, representing the Society of Friends. On September 30, Hershey asked French if it was possible for the Peace Churches to oversee all the civilian servant conscientious objectors. Two weeks later, on October 15, Hershey posed the question again, outlining his view more precisely as he added that “… no one in the Government service had given much thought to this problem [civilian servant COs] ” and he believed that it was the churches’ place “to make concrete and specific suggestions along this line.”9
Hershey also initiated a discussion that led to greater organization among the Peace Churches.
The Selective Service realized that the differing opinions of the Peace Churches involved created even more confusion and difficulties.10
The first to suggest a more streamlined approach for the Peace Churches was Hershey. The idea for what eventually became the National Service Board for Religious Objectors emerged from a meeting between Hershey and Paul French.
8Conscientious Objection, 158-159. 9Gingerich, 56; and Sibley and Jacob, 116. 10Conscientious Objection, 160.
Representing the Society of Friends, French came to Hershey’s office to discuss administrative matters concerning COs, including guidelines for the state directors. Hershey asked French if he spoke for all COs or if Hershey had to deal with each
individual church or sect. French’s reply was that he “probably represented the feeling of all the religious groups” on the issues of registration invalidation and state director
information. Hershey was interested in setting up a civilian board for the explicit purpose of dealing with conscientious objection, but he made it clear that he was unwilling
proceed in that direction until President Roosevelt had appointed the head of the
Selective Service. French readdressed the point that many of the COs chafed under the idea of government control and suggested that a civilian organization such as the American Friends Service Committee needed to be involved.11
It was Hershey’s next idea in the meeting that really got things rolling. Hershey put forth the idea that the AFSC administer the CO programs and asked how much
money the Friends would from the government to finance this. French responded that the Friends probably would not accept funds from the federal government, but he could not speak for everyone on that point. Hershey and French went on to discuss the nature of religion and asked French exactly what the Peace Churches wanted for civilian service. Hershey reassured the churches about his sympathy for matters of conscience and
11French Diary, October 2, 1940. At this point in time, Hershey was the Acting
Director of the Selective Service as President Roosevelt had not yet filled the position permanently.
religious liberty, saying that “if he [Hershey] was named director [the Peace Churches] would have no difficulty in working out a mutually satisfactory arrangement.”12
French returned to his colleagues with the message that the Mennonites, Brethren, and Society of Friends needed to cooperate under the leadership of the American Friends Service Committee. The Brethren and Mennonites, however, felt that a more cooperative and equal relationship was in order.13
On October 5, representatives from the Historic Peace Churches voted in favor of
recommendations prepared by the committee of Friends, Mennonites and Brethren in Washington and presented by Ray Newton regarding a possible continuing set-up in Washington, D.C., to work on behalf of the religious
conscientious objector. It is understood that the organization will be composed of the Friends, Mennonites and Brethren, and this organizing committee will
determine the policy governing issuance of invitations to other organizations….14
Those recommendations constituted a two-fold approach to conscientious objection. The organization’s mission was to keep the church constituency informed and to serve as a unified voice on behalf of conscientious objectors to the federal government. Other religious denominations, churches, and sects could be members, but the organization limited membership to religious groups (keeping in line with the wording of the Selective Service Act, no less). The Historic Peace Churches had the representatives on the general committee and covered the expenses.15
12French Diary, October 2, 1940.
13Gingerich, 54-55 (quote printed in Gingerich).
14Ibid., 55. Quote is the wording of the Mennonite Central Peace Committee,
appearing in Gingerich.
Thus, the Peace Churches established the National Council for Religious Conscientious Objectors on October 11, and after merging with the Peace Churches’ Civilian Service Board on November 26, they changed the name to its World War II title of the National Service Board for Religious Objectors. The Executive Board of NSBRO was made up of representatives from the Brethren Service Committee, the Mennonite Central Committee, and the American Friends Service Committee. 16
The establishment of NSBRO was incredibly significant, and Hershey’s role in its formation was pivotal. NSBRO was the unified voice for COs in Washington, and for the duration of the war, any changes in policy or camp operations involved NSBRO in some way. Although the Historic Peace Churches were more cooperative with one another than in World War I because of the interwar conferences, Hershey’s suggestion that they present a single voice to him spurned them to establish and interdenominational organization devoted solely to matters of the conscientious objector.
Those working with the Selective Service had a variety of stances towards the concepts of service and toward administration of alternative service. Ideas came in from all parts of the spectrum. Some favored service “on an individual basis,” with COs working as a singular entity, not in work camps with supervision. Others wanted much sterner “Government operated and strictly disciplined camps.” A significant and convoluted problem was the individual CO’s stance towards service. Because of the varied nature of individual beliefs, the Selective Service faced a problem in trying to account for all individual variances, clearly an impossible task. Some COs were willing
to labor in defense work as long as they did not have to serve in the military. Others went so far as to refuse to plant a single seed or harvest a single grain if its use was to feed the army. It became clear that most COs would not work in defense industries, so the Selective Service shied away from war work as much as possible. Further compounding dissatisfaction in the earliest stages was that a system for alternative service was taking longer than anticipated.
The Peace Churches were leery of anything that smacked of government control. To compromise, the government eventually took over old CCC projects and used the existing infrastructure, working with the Forest Service and the Soil Conservation Service under the Department of Agriculture.17
Furthermore, Hershey’s belief in decentralization of the draft led to more leeway in matters of individual conscience, leaving classification in the hands of the local draft boards.
From the passage of the Selective Service and Training Act until October, Hershey was in charge of the Selective Service as the acting director. President
Roosevelt had not yet appointed anyone permanently to that position. Hershey had much support throughout the government, but the President wanted to illustrate civilian control of the draft as much as possible, even though most of the men working in the Selective Service National Headquarters were military personnel. So, instead of appointing Hershey to the post, Roosevelt named University of Wisconsin-Madison President Clarence Dykstra the Director of the Selective Service on October 12. At the behest of Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Roosevelt named Hershey Deputy Director, and he
received a promotion to Brigadier General. When Dykstra arrived in Washington, he recognized Hershey’s expertise and granted him wide latitude in administrative and executive decisions. Though the decision to appoint Dykstra over him surely disappointed Hershey, the two men worked together adequately.18
By the middle of October, there was still no alternative service program in place and Hershey reiterated to French that the Historic Peace Churches needed to present him with a plan. The question of specific types of projects, administration, and funding still loomed. There was discussion between Hershey and French of medical students working in depressed urban sections of large cities or “sharecropper areas,” an idea that Hershey supported. Hershey reiterated that the Peace Churches needed to state clearly what they were willing to do, how many units were necessary, and how much money they needed to fund the program. Hershey also recognized that not much more could be done until the Peace Churches presented him with more specific information. He told French, “You fellows want to make up your minds as to what you want to do and how it ought to be done and we are in a position to talk intelligently about it.” He also stated there needed to be a discussion of responsibility for the men. Specifically, would responsibility lie with the Federal Government or the Peace Churches, or would the two share the responsibility?19
Finally, on November 12, the National Council for Religious Conscientious Objectors presented its initial plan to Hershey and the Selective Service. A product of
18Flynn, Lewis B. Hershey, 75; and Flynn, The Draft, 23. 19French Diary, October 15, 1940.
negotiations among the Council, Dykstra, Hershey, and a Major Guiton Morgan of the Selective Service, the plan outlined three possible avenues of service for the CO. The first type of work was working directly with the federal government. These men would be paid, but not more than what their equivalent in the military would receive. The government would directly supervise them, and the camps would receive full government financing. The second type was in camps working for the agencies of the government (such as the Forestry or Soil Conservation Service), but the Brethren Service Committee, the American Friends Service Committee, or the Mennonite Central Committee would administer the camps. Under this plan, the government would pay for the facilities, and the churches would pay for administration and support. This also gave the CO the choice to work for free or they could receive pay from the government, again at the military scale. The final option was complete control by the Peace Churches, with additional agencies to be approved by the Director of Selective Service. This part of the plan provided complete autonomous control over finance and administration for the churches. Furthermore, the Peace Churches already had locations in service ready as alternative service camps for COs.20
However, from the point of view of the Selective Service, a number of questions remained. One of the largest was who was responsible for financing. The Peace Church plan called for dual control, but that did not necessarily assure civilian control if there was government money involved. There were other questions, such as the legality of the
20French Diary, November 14, 1940; and Memorandum from National Council
for Religious Conscientious Objectors to Selective Service. Printed in Conscientious
entire plan, what specific types of work would be done, where the programs would be