The road to the 1979 devolution referendum
The idea of legislative devolution gained traction in the period 1966–1968, when the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Welsh counterparts, Plaid Cymru, had electoral success in Parliamentary by-elections and local elections (Bochel, Denver, Macartney, 1981: 1). In the case of Scotland, the SNP’s Winnie Ewing won the Hamilton by-election of 1967 (a seat traditionally held by Labour) to become the SNP’s only MP at the time, and the SNP also returned 69 councillors during the 1967 local elections (Lynch, 2013: 121). Partly as a result of the support of Nationalist parties at the polls, the Labour Government appointed a Royal Commission in 1969, which had the job of examining ‘the present functions of the central legislature and Government in relation to the several countries, nations and regions of the United Kingdom, to consider…whether any changes are desirable in those functions of otherwise in present constitutional and economic relationships’ (Kilbrandon, 1973: iii, iv).
Led first by Geoffrey Crowther, Lord Crowther, and then by Charles James Dalrymple Shaw, Lord Kilbrandon, the Royal Commission on the Constitution produced a report in 1973, commonly referred to as the ‘Kilbrandon report’. The Kilbrandon report indicated the view of the Commission’s members; that Scottish and Welsh Assemblies should be established (as opposed to independence or federalism), given the evident demand for devolution as evidenced by opinion polls and the continuing electoral success of Scottish and Welsh Nationalist parties (Bochel et al, 1981: 1). Further to the Kilbrandon report, and after the February 1974 general election which produced further Nationalist gains (the SNP won seven seats), the new minority Labour Government released a consultative document entitled ‘Devolution within the United Kingdom: Some alternatives for discussion’ (1974). The document outlined the main recommendations from the Royal Commission, and following consultations, the Government issued the White paper entitled ‘Democracy and Devolution: Proposals for Scotland and Wales’ (1974).
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Only a month after the introduction of the white paper, another general election was called, at which the SNP won 11 seats and a 30.4 per cent share of the Scottish vote. In terms of popular support in Scotland, this put the SNP second behind Labour and represented an all-time high in popular support for the SNP. This was significant as the SNP now presented the potential to challenge Labour’s notion of ‘welfare Unionism’ (see Keating, 2010). Indeed, the SNP did attempt to do so, through its national discourse. Two further white papers were then introduced: ‘Our changing democracy’ (November 1975) and ‘Devolution to Scotland and Wales: Supplementary statement’ (August 1976) (Bochel et al, 1981: 2). November 1976 saw the Scotland and Wales bill published, but a failed guillotine motion by the Government meant that the bill was lost (Kerr, 1978). However, separate Scotland and Wales bills were then introduced, and by July 1978, Parliamentary approval and Royal Assent was achieved for both bills (Bochel et al, 1981: 2).
Scotland’s first ever devolution referendum was held on 1 March 1979, and although a small majority voted Yes, this Yes vote fell beneath the required 40 per cent of the entire Scottish electorate needed to implement the 1978 Scotland Act (Harvie, 1998: 195). Yes votes only registered 32.9 per cent (Bochel and Denver, 1981: 141), which was well short of the required threshold. The referendum result was widely interpreted as a defeat for the Yes camp, and victory for the Noes, despite claims by Yes (in particular, by the SNP) that the Government should implement the 1978 Scotland Act by virtue of the majority of those having voting ‘Yes’ (ibid). George Cunningham’s 40 per cent rule was a major thorn in the side of pro-change campaigners. The ‘rule’ made it even more important for the Yes campaign to maximise turnout, and if a simple majority had have been required to determine the result of the referendum, Yes would have won—the result was 52 per cent to 48 per cent in the Yes campaign’s favour (Macwhirter, 2014: 198).
According to Bochel et al (1981), the decline in support for self-government and the eventual failure of the Yes campaign indicates that No simply had a stronger argument, campaigning successfully on the costs of devolution, the over- bureaucratisation that devolution would cause, and the argument that devolution would break-up of Britain. Bochel et. Al (1981) point to the significance of an ITN referendum day poll, which showed that the three most important issues to No voters were ‘the potential break-up of Britain’ (31 per cent), ‘the cost of devolution’ (31 per
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cent) ‘and the creation of another level of Government’ (23 per cent) (ibid: 144). An additional factor to the failure of Yes, according to Bochel and Denver (1981), was the division amongst devolution supporters, and division within Labour. There was a Labour Vote No Campaign, which caused confusion amongst Labour supporters, according to Bob McClean, and the Scottish Council of the Labour Party voted against participation in any cross-party pro-devolution campaign (2005: 41–42). A final factor was the lack of popularity of Labour and the SNP, the two parties most closely associated with the campaign for devolution, in contrast with the popularity of the party most associated with No, the Conservative party, which saw its vote in Scotland increase in 1979 (Botchel et al, 1981). The proportion of Conservatives intending to vote ‘Yes’ was cut in half during the campaign period, and although the party presented itself as favourable towards devolution, it argued that Labour’s Scotland Act had to be defeated (Mitchell, 1992).
The 1979 devolution referendum and beyond
Labour and the SNP were the big losers of the 1979 referendum, and bitter recriminations took place between the two regarding the lack of unity within sections of the Yes camp. Both Labour and the SNP had different motives for campaigning for a Yes vote, meaning that voters and supporters were being met with conflicting messages (Bochel and Denver, 1981: 145–146). The SNP blamed Labour for what it saw as deception in delivering devolution, causing the failure of the Yes for Scotland campaign (Denver, Mitchell, Pattie and Bochel, 2000: 27). Not only had Labour MPs helped in the implementation of the 40 per cent rule, but the Labour referendum campaign was uninspired, with several party members and representatives supporting a No vote (ibid: 27–28). The ultimate result was that the SNP withdrew its support for the Labour Government led by Prime Minister James Callaghan, in 1979, further undermining Labour’s legitimacy in Scotland. Later, a general election was called after Callaghan lost a motion of no confidence, and Margaret Thatcher’s Conservatives were elected. Labour responded to losing that general election with severe criticism of the SNP, the party that Labourites saw as having caused both the downfall of a Labour Government, and the election of Thatcher’s Tories (Denver et al, 2000, McLean, 2005).
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Within the Conservative Party, although it was perhaps the form of devolution on offer (as introduced by Labour), rather than devolution itself that the majority of the party rejected, it did not take long before the 1979 referendum result was interpreted as an anti-devolution victory. Pro-devolution Conservatives became marginalised or retired, and the party took a hard-line anti-devolution stance under Thatcher. This made it ever-more clear to devolution supporters across all parties that co-operation was needed between those who advocated some form of home rule. However, the idea of Labour and the SNP co-operating on the home rule issue was hard for many to fathom, especially after the recent bitterness between the parties (Denver et al, 2000: 28). The lack of willingness of consecutive Thatcher Governments to seriously engage with the idea of legislative devolution, created an opportunity for Labour and the SNP to discursively construct the idea that self-government was required to protect public services in Scotland—particularly the NHS—against Thatcherism (a theme that has previously been discussed in previous chapters).
Class and identity: The (social) democratic consensus in Scotland
As established already, nation-building in Scotland is central to this thesis, but so, too, is Labour and SNP party ideology, as class and ideology is an important factor in understanding nation-building in Scotland. The period 1979–1999 is crucial in establishing an understanding of how and why national identity was constructed in certain ways by various political actors in Scotland, with regard to self-government, but with wider implications for the stability of the Union, too, and for the ideological development of party discourse in Scotland.
When the post-referendum period began in Scotland, it was class and national identity that were in conflict with one another. This was a continuation of the trend throughout the 1960s and 1970s, which was at least indicated by relations between Labour and the SNP; the party of the working class (as Labour was popularly known) and the party of Scottish independence and ‘separation’ from the UK, respectively. At least, that was how each was traditionally seen. However, consecutive Conservative Governments helped to alter this narrative, and a very different relationship developed between class and national identity in Scotland (Denver et al, 2000: 28), as indicated by the national discourse of Labour and the SNP (see part 2 of this chapter).
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Before the general election on 18 June 1970, the Conservative shadow cabinet decided that the next Conservative Government would be different from that of its predecessors, Harold Macmillan and Alec Douglas-Home. The way forward, they decided, was to break with consensus, and take an approach that included a more free-market emphasis, a tougher stance on welfare, a determination to ‘let so-called ‘lame ducks’ drown’, and a willingness to confront the power of the Trades Unions with the Industrial Relations Act (McLean, 2004: 42). Margaret Thatcher took these ideas on into her own Governments from 1979 to 1990, after she had replaced Edward Heath as Conservative leader in 1975. Thatcher was seen as a more determined champion of ‘new Toryism’ (ibid: 43, Mitchell, 1992). She wanted to take forward her ‘Thatcherite’ project of privatisation of public services, and a tough stance of welfare. This was characterised by classic liberal ideas about free market forces and the self-interested pursuit of individual wealth (Hall, 1988, Mitchell, 1992), ideas which are classified as ‘neoliberalism’ here.
Indeed, consecutive Conservative Governments during the 1980s were more determined to pursue a strategy of reining back what they saw as an ‘overly expansive and uncontrolled welfare state’ more vigorously than what had ever been experienced in post-war Europe (Alcock: 1990: 88). Thatcher’s leadership challenged and changed the political terrain in Scotland, and ideas about the free market and pursuit of welfare were embedded in ‘Thatcherite discourse’ (see Hall, 1988). As support of the Conservative Party declined in Scotland (certainly by 1987, except for a minor recovery in the 1992 general election), support for devolution rose and became the leading issue in Scottish political affairs (Denver et al, 2000: 28).As Scotland felt the effects of Thatcherism, Labour and the SNP challenged the Conservative Party through their national discourse by presenting themselves as being prepared to protect the welfare state in Scotland. It is plausible to argue, then, that Thatcherism had a dislocatory effect in Scottish politics, and within the national discourse of Labour and the SNP.
From Labour’s perspective, the association of devolution with a ‘radical interventionist economic policy’ gained traction in the party’s discourse. Labour began to argue that a separate Parliament could provide a democratic institution that would be both able and willing to pursue such an economic policy. The ‘alternative regional strategy’, an idea developed by the inner circle of the Labour Party, set the
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ball rolling for an attempt to reconcile social democratic policy with home rule (McLean, 2005). And as Scots increasingly believed that the Thatcher Government was imposing policies on Scotland that they did not want, especially economic and social security policy, Labour pushed the idea that a Scottish Assembly would be preferable having seen the policy decisions that the Conservative Government was making; decisions that labour firmly opposed. This came despite residual Labour suspicions of the SNP (Denver et al, 2000: 29–30).
The link between class and national identity in Scotland began to emerge more clearly during the 1983–1987 Parliament. The idea that Scotland was being treated as a guinea-pig for unpopular Conservative policies was developing (such as the ‘Poll Tax’), and the 1983 general election, where the Conservatives had a 3 per cent decrease in support, marked the beginning of a period of Conservative unpopularity in Scotland. Additionally, the threatened closure of steel factories in Scotland, for example, was met with public campaigns against the Conservative Government (ibid: 30). The closure of the Gartcosh and Ravenscraig steel plants were particularly drawn out affairs, and they were kept at the forefront of Scottish politics. Added to those closures, were the closures of Massey Ferguson in Kilmarnock, Coats Patons, Peugeot Talbot at Linwood, Hoover, and British Leyland. Those closures represented the ‘industrial revolution in reverse’, and signify what MacWhirter has termed ‘the supports of the Union…being kicked away one by one’ (2014: 203). This was much to the disadvantage of the Conservatives: ‘Scotland was collateral damage in Thatcher’s class war’ (ibid: 209). Labour and the SNP would ensure that voters knew about this development, and did so by structuring their national discourse around the idea that Thatcherism was ‘destroying’ the welfare state in Scotland.
Indeed, and of great significance to the constitutional debate, Labour, the Unions and the SNP all campaigned in protest against the closure of Scottish businesses and industries (Denver et al, 2000: 30). The campaign against the ‘Poll Tax’ would become significant here in the period after the 1987 general election, and led to an increased emphasis on the Scottish dimension, Home Rule, and constitutional reform (Hassan and Shaw, 2012: 36). The very public rejection of factory closures, as well as opposition to what was seen as proposals for an unfair ‘Poll Tax’, helped to reinforce anti-Tory sentiment, and although the Conservative Party won re-
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election in 1987, it took less than 25 per cent of the vote in Scotland, losing over half of its Scottish seats. This indicated an increasing dependence on ‘English votes’ by the Conservatives (Denver et al, 2000: 31).
In relation to nation-building specifically, Labour and the left-leaning section of the SNP had made conscious efforts to pin on the Tories an ‘anti-Scottish label’. When he was SNP vice-convenor for publicity, Alex Salmond had launched a campaign to ensure that the Tories were portrayed as being bad for Scotland, for example (Lynch, 2013). Denver et al (2000) have argued that this was an effective campaign by the SNP—which achieved some Labour support due to the links that were being made between class and national identity—as they argued that the Tories were not only class enemies, but enemies of Scotland. At this point, it should be remembered that Labour and the SNP were competing for the anti-Tory vote. So, although they both supported self-government, they did so differently through their national discourses, designed to build support for devolution and for independence, respectively.
Towards a second devolution referendum
The 1987 general election was indeed a political watershed in Scotland. The unpopularity of Thatcher’s Conservatives in Scotland was all too clear, and the reaction to the introduction of the ‘Poll Tax’ (a year earlier than the rest of the UK) encapsulated the resentment towards Thatcher and her Government. Indeed, Scottish politicians from all of the main parties, including some in the Conservative Party, found that decision to be morally outrageous (MacWhirter, 2014: 220). The right-leaning agenda that Thatcherism was interpreted to encompass, and the perceived anti-Scottish nature of Thatcher’s Governments (as constructed through the national discourse of Labour and the SNP), created a powerful tide against the Conservative Party in Scotland, and this led to Conservative rule lacking popular legitimacy to rule over the Scottish people (Denver et al: 31–32). Such an attitude was voiced throughout the 1980s, particularly by both Labour and the SNP. By 1987, class and national identity, which had once been at odds with one another in Scotland, were now ‘mutually reinforcing’ (ibid).
At around the same time, support for a Constitutional Convention was growing, with the left-Nationalist magazine Radical Scotland calling for such a convention in order
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to plan a strategy to respond to the continued rule of the Thatcher Government. At the heart of the Convention was to be a ‘Claim of Right’ to self-government. This was an attempt to repeat the success of the post-war Constitutional Convention and its National Convent, which two million Scots signed in 1951 (MacWhirter, 2014: 225) Being reduced to only ten Scottish seats put the Tories into a vulnerable position, but although Labour now had fifty seats, they, too, were put on the defensive (McLean, 2005). The SNP’s high profile mass civil disobedience campaign over issues related to the ‘Poll Tax’ saw Labour outflanked. Scottish Labour MPs were referred to and branded as ‘the feeble fifty’ as the political saliency of the ‘Poll Tax’ issue increased (Denver et al, 2000: 33). This indicates that major differences between Labour and the SNP still existed, despite both rejecting Conservative Government in Scotland, making the investigation of national discourse at the time particularly important. In 1980, the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (CSA) was established—a cross- party pressure group of home rule supporters. Ahead of the 1987 general election, Bob McLean, one of the CSA’s more active members, and a Labour Party member, made the suggestion that their focus must be on the ‘Doomsday Scenario’—the possibility of another Conservative Government (McLean, 2005). Furthermore, the term ‘no mandate’ was adopted—especially after the ‘Doomsday Scenario’ became reality—to signify the idea that Scotland no longer voted Conservative, and that ‘the Tories’ had no mandate to introduce unpopular policies in Scotland, such as the ‘Poll Tax’ (Mitchell, 2014: 227).
Significantly, the CSA issued the ‘Claim of Right for Scotland’ document in July 1988, which proposed the establishment of a Constitutional Convention to agree upon a settled notion and form of devolution and to implement the subsequent blueprint. Things were not straightforward for the CSA in driving forward a Constitutional Convention, and the existing tensions between Labour and the SNP played a part in making that the case. However, constitutional and socio-economic politics became intertwined during the late 1980s, and the Labour leadership responded in 1989 (McLean, 2005) by agreeing to participate in the Constitutional Convention after having considered proposals from a CSA committee. Labour agreed that it would be safer for the party to join Constitutional Convention and have a majority, rather than stay on the outside looking in (Denver et al, 2000: 33). Labour took time to warm to the idea of cross party support, therefore, despite being pro-
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home rule. Labour’s internal conflict over devolution was notably influenced by mistrust of the SNP, yet Labour did learn from past misgivings, and were aware that they were required to work with the SNP in order to achieve home rule. But for Labour, legislative devolution was as far as things should go (McClean, 2005). It should be noted how important John Smith’s role was in his short time as Labour leader (from 1992, until his untimely death in 1994), who ‘famously described the question of a Scottish Parliament as “unfinished business” and committed the party firmly to devolution for Scotland and Wales’ (Tomaney, 2000: 682). Although Smith’s successor, Tony Blair, was less enthusiastic about devolution, he described it an inevitable, and saw no reason to ride against the tide (McLean, 2005).
However, the SNP approached the idea of a Constitutional Convention, or at least a directly elected one, with trepidation. Labour’s dominance of the convention, the SNP feared, could have left the party’s new policy of ‘independence in Europe’ (a policy formed by Jim Sillars) vulnerable to attack. When the Convention was officially