Human affection and feeling

Epictetus believes that loving concern for others is inherent in (non-pathological cases of) human nature. He asserts that humans are by nature noble, have a sense of shame, and that it is our nature to subordinate pleasure to the virtuous performance of our social duties. Benevolent impulses, according to him, naturally override our desire for pleasure

... in the case of the human being (anthropos), it is not his material substance that we should honour, his bits of flesh, but the principal things (taproegoumena). What are these? The duties of citizenship, marriage, begetting children, reverence to god, care for parents, in a word, desire, avoidance, choice, refusal, the proper performance of each one of these acts, and that is, in

accordance with our nature. And what is our nature? To act as free people (eleuthervi), as noble, as self-respecting. Why, what other living being blushes, what other comprehends the impression of shame? And it is our nature to subordinate pleasure to these duties as their servant, their minister, so as to arouse our interest and keep us acting in accordance with nature. (3.7.25-8)

Here Epictetus infers from the empirical observation that only human beings blush and feel shame that our nature as human beings is to esteem the noble, respectable performance of all our human roles as citizens, spouses, parents, worshippers of god, children, etc. Because of our instinctive response to feel shame and blush when we know that we are acting disgracefully, he argues that respectable, virtuous action arises quite normally from our basic human nature. Thus he even asserts that it is in accordance with our human nature to subordinate pleasure to the proper performance of our social roles.9 Therefore, Epictetus reminds us that when abroad, the intention of the traveller who is just passing through is not to stay permanently at a nice inn and selfishly indulge in the amenities of a temporary lodging, but rather

... your plan (prothesis) is the other thing, to return to your country, to relieve the fear of your kinsmen, to do the duties of a citizen yourself, to marry, bring up children, hold the customary offices. For you did not come into the world to select unusually fine places, I expect, but to live and go about your business in the place where you were born and were enrolled as a citizen.

(2.23.38-9)

He asserts we are by nature born communitarian (phusei koinonikoi gegonamen) (2.20.13). Furthermore, since we do in fact have this natural fellowship (hoindnia), he urges that we ought by all means to guard it (2.20.8). In support of this assertion he cites the incon-sistency of Epicurus' actions. Epicurus denies that there is a natural fellowship among rational beings on the one hand, yet he exerts much effort writing books and trying to persuade people that he is right on the other hand (2.20.6-14). But if he believes what he

Haw does the Stoic love? 93 says, why should he worry about people being deceived about this matter and why would he bother to take pains on their account to try to set them straight? Now it may simply be a personal quirk that doing philosophy happens to give Epicurus pleasure.10 Yet Epictetus thinks Epicurus' actions in fact reveal his true (philan-thropic) sentiment, claiming that he becomes the advocate to denounce his own doctrines (2.20.16). So, were the Stoic to say that we should find satisfaction in doing the deeds required by our mutual relations, we could construe this 'should' both descriptively and normatively - descriptively, since it is both natural and normal for us to feel satisfaction in performing our proper social functions, and normatively since it is good, healthy, and thus rational for us to do so.

Elsewhere Epictetus claims the nature of human beings is 'gentle, and affectionate, and faithful' (4.1.126), and so he infers that family affection (to philostorgon) is in accordance with nature and good (kalon) and is compatible with what is reasonable (to eulogiston) (1.11.17-19). Moreover, he not only says that affection for our own children is a natural sentiment (1.23.3), but he even asserts 'once a child is born, it is no longer up to us not to love

(stergein) it or to care for it' (1.23.5).

Now this last assertion is very significant for Epictetus, since he is using his emblematic phrase 'not up to us.' Epictetus may mean that after a certain time, having bonded with the child, it is simply impossible for the normal parent not to be strongly and permanently positively disposed toward her child. An alter-native interpretation is that 'what we have at birth is instincts; this instinct does not come into play until we actually have offspring, but when we do, we do not have to learn to love them.'11 On this view, the Stoic's innate nature moves her to bond with and care for her own offspring. Moreover, this motivation is reaffirmed by her judgement (the recognition of her duty) to so act. She acts on her rational decision and in accord with her natural inclination. This nurturant love for her child is so strong that the normal parent is incapable of suppressing it even if she wanted to.

The Stoic cannot feel indifferent about her child, because it is not possible for a human being absolutely to lose the affections of

a human being (tas kineseis tas anthropikas) (2.20.19). On Epictetus' conception of human psychology, the child abuser would be a pathological aberration of nature. The mother who beats her child would be acting contrary to (her maternal) nature, on the Stoic account.

Epictetus holds not only that we are by nature social beings (1.23.1), but that we have a natural sense of self-respect, fidelity, affection, helpfulness, and of keeping our hands off one another

(2.10.22-3). He sees all of these as natural human sentiments, but he also believes that Stoicism works to strengthen them since upon completing their Stoic education people ought to be ' ready to help one another' (3.21.9). Consequently, beneficent conduct toward one's fellows is both in the Stoic's self-interest (since it is required by the virtues needed for a sound prohairesis) and so rational to choose, and it normally stems directly from our human nature.

Epictetus reasons as follows. A thing is faring badly when it acts contrary to its own nature. What then is the nature of human beings? To bite, and kick, and throw into prison, and behead?

No, but to do good, to work together, and to pray for the success of others. Therefore, he is faring badly, whether you will or no, when he acts unfeelingly' (4.1.121-2). Epictetus' optimistic view is that animosity and hostility are contrary to human nature. To act belligerently toward other people is to act contrary to one's own human nature and thus to fare badly. But the Stoic acts according to human nature not just in refraining from harming others, but also in caring about and feeling for them. Epictetus argues that the Stoic is not, therefore, nor ought he to be utterly impassive, since it would be contrary to his nature as a human being, 'for I ought not to be unfeeling (apathe) like a statue, but should maintain my relations, both natural and acquired, as a pious person, as son, as brother, as father, as citizen' (3.2.4).

The picture of the Stoic's attitude toward others that has emerged is this. Since she defines her own good as one and the same as the noble, the honorable, and the just, the preservation of her natural and acquired relations becomes necessary for keeping her volition in a healthy state, i.e. in a state in accord with nature's norm. Thus virtuous conduct toward others is required for her own intellectual

How does the Stoic love? 95 self-preservation and eudaimonia. Moreover, that she is not a statue since she is also instinctively affectionate, gentle, faithful, helpful, and loving, and so is drawn to fulfill all her social, familial, and civic roles is a sign of what is natural, i.e. healthy and normal.

Nonetheless, she must not let her feelings for others disrupt her mental serenity, for

... the work of philosophy is ... that each person passes his life to himself, free from pain, fear, and perturbation, at the same time maintaining with his associates both the natural and acquired relationships, those namely of son, father, brother, citizen, husband, wife, neighbour, fellow-traveller, ruler, and subject. (2.14.8)

But how can the Stoic maintain her relationships with other people without being unfeeling, and yet without becoming upset when those she loves suffer or are lost? It is not up to her not to love her children; yet how can she love them without also feeling pain when they are hurt?

In order to resolve this dilemma we must first distinguish between the natural feelings that the Stoic has (affection, gentleness, helpfulness, etc.) that are entirely positive, and the feelings that disrupt her mental serenity. From the Stoic's perspective, when one's child dies, grief is not natural in the sense of appropriate, it is natural in the sense of typical, that is, typical of non-Stoics.

Epictetus has said that family affection (tophilostorgon) and fondness (sterktikon) are natural human feelings, and so Epictetus does not consider them to be 'passions' (pathe). The Stoic is not supposed to be devoid of these natural, positive feelings, which Epictetus evidently would include among the classic eupatheiai of orthodox Stoicism, namely joy/delight {chard), caution (eidabeia) and wishing (boulesis); the Stoic is devoid only of the overly intense emotions or passions which destroy her ataraxia, euroia, and apatheia.12 We could say, then, that the Stoic is passionless but not unfeeling.

Epictetus holds that only (Stoic) philosophy in fact can produce in us peace from ems (sexual passion), sorrow, envy, and other passions (3.13.10). Thus, as Bonhoffer correctly observes, Epictetus

agrees with the early Stoa in rejecting the sexual eros as pathos: 'Eros is therefore here interpreted as an emotion disturbing inner peace and true happiness.'18

A short digression on the eupatheiai may be instructive here. The eupatheiai are importantly but subdy different than the disturbing pathe. For example, the Stoic experiences chara about her choices.

She is delighted about her proper functioning, but generally her functioning is toward an external. Thus it will be directed toward having successfully achieved some external. The lover, for example, delights in the success of her loved one by virtue of being related to him. Consequently, the familiarization with one's beloved is the source of one's chara.

As we have already seen (in Chapter 2, section A and elsewhere), Epictetus often stresses the importance of maintaining caution

(eulabeia) and carefulness (epimeleia) in dealing with phantasiai Caution and carefulness manifest reasonable concern, in contrast to the irrational pathe of worry and nervousness.

The third 'good-feeling' is boulesis. This is the (rational) wanting of something as good. It is a desire for the continuation and expression of one's internal (virtuous) states, and that entails desires for externals because it is in this secondary desire that the primary desire of boulesis consists. The hungry Stoic is wanting (boulesis) her own wanting (hormeas kathekon) of food. The primary object of her wanting is thus her perfect way of wanting. The secondary object of her wanting is the food. The pleasant sensations of eating the food are not the same as the delight in those sensations. The latter constitutes a, pathos for the Stoics, though the former, the titillation of the palate, does not.

Now to return to the question at hand: how does the Stoic love others in a way that does not leave her open to emotional distress and inner disquietude? In other words, how does the Stoic love others without letting her love become a pathos?

How does the Stoic love? 97