Human Capital as Orientalist Discourse

In fact, the work of those such as Fanon, Said and Wallerstein make clear that knowledge has always been intimately related to power and a part of colonialism. For example, two empires: the British and the French were both rivals and allies who generated knowledge about the world that justified their dominant positions within it (Dixon, 2001; and Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995). They encountered each other and the orient with the greatest intensity, familiarity and complexity, to either monopolize or share it. What they shared by military force was not only land, goals, profit or rules it was the kind of intellectual power „knowledge/information‟ over the subaltern populations and their sense of identity. The strong desire for colonial expansion in Britain and France was intimately related to the ideas and information that Orientalist‟s had produced. Orientalist‟s and their writing played a vital role in the construction of the desire amongst European peoples to colonise the orient. These writings were the only helpful way to achieve extensive desire of colonialism such as the press campaigns that happened in Paris in France 1914, or the several commissions that happened in England, and the famous Committee which was chaired by Mark Sykes and George Picot in 1927. As a result, the Orient was geographically divided between the two parties by "mutual force" of the world at that time (Said, 1987).

Since the First World War, America (USA) has replaced Britain and France as the most powerful nation both militarily and in terms of the production of Orientalist discourses through its vast university and think-tank infrastructure (Said, 1994a; Wallerstein, 2001). Thus, the USA “successfully” took the place of the European powers by the use of military force, technology, information, the production of knowledge and ultimately through its hegemonic place in the expanding capitalist world (Said, 1994a, Wallerstein, 2001 and 2006). This is an important point because, as Wallerstein noted, there are three main ideas that corroborate this idea of the superiority of Western knowledge over that of the non-Western world. These are: “the right of those who believe they hold universal values to intervene

against the barbarians; the essentialist particularism of Orientalism; and scientific universalism‖ (Wallerstein, 2006: 71). Human capital is a part of this Western process of

exercising power through the dissemination of developmental policy-based knowledge, which places significant constraints upon the autonomy of those in the periphery and semi- periphery. Wallerstein (2006:72) added that:

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“If one looks at the arguments encrusted in the various doctrines that were put forth, they

always ended up by seeking to demonstrate the inherent superiority of the powerful. And from this inherent superiority, these doctrines derived not merely the capacity to dominate but the moral justification of their domination”.

So, there is a problem for any states and peoples in the semi-periphery and periphery of the world-system adopting such concepts and strategic goals as the promotion of human capital because they are not simply neutral scientific concepts but part of a broader Orientalist discourse that helps to underpin the power of the core states in the MOWS. For example, I asked Dr, Husain Al Ajeli45 the coordinator of learning English language project at Libyan universities, if he thinks that Libyan government changes its position on ELA amongst its students because of Western power. He answered:

“The demand for English language skills nowadays hasn‘t left any authority or

autonomy for us as government. We have no choice now but to prioritise English language training and skills. Whatever we thought before about the dangers of colonial languages has been overturned and English is simply a tool by which we can develop our country‖

The acquisition of English language skills raises both advantages and disadvantages for the Libyan people; it is not simply one thing or the other. The power/knowledge relationship that it entails is there and cannot be ignored as it is more insidious than older forms of colonialism. This factor, the acceptance of the legitimacy of such ideas as human and social capital, never happened within the old form of Western power and its brutal military colonialism (Said, 1987; Boulding, 1999; Stoler;46 2002; & Wallerstein, 2006). Nonetheless given the interdependent nature of the advantages and disadvantages that ELA in particular and human capital development in general can potentially bring to a country such as Libya it

45 _{Interview with Mr, Husain Al Ajeli the coordinator of learning English language project at Libyan universities at the} language centre in Al-Fateh University in 04/05/2009.

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means that there are always strategic and relational possibilities for the Libyan government and people to try to use these ideas to their own advantage.

The promotion of policies advocating the development of human capital, then, have become a means by which the core has been able to exert new forms of control over the periphery and semi-periphery and in the process this has tended to help drain the non-Western world of its skilled population whilst marginalising its unskilled. For instance, Germany has changed its immigration policies in order to achieve its high level of its investment in human capital, by stipulating that only skilled migrants will be allowed to enter the country on a permanent basis (Desai, et al, 2001). Thus human capital becomes a form of power/knowledge in line with Said and Wallerstein‟s ideas, allowing the states of the core to use the peoples of the periphery and semi-periphery as a source of cheap, skilled, migrant labour. This usage of migrants as skilled (and also unskilled) workers provided expertise and helped the developed nations for example to succeed in its IT sector in 1990s. For example the success of the United States IT sector during the 1990s and till now is due to its implementation of the H1B47 program towards the developing countries immigrants and workers (Saxenian, 1999 cited in Desai, 2001). Desai (2001) stated that the H1B program has led European countries like Germany to change their immigration policies where the Germany's Interior Minister Otto Schily argued that, “There‘s competition among the industrialized countries for the best

minds. That's why we have to direct our immigration law more strongly toward our own economic interests". Desai (2001: 08) assured that “countries are becoming more skill- focused as they compete in the market for migrants‖. It appears that it does not matter from

where those "migrants” human resources come, as long as they are well educated and skilled, as long as they possess the necessary „human capital‟. What human capital promotes is the capacity of people to work and produce wealth for capitalists, not to control it for themselves. The measure of one‟s human capital, in practice, helps to categorise and regulate the job market in any country. It becomes a means of evaluating the worth of an individual, not in moral terms but in terms of their capacity to produce wealth primarily for capitalists.

47 _{H1B visas are indented for “professionals” in a “specialty occupation”. This means also an IMC intending to pursue a} residency program in the United States with an H1B visa needs to clear all three USMLE Steps before becoming eligible for the H1B.

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4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has concentrated on the concept of human capital, its origins and problematic place in Libyan developmental strategies since 2004. In so doing it also examined its relationship to social capital in order to differentiate it where possible. The Libyan governments‟ planned education systems and policies aspire to play a significant role in creating and developing these skills and to enable Libyan society to achieve rapid social- economic growth. As has been shown, however, this is not a risk-free strategy as the concept of human capital is inherently bound up with what Said and Wallerstein have called Orientalist discourses, knowledge that is embedded in the MOWS. In particular, examples have been given from the experiences of Libyan institutions, postgraduate students and employees in order to set out the kind of problems and opportunities that Libya faces in embracing these ideas. The Libyan Postgraduate students mostly agreed that they are in dire need of English language skills in order to enhance Libyan development and their own job prospects. Globally, investing in human capital („skilled people‟) itself a form of power/knowledge has become the dominant requirement for those in the periphery and semi- periphery in their developmental strategies, in particular, to attract investment from the Core and powerful parts of the semi-periphery such as the CRIB bloc and ultimately to deepen integration into the global economy. In this context, the Libyan government has introduced strategies to develop its human capital as to integrate itself in the global economic system. A dilemma remains, however, that it may not be possible for Libya to simply catch-up with these major states in the semi-periphery, that Libya‟s specific historical position in the world- system and its economic dependency and vulnerability mean that it lacks the qualities that have enabled the CRIB countries to grow rapidly (large domestic population and demand for goods and services, diverse supply of resources). Indeed this point has been made by Alan and Shahid (2007:12) who confirmed that:

"The prodigious growth in the number of graduates in China and India presages a

significant increase in the giants‘ shares of world skills and, hence, changes in their comparative advantages".

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The comparative advantage of the CRIB economies far outreaches that of Libya, however. That said, given its strategic goals, the Libyan government is committed to believing that this is not necessarily the case, of making use of its resources to achieve its developmental goals.

In theoretical terms this chapter has set out the ideas behind human capital, a prominent concept within contemporary neo-liberal discourse. It has argued that Libya‟s embrace of neo-liberalism and abandonment of an authoritarian state-led model of development is part of this cultural process of opening up to the West and to the global economy. The consequences of this are that the Libyan state will lose much of its direct control over the economy, further undermining its ability to act in the manner of a developmental state. More broadly though it also opens up the opportunity for generations of Libyans to engage with and travel to Western countries in order to learn English and perhaps to work. This will have profound effects on the legitimacy of the Libyan government as the development of a bourgeoisie, as Barrington Moore famously noted, tends to lead to democracy as a bourgeois class asserts their social political and economic rights (Moore, 1968). The extent to which the current Libyan regime can adapt to and accept this remains to be seen but it is a direct consequence of its new policies of cultural (global English) and economic integration in the MOWS.

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Chapter 5: Libya in the MOWS: Promoting Human Capital as a part of the „New