Human security debates

In the context of global climate change, the human security problems coming from disasters are obvious downside risks, indicating that the safety and normal routine of daily life in many countries are disturbed by disaster than armed conflicts (Bacon and Hobson 2014b; Purvis and Busby 2004). In the definition of the Canadian government, human security means ‘freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, safety or lives’ (UNESCO 2008, p.xx). While the UNDP and Japanese references to human security emphasize security from fear and want, the Canadian focus is on life- threatening threats and situations that constitute fear (Konrad 2006). The Canadian

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approach is viewed as a narrower interpretation of human security, preventing physical violence and protecting civil rights only (Hobson 2014; Ewan 2007). The rule of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is primarily a tool that is developed out of the narrow version of human security according to the Outcome Document of the 2005 United Nations World Summit and the Secretary-General’s 2009 Report (A/63/677) (UNGA 2009).

In the R2P principle, the UN recognized that the state carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. If a state is obviously failing to protect its population, the international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect the population, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (UNSC 2015). Hubbard et al. (2011) argue that the human security approach in R2P can be misunderstood by some countries as justification for intervention. Moreover, R2P can only handle cases of human security in the form of threats of violence. As ‘R2P still requires state-based and supranational response’, it contrasts with a more holistic human security approach that brings engagement with multiple stakeholders including individual citizens, NGOs and all levels of government (p.338).

The Canadian approach and the Norwegian approach, which also favors protection of civil rights as an action of human security (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007), and the UN Trust Fund for Human Security expand the principle of human security in policy making that aims ‘to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment’ (UNTFHS 2009, p.5). It is noted that the limiting of human security to a narrower definition such as freedom from war or conflict is possible, yet does not reflect the yearning of people for security not only from the perspective of freedom from fear but also freedom from want (Acharya 2001). However, there has been criticism for taking extensive fields of people-related issues, which Buzan calls ‘normal politics’ into the security agenda (Buzan 2004; Krause 1998; Mack 2004; MacFarlane and Khong 2006). Buzan (2004) rejects the idea of securitizing social and political issues as human security claiming that ‘The idea also risks mixing up the quite different agendas of international security, on the one hand, and social security and civil liberties’ (p.370). Critics also pointed to the vagueness of

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the concept and its applicability to the policy realm (Ewan 2007; James 2014). An influential work by MacFarlane and Khong (2006) also criticizes the purpose of the human security concept for its applicability:

Analysts who have examined the effectiveness of this instrumental use of the notion are doubtful whether it has been successful in persuading states to divert significant resources from military security to items associated with human security. (p.236)

When MacFarlane and Khong (2006) stressed the possible pitfalls of the human security concept, they pointed out that the concept extends to almost every threat that can undermine the wellbeing of the individual citizen, and it is likely that stakeholders will pick up the wrong priority among many other items calling for attention. Prioritizing the right issue at the right time is not easy, especially when all the threats may also mutually interact and create a series of complex outcomes when their causes and effects ‘lump’ together (MacFarlane and Khong 2006, p.241). They also argue that military measures will be installed everywhere if too many issues are put into a security platform (MacFarlane and Khong 2006).

The UN ruled out the potential of problem-solving for every human security issue with arms by clarifying the meaning of the human security approach in October 2012. Articles (c) and (d) of Resolution (66/290) of the General Assembly of the UN described the meaning of human security as:

(c) Human security recognizes the interlinkages between peace, development and human rights, and equally considers civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights

(d) The notion of human security is distinct from the responsibility to protect and its implementation

(e) Human security does not entail the threat or the use of force or coercive measures. Human security does not replace State security. (UNGA 2012, p.2)

The critics of MacFarlane and Khong (2006) have also been counterchallenged by several proponents of human security (Owen 2014; Gasper 2010). Owen (2014) counterclaims that these two authors’ proposal is to defend the place of old-fashioned (state) security studies:

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They aim to reserve the term ‘protection’ only for the protection of life against violent attack, as if protection of health, and protection of anything else against anything else, is not ‘protection’. Security claims are claims of existential threat, meant to justify priority response. Attempts to limit such prioritization to one type of threat, such as threats of physical damage from physical violence, and/or one type of referent/target such as the state, are arbitrary. (Owen 2014, p.34)

After two decades of debate on conceptualizations of human security, a few authors have attempted to clarify the human security concept for applicability purposes by putting more emphasis on its protection-based policy orientation (James 2014; Owen 2014). Owen (2014) distinguished human security from ‘neighboring concepts’ such as human development and human rights. He also proposed that a broad definition that is used by the UN is the best so far for conceptual integrity but a new definition is also needed for policy relevance. His new definition of human security is ‘the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive environmental, economic, food, health, personal and political threats’ (Owen 2014, p.63). James (2014) defined human security in the context of disaster risk reduction policy, emphasizing˗ ‘the sustainable protection and provision of the material conditions for meeting the embodied needs of people, and the protection of the variable existential conditions for maintaining a dignified life’ (p.87).

Thomas (2000) agrees with this comprehensive approach in the pursuit of human security. The material needs of people such as food, shelter, education and healthcare must to be fulfilled but the non-material aspects of human security are not negligible. She insists,

The qualitative aspect of human security is about the achievement of human dignity which incorporates personal autonomy, control over one’s life and unhindered participation in the life of the community. Emancipation from oppressive power structures, be they global, national or local in origin and scope, is necessary for human security. (Thomas 2000, p.6)

Human security in this broader scope has a three-dimensional agenda as it encompasses security, development, and rights that are essential points in protecting individual human life and dignity (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007; UNTFHS 2009).

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