intemational attempt at alleviation. Gorbachev’s definition of global problems, as presented in a speech in Prague in April 1987, was rather broad, including AIDS, terrorism, crime, drug addiction, underdevelopment, pollution and the threat of war.20 The new priority accorded to these areas of concern has affected Moscow’s approach to security, as discussed later in this chapter and in Chapter Two. This new ‘global’ approach to foreign policy was symbolic of the greater importance attached to the effect of pohcies on the world at large; Eduard Shevardnadze (then Soviet Foreign Minister) openly stressed the need ‘to correlate public opinion (in the West) with the foreign policy actions planned (by the USSR)’.C l e a r l y , this swing towards the Westemizers’ pole of foreign policy went much further than during any other period of Soviet government, and had irreversible implications.
The change both in the perception of Westem Europe and of its relation to Russia, and in the approach to information and censorship, became irrefutable. There was a gradual but overwhelming tendency in Soviet specialist writing, fi*om 1985 until the beginning of the 1990s, to emphasize the high levels of cooperation and understanding between the peoples of both sides of Europe. One commentator stressed Europe’s common cultural heritage, and realization of the horrors of war, fi’om the raids of Attila’s Huns to the devastation of the Second World War.22 The historians lu. Borko and B. Orlov pointed out that firom the end of the seventeenth century, Russia started actively participating in many aspects of European life. Both these historians agreed that after decades of self isolation, the Soviet Union was left with catching-up to do, both materially and morally. In their opinion, isolation during the Renaissance and Reformation periods may have been at the root of the violence and intolerance of Soviet mass
20 Stephen Shenfield, op. cit., p. 63.
21 Gerhard Wettig, Changes in Soviet Policy Towards the West, London, 1991, p. 16.
22 A. Grigoryants, ‘Europe — Our Conunon Home’, Intemational Affairs, Moscow, no. 4, 1986, p. 81.
culture in the 1980s.23 It was regularly stated that the Soviets share with Westem Europe a particular attachment to détente, due to their similar geographical situation and experience of war.
At least until the end of the 1980s, opinions on foreign policy included in academic journals such as MEMO and New Times could be expected to have support in at least part of the Central Committee, or else high up in MID. Although strongly pro-Westem and anti-isolationist articles did not necessarily reflect the view of the relevant decision-makers, they did show the dichotomy which was by then present within the various foreign policy-determining organs of Soviet government. Writing for the sake of trath and academic debate did not start until the tum of the 1980s, at least in such established joumals; until then, the views therein were bound to be shared by some influential cadres. A more diverse array of opinions was being printed in the second half of the 1980s, often offering contradictory opinions and suggestions, because this reflected the clash of opinions which reigned in foreign policy-determing bodies. The mere fact that conflicting information could be published reflected Gorbachev’s readiness to widen the debate on foreign policy. This put the Foreign Ministry in a relatively strong position, where it could use its greater knowledge and expertise. At the same time, the Central Committee’s Intemational Department became less influential.^^ This change in itself made Soviet foreign policy decision-making more similar to the equivalent process in Westem Europe, and more influenced by Westernizing tendencies. It would be wrong to say that unanimity had always reigned in the higher echelons of Soviet power in the past; straggles had often taken place. As Peter Shearman explains.
Leadership in the USSR was personalized, and in order to build authority and power individuals needed to formulate programs
lu. Borko and B. Orlov (dialogue), ‘Chto nam stoit obshcheevropeiskii dom postroit’, MEMO,
no. 1, 1990, pp. 50-51.
Neil Malcolm, "Russian Foreign Policy Decision-Making’ in Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990, ed. Peter Shearman, Boulder, 1995, p. 25.
The Russian vision o f Europe
identified with themselves that would appeal to a winning coalition in the Politburo and Central Committee of the CPSU.^^
The difference now was that the debate, in fact the lobbying process itself, was made more open to the public. This was to be even more the case in the 1990s.
Turning back to the intellectuals in the last years of the Soviet era, the predominating opinion was that the artificial barriers between East and West served no useful purpose, and that it was time to stop seeing Europe as divided between socialism and capitalism. According to Orlov, the Soviets had not reached socialism or even come close to its high levels of morality and humanism, whilst the West had gone past capitalism, its working class no longer being exploited, its democracy no longer serving only the middle classes, and it having now developed an ‘embryonic’ level of social justice.^^ Also reducing the divide between the two sides of Europe was a willingness by the Soviet Union to acknowledge its diminished intemational political status. This new-found modesty was prompted by the belief that to appear threatening was simply no longer affordable, not only because of the amount of resources having to be poured into the military sector, but also because of the lost trading opportunities. The head of IMEMO’s (the Institute of the World Economy and Intemational Relations) West European Department wrote that Moscow hoped to fulfill its new primary aim in foreign policy, which was to integrate itself more tightly into the intemational community, by going through the ‘European window’. This could only be possible if Europe did not feel threatened by the Soviet Union.^^
Such concem to reduce West European apprehension about the Soviet Union was clearly echoed by Gorbachev’s government, and represented a vital development in Soviet European policy; previously, argued Adam Ulam and Hannes Adomeit, even when Moscow was trying to achieve fiiendlier terms with the West Europeans, there was still a tendency to resort to threats regarding the
Peter Shearman, 1995(i), op. cit., p. 17. lu. Borko and B. Orlov, op. cit., p. 56.
Vladimir Georgievich Baranovskii, ‘Evropa: formirovanie novoi mezhdunarodno-politicheskoi sistemy’, MEMO, no. 9,1990, p. 9.
consequences of non-cooperation.^^ The Kremlin under Gorbachev instead swallowed its pride and sought a smooth, friendly relationship with Europe.
An important aspect of this new perception of the relationship with Westem Europe was the much-talked-about ‘Common European Home’. This concept was very nebulous, however, and understood in various ways by various people at different times. This is a predictable problem, partly because, as Orlov and Borko point out, the notion of ‘home’ has different meanings to different nationalities, be it a tent, a mud hut, an old wooden cottage or a gigantic concrete apartment bloc. This may help to explain why attempts to find all-embracing definitions became rather vague, for example: ‘Home is a place where you are understood, and you understand others, where residents show an interest in each other, and where an atmosphere of accord and spirituality surrounds them’;^^ or Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskii declaring that the establishment of a Common European Home would support Kantian principles of intemational relations, ‘discarding stereotypes of disunity as it shapes a new system of human relations on the principles of non-violence, solidarity and c o o p e r a t i o n ’ . Although the concept of the Common Home was included in the majority of articles on relations with Europe in the late 1980s, there were few attempts made to clarify what institutions and/or measures the Soviets would have liked to see holding this home together.
It is not without reason that the concept of a ‘Common European Home’ came to be heard less and less; although it was initially a major component in Gorbachev’s new approach to Westem Europe, the subjectivity of the term, and the discord over what the new home should or could look like, eroded the support for this slogan for a new Europe. Alex Pravda has suggested that the need for constant shifts in the Common Home ideal stemmed from the fact that the Common European Home was conceived as some sort of scaffolding, bridging the
See for example Adam Ulam, ‘Europe in Soviet Eyes’, Problems o f Communism, May-June 1983, p. 29.
lu. Borko and B. Orlov, op. cit., p. 49.
Neil Malcolm, 1994(i), op. cit., p. 160; taken from Intemational Affairs, Moscow, March 1991.
The Russian Msion of Europe
38