Humanism Constructionism

A humanist - constructionist or interpretive approach to the study of the social world has often been set in contrast to that of a positivist - objectivist or realist-oriented social science approach (Bryman, 2008a). The proposition that society may be seen as a set of definitions and meanings other than just empirically observable and testable phenomena -- "a social construction rather than simply a social given" (McQuail, 1987, p. 7) -- has been suggested as an alternative position to that of the tradition more closely associated with the natural and physical sciences. Such an approach to social science holds the view that social reality and the social world can be considered a product of human symbolic activity and interpretation, and the subjective experience of social actors constitutes what can be considered as sensible 'social facts'. In other words, the approach suggests that "[m]uch of the record of human culture is, in fact, the interpretation of experience and giving of significance, hence, order and predictability ... [m]uch of art, religion, politics, philosophy and even science is essentially an interpretative activity which provides a framework within which sense can be made" (McQuail, 1987, p. 7).

The humanist and constructionist orientation to social science embodies a methodology which considers social actors and social events as syntheses of values and value systems. Instead of strong attention given to the verification and systematisation of empirical data, or to the measurement of phenomena, it has been suggested that such an orientation is supposedly more focused on the discovery of meaning, and on the presupposition that the linkage between social phenomena is normative as well as causal (Dawson, 1985); that is, people's experiences and knowledge of the world, for example, are assumed to involve not only the element of 'objectivity', but also the elements of 'subjectivity' and 'inter-subjectivity'. Davidson (2001, p. xiii) explained these elements and wrote that:

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First person knowledge is distinguished by the fact that we can legitimately claim a unique sort of authority [or rather, a normative 'right' to claim authority] with respect to what we believe, want, intend, and some other attitudes. Second person knowledge and knowledge of the rest of the world of nature do not have this authority, but they differ from each other in that our knowledge of other minds is normative in a way the latter is not. All three varieties of knowledge are, however, objective in the sense that their truth is independent of their being believed to be true ... All our knowledge is also objective in the sense that it could for the most part be expressed by concepts which have a place in a publicly shared scheme of things.

The ways of analysing social phenomena in the humanist - constructionist tradition draw much from the work of Znaniecki (1934) who proposed the use of analytic induction -- a method of social research founded on phenomenological criteria which emphasises description and comprehension rather than logical extension (Halas, 2001). Znaniecki (1934, p. 250) argued that:

[W]hile both forms of induction tend to reach general and abstract truths concerning particular and concrete data, enumerative induction abstracts by generalising, whereas analytic induction generalises by abstracting. The former looks in many cases for characters that are similar and abstracts them conceptually because of their generality, presuming that they must be essential to each particular case ... the latter abstracts from the given concrete case characters that are essential to it and generalises them, presuming that in so far as essential, they must be similar in many cases.

Halas (2001) observed that Znaniecki's humanist approach to social science holds five main general assumptions. First, there is the assumption that human thought is united with social reality; that is, there is a connection between human experience and human thought, and a possible unity between reflection and experience. Second, society is dynamic and subject to change. Third, all images of the social world have a relative character; which is to say that people construct individual as well as collective ideas, values and cognitive images of society. Fourth, values used in the description of social reality are not necessarily characteristics that reside in social situations and objects, but rather, are characteristics that are assigned to them by people. And fifth, all reality, social or otherwise, is permeated with culture, and because of this, it may be unwise to subordinate scholarly interests in culture to the methods of the natural and physical sciences, or to set one in direct opposition to the other.

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As with positivism - objectivism - realism, there have been issues raised over a humanist - constructionist- interpretive approach to social science. Problems associated with suggestions of cognitive and cultural relativism have been one of the main challenges raised. Sokal and Bricmont (1998, p. 1), for example, argued against "an intellectual current characterised by ... theoretical discourses disconnected from any empirical test, and by a cognitive and cultural relativism that regards science as nothing more than a narration, a myth, or a social construction, among many others". Hacking (1999) suggested that although the constructionist approach may have raised significant points with regard to issues of 'contingency', 'nominalism', and the 'stability' of social scientific explanations, there is a lack of consistency with how the term 'social construction' has been used. He also argued that the question of what it is that social scientists consider to be socially constructed needs to be addressed (Hacking, 1999). Other scholars have also commented on the danger of social reductionism -- "i.e., of eliminating anything other than social causes from ... analyses" (Irwin, 2005, p. 215). Dickens (1996, p. 72), for instance, commented that "the fact that knowledge is socially constituted does not entail that knowledge is only socially constituted". Notwithstanding the apparent significant differences between a positivist – objectivist and/or realist – empiricist orientation and that of a humanist – constructionist – interpretive one, many scholars and writers have suggested that such theoretical contrasts, and the ensuing long-standing debates associated with them, should not constrain the ways in which research in the social sciences should be approached. For instance, Beck (1999, p. 134) argued that "realism and constructivism [are] neither an either - or option, nor a mere matter of belief ... [and we] should not have to swear allegiance to any particular view or theoretical perspective. The decision whether to take a realist or a constructivist approach is ... a rather pragmatic one, a matter of choosing the appropriate means for a desired goal". Notwithstanding that pragmatism also has its own share of critics, perhaps the more crucial issue for social scientific research is finding a balance between the need for theories and methods in the social sciences to remain highly disciplined and empirical, and the need for having some allowance and some room for the growth of the social imagination; that is, "the capacity to range from the most impersonal and remote transformations to the most intimate features of the human self -- and to see the relations between the two" (Mills, 1959, p. 7). On the importance of social imagination, Blumer (1954, p. 3) observed almost sixty years ago that "in every society, particularly in a changing society, there is a need for meaningful clarification of basic social values, social institutions, modes of living and social relations".

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He argued that "this cannot be met by empirical science [alone], even though some help may be gained from analysis made by empirical science", and that "its effective fulfilment requires a sensitivity to new dispositions and an appreciation of new lines along which social life may take shape (Blumer, 1954, p. 3). More recently, researchers such as Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis (2002) similarly argued that imaginative inquiry is a good counterbalance to the pursuit of reliable factual data.