Janine O’Flynn
12.1 Hybridity: Wrestling with the Beast
Hybridity is nothing new. Public management scholars have become increasingly interested in the idea – as is evidenced by the collection of studies here – however, this is not the first wave of hybridity studies in our field. The authors here draw out a fascinating range of theoretical and practical tensions and questions through their exploration of the links between hybridity and smarter governance. In doing so, they also provoke many new (and old) questions that we need to explore to develop our understanding of hybridity. It is also important that we start to get much more connected to rich interdisciplinary literature that can help our field to advance our understanding of hybridity.
Hybrids have been described in many ways – as mixes, something in between or neither one nor the other. For sociologist Heydebrand (1989) hybrids are the interpenetration of markets and hierarchies; for economist Williamson (1979) they are neither one nor the other but rather an intermediate form that combines aspects of both. Williamson (1991) described how forms such as long-term contract- ing, reciprocal trading, regulation and franchising were all examples of hybrid governance (Williamson, 1991). Hybrids, he argued, sacrifice some advantage of markets and hierarchies in these more intermedi- ate forms. In management and organizational studies, writers such as Ouchi (1980) explored neither one nor the other idea, which developed into his concept of clannish governance approaches – neither markets nor hierarchies but perhaps networks; this idea served as an inspira- tion for a generation of network scholars.
Amid the market-based reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, scholars studying the transformation of public services drew on ideas of hybridity to help them explain and describe how governance forms were changing. More market-like practices were emerging, but hier- archies (and bureaucracies) remained steadfast, producing a range of tensions in these new ways of governing. When the balance of the market-hierarchy mix tipped towards markets, Menard (1995) argued that quasi-markets developed. And work by Vincent-Jones (1997) drew out in much more detail the various forms of hybrids that were emerging, especially in studies of reforms in local government in the UK, where he made the case that quasi-markets were a peculiar form of hybrid.
Hybridity has long lineage we can engage in. And we do need to engage much more with the rich strands of thought from other disciplines and look back and reflect on some of the early work on hybridity that emerged as large-scale, even paradigmatic, changes took place in the practice of public management.
12.2 Hybridity and Complexity
In this collection, the authors deploy hybridity to explore com- plex, sometimes wicked problems. These examples illuminate the increasingly hybrid nature of how we practice the craft of governing. The authors draw out the potential for hybrid forms to help in address- ing the challenges – hybrids as the smart solution. But need hybridity be so intimately linked with complexity? Could hybrid forms also be smart solutions to simple problems? Contingency and working out what works, and when, seems to be an important part of the age of hybridity.
It may also be the case that when hybridity and complexity meet, we create new problems, or exacerbate existing ones. This is not because we have dumb rather than smart solutions but because the complexity of hybrids themselves can mask toxic dynamics that can emerge when markets and hierarchies meet. Here we need to look to what emerges when we get the worst of both worlds, not the best. Koppenjan, Termeer and Karré in their introduction to this collection note that hybrids may become “destructive and counterproductive” (Chapter 1). In their concluding chapter, they also note that hybrids
are not just magical marriages but may also be monstrous combina- tions (see Chapter 13).
My forthcoming work on ‘markets for misery’ shines a spotlight on these points, especially the claim that hybridity can combine the worst aspects into governance approaches that are neither smart nor solutions but that are catastrophic in their effects (O’Flynn, forth- coming). This is especially the case when we move into some of the most complex, wicked problems confronting societies. In areas of extreme misery and misfortune such as irregular migration (bor- ders and detention) and justice (prisons and probation), I argue that not only do hybrid forms enable exploitation but that they give rise to acute and pressing moral dilemmas. This is because they join together the forces of depersonalization, dehumanization and commodification, which creates toxic, destructive, monstrous com- binations, not smart, adaptive, problem-solving hybridity.
12.3 What Is Next?
In the best of worlds, hybrid governance forms enable us to develop adaptive, smart solutions to complex problems. But this is only part of the story. In the worst of worlds, hybrid forms can be malevolent, a vehicle that enables the exploitation of misery and misfortune through the joining together of the worst features of markets and hier- archies. As we continue to develop our understanding of hybrid forms, and move further into the age of hybridity, we must be able to account for the problems and challenges of hybridity, not just the smart solu- tions they may offer. Will hybrids help us to solve some of the most complex challenges societies must contend with? Very likely. Will hybrids amplify some of these challenges and produce not just moral questions but further misery and misfortune? Undoubtedly.
References
Heydebrand, W. V. (1989). New organizational forms. Work and
Occupations, 16(3), 323-357.
Menard, C. (1995). Markets as institutions versus organizations as markets? Disentangling some fundamental concepts. Journal of
O’Flynn, J. (forthcoming). Markets for misery: Profiting from vulnerability
and misfortune. Cambridge: Polity.
Ouchi, W. G. (1980). Markets, bureaucracies and clans. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 25(1), 129-142.
Vincent-Jones, P. (1997). Hybrid organization, contractual governance, and compulsory competitive tendering in the provision of local authority services. In S. Deakin & J. Michie (Eds.), Contracts, cooperation, and competition: Studies in economics, management and law. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, O. E. (1979). Transaction-cost economics: The governance of contractual relations. Journal of Law and Economics, 22(3), 233-261. Williamson, O. E. (1991). Comparative economic organization:
The analysis of discrete structural alternatives.