I 3 THE END OF BIPOLARITY: CONTINUITY OR CHANGE?

During the Cold War, efforts to challenge the dominance o f realism were relentlessly thwarted by the continued rivalry between two superpowers, for the connection between theory and events was undeniable. It now appears that the dominant theories, based on the necessity of Great Power rivalry and the prominence of military power, are now in question. The central issue facing scholars and analysts is whether the entire international system discredits the realist approach because of the collapse of the bipolar system. More importantly, will the current global changes manifest themselves in the Asia-Pacific region? And is there anything about Asia-Pacific development that deserves to be noted from a theoretic perspective?

Kenneth Waltz responds to his critics, who mainly focused on questioning realism’s failure to explain and predict the end o f the Cold War, by maintaining that “ a theory may help us to understand and explain phenomena and events yet not be a useful instrument for prediction.”11 He defines theory as a picture in which reality is reflected, and a theory’s capability o f explaining is more important than its ability to predict. Some neo-realists, Joseph Grieco for example, argue that international

" Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o f Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 439-40.

12 Robert Jervis, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War,” Journal o f Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 1980), pp. 563-592.

13 Kenneth N. Waltz,” Reflection on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics,” Robert O. Keohane, ed.. Neorealism and Its Critics (New York:

relations theories are capable only of predicting patterns of behaviour; they help one to understand how a given system works; they are not useful merely because they help one to predict the trend of events. In fact, the main analytical perspectives on international relations, neo-realism and liberalism, share with all their critics their inability to foreshadow, let alone foresee, this momentous global change. The end of the Cold War, according to the traditional version o f power transition theories, is marked by the problem of hegemonic decline and its consequences. Thus, the end of bipolarity is simply the result of the rise and decline of states’ relative power conditioned by the nature of the overall distribution o f capabilities. “The prospect of major crises, even wars, in Europe is likely to increase dramatically now that the Cold War is receding into history,” as one realist concludes.14 Apparently, if realist forecasts are correct, the patterns of power competition will be repeated again and again. The unavoidably conflictual nature of politics in an anarchical international system is obviously the legacy of Cold War experience and historical realities. However, many criticisms of realism based on the post-Cold War transformation of international politics argue that the evaluation of theory should look to future patterns rather than past events.15 More significantly, the lesson of the sudden end of the Cold War suggests that power rivalries need not necessarily end in armed conflict as they did in World War I and World War II.

Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 335; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Evaluating Theories,"

American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 913-16. 14 John J. Mearsheimer, “Europe after the Superpowers: Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds., The Global Agenda,

3rd ed. (New York: Mcgraw-HiU, 1992), pp. 158-159. See also Waltz’s “The Emerging Structure o f International Politics,” pp. 42-48.

15 Richard Ned Lebow, “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure o f Realism,” International Organisation, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 251-252. See also Friedrich Kratochwil, “The Embarrassment o f Changes: Neo-Realism as the

In the case of the Asia-Pacific region, the period of the end of bipolarity, when the “new world order” becomes world-wide aspiration, has not provided real peace for regional states. There is no doubt that the collapse of the Soviet Union has made the United States the only superpower in the world arena, but this does not mean that the US is either able or willing to exercise sole hegemony in the sense of being able to lay down the law to the rest of the world, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. Having noticed the change of world politics today, Henry A. Kissinger declares that the world no longer has two superpowers, but at least six major powers (the US, the PRC, Russia, Japan, UK, France, etc) The United States is militarily the strongest, but the circumstances in which its military power is relevant are diminishing.16

For one thing, Asian stability during the past several decades has benefited from the American military presence. In response to domestic demands and the end of confrontation with the Soviet Union, the United States is reducing its military forces, which have long been regarded as the main buttress to regional stability. This new strategic environment is seen as uncertain since it is suspected that the US may not have sufficient domestic support in the long term to sustain the level of forces deployed in the region necessary to serve the objective o f upholding stability. To make matters worse, as some analysts maintain, the perception of a perception of possible “power vacuum” caused by US withdrawal might encourage more turbulence and unilateral bids for power accumulation.17 Tensions between the two Koreas and between the PRC and Taiwan remain high. North Korea’s aspiration to acquire nuclear weapons and territorial disputes over the South China Sea have also signified potential dangers within the region. The break-up o f the bipolar system has

16 Kissinger, Diplomacy, pp. 17-28

17 Denny Roy. “Assessing the Asia-Pacific ‘Power Vacuum’,” Survival, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Autumn 1995), pp. 43-49.

compelled regional states to deal with problems that have deep roots of their own, and which direct them toward engaging in behaviour apt to lead to spiralling conflicts, such as arms races, crises and even wars.18 On the other hand, the dynamics of their highly expanding economic growth, coupled with an easy access to military technology after the bankruptcy of the Soviet empire, have provided them a better chance to purchase more sophisticated weapons. Ironically, instead of establishing a structure of arms control or a collective security, the United States has fuelled arms competition by becoming one of the major arms suppliers in the region.

Accordingly, the region, to some pessimists, is in danger of heading “back to the future”, because states in the region are responding to the uncertainty about their future threats by an arms build-up. This might suggest a self-stimulating military rivalry between states, in which their efforts to defend themselves militarily cause them to enhance the threats they pose to each other. In other words, the realists can justify their arguments by pointing out that in an anarchic order, security can only be achieved through self-help, but self-help (or armaments and national defence) increases the insecurity of all thereby incurring the risk of a security dilemma. Viewed in this way, the recent development of the Asia-Pacific region may confirm the realist wisdom of a “timeless present” and the view that the collapse o f the bipolar system has not given way to a better world in the region.

Given these recent incidents, optimists wonder whether this is necessarily to be the case, and some may argue in terms of changes that manifest global effects on the

18 For a further discussion of the arms race in the Asia-Pacific region see Desmond Ball, “Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisition in the Asia-Pacific Region,”

International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 78-112; Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, “Rethinking East Asian Security,” Survival, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Summer

Asia-Pacific region. One of the major structural changes is the rise of mulitilateralism at the global level, which is sometimes taken as an essential characteristic of the new world trend, and there is speculation as to whether this is to be repeated in the Asia- Pacific region. However, it is highly contentious whether multilateralism is more stable than a bipolar system, and no historical survey had been done on the question. Specifically, the rise of the norm of multilateral consultations in the Asia-Pacific region reinforces an acquired collective identity. Even Waltz acknowledges that his theory fails to account for the changes of world politics and that a multipolar system seems more stable than the bipolar one.19

From the economic perspective, rapid economic growth for the Asia-Pacific states and the relative decline of American hegemony have changed the basic structure of the distribution of power. The rise of Japanese economic power, of NIEs (the newly industrialised economies: South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), and then of ASEAN states and the PRC has proved to be successful. As a result of the rising importance of economic security in the new era, the US has converted its economy from a Cold War orientation to a post-Cold War strategy. Japan has thus replaced the Soviet Union as the major challenge to American worldwide interests.20 For its policy toward Asia-Pacific region, despite its initial hesitation, the US finally attempted to provide leadership in the region as a whole by convening a summit for the annual meeting of the APEC forum in 1993 with a view to transforming it into a

Congress, July 20, 1992), pp. 60-72.; Gerald Segal, “Managing New Arms Races in the Asia/Pacific,” Washington Quarterly (Summer 1992), p. 82

19 Waltz, “The Emerging Structure o f International Politics,” pp. 42-43.

20 Samuel P. Huntington, “America’s Changing Strategic Interests,” Survival, Vol. 33, No. 1 (January/ February, 1991), pp. 3-17.

more formal free trade area. This may be seen by some as an American grandiose scheme, using APEC as a vehicle for creating a “new Pacific Community.”21

In security matters, in response to an uncertain strategic future, a comparatively new mode of multilateral arrangements has emerged in Asia-Pacific international relations. The formation of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993, which is designed to promote a multilateral security dialogue in Asia-Pacific region, may be considered an historic event in the sense that for the first time all Asia-Pacific states began to officially discuss political and security co-operation issues. Furthermore, it is also believed that the establishment of a security framework in the region, although it is essentially consultative in character, could be seen as the first step to promote regional stability. More importantly, the ARF is seen as a significant success for incorporating the PRC within multilateral approaches in the hope that it will become a good neighbour in the region as it inevitably grows in power. A detailed discussion of ARF is preserved in chapter four.

There is no doubt that the end o f bipolarity and the decline of American hegemony have provided better chances and new reasons for constructing multilateral regimes in the Asia-Pacific region.22 Interestingly, according to the theory of hegemonic stability, the loss of US hegemony would equally reduce the ability of regional states to co-operate with others. But this may not necessarily be the case in the Asia- Pacific, for the changing perceptions of the benefits of co-operation have encouraged regional states to change their behaviours, which has in turn made international co­ operation in the region possible. Besides, in the case of Asia-Pacific, there exists

21 Ngai-Ling Sum, “The NICs and Competing Strategies of East Asian Regionalism,” Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne, eds., Regionalism & World Order (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), 221-222; Michael Leifer, Dictionary o f the Modern Politics o f South-East Asia (London & New York: Routledge, 1995), p.52.

what can be termed as economic interdependence leading toward common prosperity and stability. In other words, collective action can sometimes substitute for hegemonic leadership. Compared to Europe, the process of Asian multilateralism was late in getting started and it remains limited in its scope, but this does not mean that the situation is decidedly short of hope.

Another notable by-product of regional economic growth is the development of democracy, for example in South Korea and Taiwan. It is argued that economic growth provides the basis for a natural evolution of democracy, and further prosperity is made possible by regional peace. Some scholars maintain that democracy is incubated by wealth; more importantly, démocratisation makes international conflicts less likely because democracies almost never fight each other. Moreover, empirical support for the pacifying impact of constitutional democracy, as Bruce Russe» suggests, is firmer than the assumption that economic interdependence breeds peace.21 Indeed, the popular sentiment in the democracies in recent years has tended to oppose military involvement, although the Desert Storm (the war with Iraq) shows that the electorate can be brought around to support military activities by skilful political leadership. 22 23

22 Donald Crone, “Does Hegemony Matter? The Reorganisation of the Pacific Political Economy,” World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 4 (July 1993), pp. 501-525. 23 For more discussions on democratic peace, see Bruce Russett, “The Fact of Democratic Peace,” Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (London: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 58-81; Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace,

1946-1986,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993); Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Démocratisation and the Danger of War,”

International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38; John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125; Randall L. Schweller, “Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?” World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 2 (January 1992), pp. 235-269; Francis Fukuyama, The End o f History and the Last Man (London: Fenguin Books, 1992), p. 262; Luyne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace,” pp. 5-49.

Insofar as the number of democracies in the Asia-Pacific region is likely to increase in the coming decade, especially among the NIEs and ASEAN states, it remains to be seen whether democracies are indeed more peaceful in their relationships one with another. Furthermore, while communism may have been dismantled in the region, this by no means implies that the successors to communist regimes must be democratic. Apparently, the significance of rapid modernising Asia- Pacific states presents an anticipating evolution of democracy, which might be regarded by many regional states as a challenge to existing authoritarian systems. For them, démocratisation not only brings domestic turmoil but also undermines economic growth in the long run. Resistance to démocratisation, therefore, has become a common feature of many regional states, and is justified in the name of economic development and social and political order.

However, the flow of historic trends is hard to avoid, as Francis Fuguyama declares. In contrast to the theory of historical continuity, he regards this fundamental change in human history as a “large process” and concludes “that we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”24 In the Asia-Pacific region, the political and social consequences of recent economic crisis have not yet overcome, but anti-Western sentiments are being expressed. It is too early to make a judgement on its long-term implications, but it is also hazardous to dismiss it as a short-term, solely economic problem.