The ideational component: the role of soft power variables

The nuclear discourse of India-Pakistan is woven around the wider discourse of the identities of the Hindus and the Muslims of India and Pakistan respectively. Identity with regard to the security discourse has become ‘securitized subjectivity’ (Kinnvall 2006). The subjects in a state desire securitization when they are afraid or when they feel a threat to the existence of their identity. In such situations, every self identity requires a threat from others. The threats to self identity are socially constructed by carefully selecting the narratives of threat constructions. The elites in both countries are

responsible for the construction of threats. In a constructed world, identities are in a state of ‘flux’, but according to Robert Cox , “there may be periods and places where

intersubjective understandings of these social facts are stable enough that they can be treated as if fixed and can be analyzed with social scientific methods” (Abdelal, Herrera et al. 2006: 700). The decision to go nuclear made by both countries in 1998 is one such instance of a period of stability in the hostile intersubjective understandings of India- Pakistan. This intersubjective environment was strengthened further by social norms which helped to influence the decision making of the elites.

At one time, norms not only inform the perceptions of political leaders but also help to shape the national identities of the state (Jackson 2008). This does not mean that

nuclear, but the point to be emphasized here is the causal relations of cultural factors in influencing such a decision. Bourdieu has added the concept of ‘habitus’ to explain the cultural orientation of actors which is “a semi-conscious (though not innate) orientation that individuals have of the world [forming] a basis for practice ” (Jackson 2008: 164). In other words, every political actor has been working under the influence of certain norms of the society. Bourdieu explains that such norms act as an “effective constraint” on the behaviour of actors (Jackson 2008: 167). But it is pertinent to mention here that all such norms are continuously contested and re-contested by the elites in their respective ‘fields’ of action (Jackson 2008). We can define such norms by linking them with the social practices of the elites.

Soft power variables like religious myths, socio-cultural norms, belief systems and the ideological commitments of the elites have great salience in the nuclear discourses of India and Pakistan. Joseph S. Nye has defined soft power as “the power of attractive ideas” that can appeal to people and make them comply which includes “intangible power resources such as culture, ideology and institutions” (Nye 1990: 166). The

constitutive norms derived from culture, described as formal and informal rules, identify the characteristics of a group (Abdelal, Herrera et al. 2006). The ‘contestation’ of a group’s identity explains the degree to which a particular norm influences the actual social practices while ‘context’ refers to the main attributes of a group’s identity (Abdelal, Herrera et al. 2006). If we examine the ‘context and contestation’ of BJP’s identity under the influence of ‘Hindutva’ norms, we can explain the social practices of the Indian state at the time of the nuclear test explosions in 1998. With an established

practices that are appropriate to their group characteristics. When such elites arrive at the forefront of state politics, then they have the clear aim of imposing their view of national identity of the state. They come up with a world view of their own and they try to

construct the same view at the level of national politics. As a result, the social practices of the state are being influenced by this particular elites’ identity. The elites’ practices before obtaining state power can be viewed as social practices. However, after these elites become state elites, then their practices become security practices of the state. The above argument can be split into three tiers in order to clarify the ideational framework behind the Indian nuclear decision of 1998.

• By understanding the social norms underpinning the identity of a political party. For India, it is the BJP and the socio-cultural norms are “Hindutva”.

• By linking the social norms of BJP to the social practices of the political elites [The speeches of the elites when they are outside the helm of affairs].

• By explaining the social practices of Indian elites related to a state’s security after the party elites become national elites. [The speeches of the elites when they are at the helm of affairs].

For Pakistan the same scheme can be adopted while only slightly altered.

• By linking the state’s identity discourse in the speeches of the elites to the broader context of the ideological commitment of Pakistan’s identity towards Islam and the ‘Two Nation Theory’. [See also Chapter 4].

and the attainment of an Islamic bomb. [The political elites’ speeches after they became state elites].

• By understanding the social practices of the military elites when they become state elites and linking them with the security discourse of the state.

These social practices of elites are principally derived from the soft power of religion such as the use of ‘Hindutva’ politics in India and the use of Islam in Pakistan (Haynes 2008). The ideologically committed use of ‘Hindutva views’ or social norms has ‘influenced’ the Indian elites “in relation to Pakistan, Kashmir terrorism and nuclear weapons” (Haynes 2008: 155). Some analysts dismiss the relationship between the BJP’s Hindutva ideology and the nuclear decision of Indian state in 1998 (Corbridge 1999). But I assert that if we link the identity of the BJP by exploring its ‘constitutive’ and

‘regulatory norms’ then we can see that they form a causal link to the state’s security practices which in turn can explain the reasons behind India’s nuclear decisions in 1998 (Katzenstein 1996).

6.4 The social practices of India and Pakistan elites

Indian civilian leadership is firmly in control of its nuclear programme with little influence by India’s military. Nevertheless, from 1974 until 1998, India’s nuclear

programme was more or less ad-hock and was devoid of any institutional mechanism like a National Security Council or other supervisory body. In May 1998, the Indian Prime Minister Deve Gowda stated, “The decision to conduct the nuclear tests is not a military

(Perkovich 1999: 377). There was no long term policy or institutional body to formulate and implement any nuclear security doctrine until 1998. These decisions were made by a few political elites who were at the top echelons of power. Most of the time, the elites’ mind set was influenced by domestic conditions and their nationalist agenda to satisfy the voters. The social practices of the elites affect state security practices when these elites arrive as state elites in the political arena after winning elections. Obviously, any prior ideological commitments to party norms by these elites can transform the state’s security practices, especially if there is an absence of any institutionally designed decision making or regulatory bodies to put a check on the change in policy direction. This state of affairs was exploited by the Hindu fundamentalist party the BJP in favour of pursuing the bomb after it assumed power in 1996.

The foundational norms of secularism were established by the founding fathers of the Congress party almost five decades after independence. A novel phenomenon

occurred in the decade of the 1990s with the resurgence of religious fundamentalist parties in India. The BJP elites arrived on the national political scene in the 1990’s with a new ideology and a new vision for the state’s identity and security discourses. They believed that an overt nuclear posture would “deliver to Hindu India, the international status as a great civilization and nation” (Perkovich 1999: 377). The reasons behind the successful electoral campaign of the BJP which ultimately led to the nuclear decision are varied. First, their success was partly due to the degeneration of the secular identity of India as formulated by Nehru [1947-1964]. Second, because of India’s history of uninterrupted democracy, there was an increase in the political mobilization and

economic disparity between a few wealthy elite groups and the poverty stricken masses. And finally, the fourth reason for their success was the Hindu fundamentalist party’s successful propagation of mythical religious stories to gain popular support among the people (Jaffrelot 2005). It was this last reason that played a dominant role in influencing the Indian nuclear discourse and will be elaborated on in more detail in the section discussing popular social practices.

The cultural appeal of BJP’s revitalized Indian identity with the reconstruction of religious myths, deviated from the long established secularist social practices of Indian elites. According to Cohen, the reasons for the success of the Hindu fundamentalist party at centre stage include “social and caste tensions, the stresses of rapid and uneven

economic growth, and the erosion of traditional caste norms spur on it” (Cohen 2001: 121). While discussing the identity politics of BJP, Cohen notes that “the nuclear program is one in a series of important symbolic projects that the centre has undertaken to develop a sense of Indian nationhood and identity” (Cohen 2000: 26). India’s decision to go nuclear in 1998 is culturally and symbolically constructed in order to carve out an Indian identity based on religious nationalism [Hindutva]. The ‘Hindutva’ ideology emerged in India after the Hindu fundamentalist parties gathered together to form what is commonly called the ‘Sangh Pariwar’. Gandhi’s secularist ‘ahimsa’ vision of Gandhi was discarded by Sangh’s new ideology which considered ‘ahimsa’ tantamount to

‘emasculating Hindu manliness’ (Bidwai 2001).

The Sangh Pariwar is made up of different Hindu fundamentalist parties which include the RSS [Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh], the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] and

fundamentalist parties in India. It’s well knit organization has provided the cadre and ideological tools necessary for all subsequent Hindu fundamentalist parties in India. The BJP is one such party whose leadership comes from the cadres of the RSS even though publicly these connections are denied (Jaffrelot 2005). The difference between the BJP and the other parties of the Sangh Pariwar is that the other fundamentalist parties never achieved major electoral successes. They only held power briefly from 1977 to 1979 while the real power remained with the Congress party until the mid-1990s. If we look at the history of the Sangh Pariwar, then first comes the RSS, followed by the BJS and only after that there was the rise of BJP from the 1980s onwards. Today the RSS and the BJS still exist. However, the BJP is the only religious fundamentalist party in India that has come to power three times and it is still the main opposition party in India which enjoys vast popularity. Because the majority of the party elites of the BJP, including the former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and stalwarts like L.K. Advani, came from the cadres of the RSS, it is fruitful to take a closer look at the core ideology of the RSS. The RSS was founded in 1925 and drew its main inspiration from Vinayak Damodar Savarkar’s book ‘Hindutva’ [1923]. The book described Indian national identity in terms of Hindu culture, Hindi language and the worship of the sacred land ‘India’ under the influence of the ‘Vedic Golden Age’ (Jaffrelot 2005).

The major beliefs of Hindutva are explained by D.R. Goyal as follows: “Hindus have lived in India since times immemorial;

Hindus are the nation because all culture, civilization and life is contributed by them alone; non-Hindus are invaders or guests and cannot be treated as equal unless they adopt Hindu traditions, culture etc.” (Guha 2007: 646).

India is evident in the speech. A critical discourse analysis shows the macro structural components of this quotation as ‘Hindu culture’, ‘traditions’ as well as timelessness in the shape of ‘times immemorial’. These opaque as well as powerful themes constructed by the RSS elites demonstrate the biased discourse of Indian identity heavily tilted towards being solely a Hindu identity. It explains why it is difficult for the Muslims of India to accept the culture of Hindus. It is a monolithic perspective of the domination of one community over all others. The Muslims in Pakistan consider the Muslim invaders of India to be their forefathers, yet these same people are thought of as the plunderers of ‘mother India’ by Hindus in India. These are two opposing myths of identity with no point of convergence.

The BJP derives its Hindutva ideology from its mentor the RSS which has a distinct view of Indian state identity. Hindutva identity is based on the social norms of Hinduism and it is believed that if a large section of Indian society practises these norms then they will help form a distinct identity for the Indian state. The question may arise what then is wrong, if the BJP has an indigenous Hindu identity as a road map for the progress of India? If Pakistan can be for the Muslims, why can India not be for the Hindus? It can be corroborated that Indian society is predominantly Hindu, with the next largest minority being Muslim that constitutes 14 percent of the population. According to the 2001 census, India has the third largest Muslim community in the world with 138 million Muslims.

The problem with BJP’s road map is its anti-Muslim agenda in contrast to the secular, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and pluralistic identity of Indian polity. Since

majority. In spite of the BJP’s ideology, there is no homogenous Indian identity. Even among the Hindu community there exists diversity since Indian society is riddled with the caste system. Thus, there is no monolithic culture as such for either the Hindus of India or the Muslims of Pakistan (Kinnvall 2006). This means that there are various types of Hindus among the Hindus and Muslims among the Muslims in India and Pakistan respectively. The Hindu society is divided into four distinct castes and every caste has a role to play according to its social significance in society. The upper most or the most revered caste is the ‘Brahmins’ who according to Hindu mythology are created from the head of the Hindu god and they are the teachers as well as the guardians of the religious places like ‘Mandirs’ [temples]. Second in line are the ‘Kushtarayas’ who are born from the hands of the god and they are the warriors and kings. Then comes the ‘Vaishyas’ or the peasant class born from the stomach of the god and their role is to feed the masses. The last are the ‘Shudras’ who are born from the feet of the god and who are intended to serve the other castes by conducting all the menial work for them. There are also the outcastes or the untouchables who are outside the domain of the caste system and they are looked down upon in society on account of not being Hindus. This caste system or strict compartmentalization of humanity is still being practiced is many parts of India today.

Hindutva identity is based on ‘Bharatiya sanskriti and maryyada’ [language and tradition] (Puri 2005). These social norms speak the specific language understood by the Hindu masses at large. This is reflected in the idea of ‘cultural nationalism’ (Kampani 1998). The attributes of cultural nationalism refers “to build a grand, powerful, and

and the converging point of high science, national identity, and achievement” (Kampani 1998: 18). The cultural socialization of the BJP elites “constructed the notion of a civilizational Indian nation based on the myth of an unbroken brahamanic traditions, language, and symbols” (Kampani 1998: 18). It brought a new niche for Indian state identity based upon the ideal of an ‘imagined community’ and norms of ancient Hindu civilization (Anderson 1983). This socially constructed, new Indian identity of

‘Hindutva’ was reinforced by state’s security practices during BJP reign and led to an intersubjective understanding of hostility between India and Pakistan. How did it happen? After only a brief taste of holding power for fifteen days in 1996, the BJP was able to win broad support among the electorate for its populist slogan of Hindutva identity and formed the central government in India in March 1998. The new Prime Minister

Vajpayee met with Indian nuclear scientists before his inauguration on the 20th of March 1998 (Perkovich 1999). The ‘adhocism’ in nuclear decision making and the absence of any institutional framework for nuclear decisions, allowed the BJP party elites to make the decision to conduct a nuclear test (Perkovich 1999: 389). Only a ‘handful of the BJP elites’ who now became state elites actually knew about the impeding nuclear tests (Perkovich 1999: 404). These state elites included Vajpayee [the Prime Minister], Brajesh Mishra [the National Security Advisor], L.K. Advani [the Home Minister], Jaswant Singh [the Foreign Minister] and one or two others (Perkovich 1999). The few top Indian nuclear scientists who knew about the tests were referred to as the ‘strategic enclave’ (Perkovich 1999). In the absence of any institutional body to formulate and decide the core national interests of the state, the state’s lack of institutional capacity

pristine security question of not only regional importance, but also of global significance. It was only in 1998 that the idea of the formation of a National Security Council was introduced by the Prime Minister Vajpayee and was subsequently established in November 1998 after the nuclear tests. This body now has the mandate to review the political, economic, energy and strategic concerns of India with proper structural mechanisms involving a strategic policy group, an advisory board, a joint intelligence committee and a national security advisory board.

After conducting the Pokhran tests II, the ruling BJP committed itself to building a national monument at the site where India detonated its nuclear device in 1998.

Furthermore, the Vishva Hindu Perished [VHP], a political party whose norms or ideals are also shared by the BJP, wanted to distribute the radioactive sand from the Pokhran desert as ‘Prasad’ to all the nooks and corners of India (Roy 2001). ‘Prasad’ has a special significance in Hindu culture, since at every religious or culturally significant occasion [like marriages or religious festivities] sweets are distributed to all participating people as ‘Prasad’. It is considered to be a good omen and its eating is obligatory for all

participants. The link between ‘Prasad’ and the nuclear security discourse of the state shows the conflation of cultural identity with Indian state security.

The conflation of cultural norms with the strategic culture of India was explained by Jaswant Singh, the External Affairs Minister of India in the BJP’s government during India’s nuclear tests in 1998, as:

“an intermix of many influences: civilization, culture, evolution, and the functioning of a civil society, etc. It is a by-product of the political culture of a nation and its people; an extension of the functioning of a viable state more importantly its understanding of the ways in which the power of a state can be used”(Singh 1999: 2).