The Impact of institutional and structural issues on Peace

In considering factors that affect Peace Journalism practice, Hackett (2007) and Shinar (2007a) emphasise the need to examine the daily newsroom routines journalists follow as well as the ownership and control regimes of the media institutions. Both Hanitzsch (2004) and Hackett (2007) note that the daily work routines in which journalists function produce standardized and recurring patterns of generating media content; so much so that, according to Hanitzsch, “claims for a change of war reporting must address the structures of journalism e.g. the criteria of news selection, formats and techniques of story-telling” (p.486). But one of the most detailed analyses of how structures of journalism practice impact on peace reporting is provided by Wolfsfeld (2004) who states that “peace and news make for awkward bedfellows” (p.2). He captures the operational impediments that proponents of a Peace Journalism model face in breaking up the entrenched conventional norms of journalism thus:

“A successful peace process requires patience, and the news media demand immediacy. Peace is most likely to develop within a calm environment and the media have the obsessive interest in threats and violence. Peace building is a complex process and the news media deal with simple events. Progress towards

peace requires at least a minimal understanding of the needs of the other side, but the news media reinforce ethnocentrism and hostility towards adversaries” (Ibid.). Under what he calls a “static model”, Wolfsfeld (2004) belabors the point that conventional news values are so grounded in conflict to the extent that “when peace appears to be taking hold in a particular area, it is time for journalists to leave” (p. 15). In an enumeration of the conventional news values, he observes that journalists and their editors select what is newsworthy based on a sacrosanct set of values such as “immediacy, drama, simplicity and ethnocentrism” (Ibid.). He argues that these news values are so well established that even competing political actors use these frames to position their messages and actions for the effective attention of the mass media.68 As a conventional news value, the “immediacy” frame captures events and specific actions while “processes and long-term policies” do not qualify as news values since journalists are not known to be in the “business of waiting” (p.16). What makes news under the “drama” frame is “violence, crisis, conflict, extremism, dangers, internal discord, major breakthroughs”; whereas “calm, lack of crisis, cooperation, moderation, opportunities, internal consensus, incremental progress” do not constitute news values (Ibid.). The “simplicity” frame favours “opinions, images, major personalities, two-sided conflicts”; while “ideology, texts, institutions, multi-sided conflicts” do not qualify as news worthy (Ibid.). Under “ethnocentrism”, news is “our beliefs, our suffering, their brutality, our myths/symbols”; whereas what is not news is “their beliefs, their suffering, our brutality, their myths/symbols” (Ibid.). On his part, Lynch (2010) also notes the problematic nature of a conventional media concept such as ‘balance’ since “it encourages dyadic i.e. on the

one hand, on the other hand; which provide equal voice to warmongers as to peacemakers” (p.73). In the same vein, Hanitzsch (2004) cites other authors to make a case that conventional news values such as "establishment, controversy, surprise, influence/prominence, personalization and damage…represent important criteria of news processing for the audience as well” (p.490). He points out that since news values are negotiated between journalism and its audiences, media institutions that compromise that state of affairs would suffer with “a loss of readers, listeners, viewers or users” (Ibid.).

With regard to African journalism practice, Mutere (2006) argues that reporters ought to have more opportunities to dialogue with their editors on the issues in their reports, but notes that unfortunately, “the parochial structure of newsrooms does not lend itself well to such dialogue” (p.9). In his research capturing the views of East African journalists, he states that for most, the conventional routines of “reporting events is easier than addressing issues” (p.8). In another research, Mutere & Ugangu (2004) established that most East African journalists were “unable to capture issues or processes” and depended on “single sourcing” for their reports (p. 16). They also noted that journalists were “vulnerable to manipulation by sources” and the stories were often “incomplete” (p.17). Referring to the conventional principles of journalism, Mutere (2006) argues that “with events, as long as you accurately represent what happened and who said what, why, when, where and how (5Ws and an H), you are just about there in journalism” (p.8). This style of news framing is called the inverted pyramid, which Mutere & Ugangu (2004) label “out of date” and “weak [at] addressing issues” (p. 36). They propose the “suspended-interest news story” as an alternative model. Whereas in the inverted pyramid model the most important elements are packed in the lead, the suspended-interest one

“captures audience interest and holds (suspends) it; then releases it later in the story, [and] sometimes the interest is held to the very end of the story” (pp. 36-37).

Mwesige (2004) also established in his study of political talk radio in Uganda that the mass media agenda was often “event driven” and those issues that “generated controversy and drama” were more likely to make it to the media agenda (pp.114-115). Reflecting on news values in his “four promises” of Peace Journalism, Shinar (2007b) observes that there is a tendency in conventional journalism to “overplay the place of national, political and religious leaders” by always giving them centre-stage. In a framework that for instance examines “the leader [as] the message”, he proposes a widening of the news coverage horizon from a personalities’ perspective (p. 4)

On the other spectrum of the debate, however, some scholars are making a case that however difficult it may appear, frames of peace can progressively constitute news values. Galtung (2000), for instance, defends peace as a news value and charges that for anyone “to argue that violence is the only thing that sells is to insult humanity” (p. 162). Citing some of his research, he argues that other than a small section of males aged 18 to 55, the vast majority of the population comprising women, the youth and the elderly prefer news that is less adversarial (p. 163). He states that for the majority of the human family, peace and not conflict, remains an important news value. The work of Wolfsfeld (2004), though seemingly justifying news frames of war/violence, in effect supports the view that journalists have an obligation, in situations of violence, to “emphasize the benefits that peace can bring”, to “raise the legitimacy of groups or leaders working for peace”, and that “they can help transform images of the enemy” (p. 1). The push for the development of media values of peace notwithstanding, Shinar (2004) deplores the fact

that owing to the current media institutional practices based on “competition, high news- value and ratings, the current economic structures of the media entail a preference for war” (p.2). For such an agenda to be successful there is need to rethink and reposition the ownership and control dynamics of media institutions.

In a discussion of the structural issues that affect peace-oriented media, Shinar (2007a) reviews literature by political-economy media scholars and observes that “a few transnational media corporations in the more developed countries dominate the commercial media system” across the globe (p.55). Likewise, Bell (2008) notes how “most media outlets, in television and print, are owned by mega-corporations who see them as profit centers rather than public services” (p.228). He points out that such ownership affects the very definition of news whereby “if it sells, it leads” (Ibid.). Citing examples from several countries, Shinar (2007a) proposes the introduction and use of new peace-oriented media structures that have turned out to be effective in countries such as Burundi in transforming conflict potentials (p.57). He also cites changes in media policies such as in Bosnia and Kosovo where independent media commissions were established to prevent the propagation of hate messages (p.58). In addition to media structures, Shinar (2007a) also cites successful examples in countries such as Burundi, Colombia, Israeli-Palestine and the Balkans where peace-oriented radio stations have been set up; and production of peace-oriented programs such as “news, soap operas, programs for women and children, and musical shows featuring peace songs” have been accomplished (p.58). Shinar concludes that “pluralism of media ownership and control is an indispensable condition for media checks and balances as well as for the production and dissemination of peace-oriented contents and forms during and after conflicts”

(p.59). In agreement, Lynch & McGoldrick (2010) observe that for the Peace Journalism model to be successfully adopted by media institutions, its promotion and adoption must “emanate from the level of management” (p.97). As Patindol (2010) noted from the implementation of the Peace Journalism model in the Philippines, “no matter how conflict-sensitively an article is written, if an editor does not like it, it is cut or worse rejected” usually based on “pressing publisher demands and advertiser constraints” (p.201). It is such pressing extra-media factors that I discuss in the subsection below.

4.1.3 The Impact of Extra-media factors on Peace Journalism practice