Implications for the global realm

We have seen that the most straightforward interpretation of Blake and Nagel’s requirements for justice-triggering coercion, produced some difficulties in the intergenerational realm. A possible explanation for these difficulties, apart from the specific features of the

intergenerational realm, is that both Blake and Nagel’s accounts of coercion specifically aim to defend statist conclusions about the scope of justice. The requirements for justice-triggering coercion mean to distinguish the domestic and the global realm. In response to his

cosmopolitan critics, who argue that relevant forms of coercion do exist globally and thus that coercion theory does support global egalitarian justice, Blake writes: “This charge would, if true, undercut most of the appeal of coercion theory. What has made coercion theory useful, I think, has been that it allows us to distinguish between the local norms of distributive justice, and the universal norms of respect for autonomy that hold internationally. If these supposedly local norms hold universally, however, it is no longer clear that coercion theory has any particular benefits.”124

As I have discussed above, the intergenerational account is in various aspects broader than Blake and Nagel’s original account. This move to accommodate the intuition that we should

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care for future people, has a spill-over effect to the global realm. Broadening or abandoning requirements that were made to distinguish the domestic and the global realm makes it likelier to find acts or systems internationally that meet the criteria for justice-triggering coercion. Multiple authors have already used this strategy in the global domain. They have argued that there are relevant coercive acts internationally and that coercion theory is therefore only consistent when the scope of justice is extended to the global realm.125 Valentini has developed a comprehensive ‘broader’ account of coercion. I already mentioned a few elements of her account earlier. According to Valentini, the coercion view entails that “the function of principles of socioeconomic justice is to justify state coercion by making it

compatible with each citizen’s freedom.”126 She argues that it is wrong to focus exclusively on state coercion. Outside of the state, constraints on freedom that stand in need of justification also exist.127 _{To accommodate these other constraints on freedom as well, she proposes a}

broader notion of coercion.

Valentini starts with the ‘narrow’ account of coercion: “An agent A coerces another agent B if A intentionally forces B to do, or refrain from doing, X through a command backed by the threat of sanctions.” Next, she relaxes some of the criteria in this account. First, she argues

that not only threats can be coercive, but also other constraints of freedom.128 _These

constraints should be non-trivial and should restrict freedom in comparison to a suitable baseline. Secondly, she replaces the intentionality requirement with the requirement of foreseeability and avoidability. The coercive consequence of an action does not have to be intended, but the coercer must have been able to foresee and avoid it. Thirdly, she allows for ‘systemic coercion’. This is a form of coercion which is not exercised by an individual agent or a group agent, but takes place through a system of rules. This system may be comprised of formal or informal practices, as long as they follow a ‘recognizably rule-governed pattern’. The agents who are responsible for this systemic coercion are those who support the system through their actions and behavior. In contrast to Blake and Nagel, Valentini’s account of coercion identifies relevant forms of coercion that exist globally, so according to her account, the scope of justice is global.

Now I will return to the ‘intergenerational coercion account’. This account is similar to Valentini’s account. Firstly, the intergenerational coercion account replaces the intentionality condition with the weaker condition of knowledgeability, while Valentini replaces it with the weaker condition of foreseeability. Although one might argue that foreseeability is even weaker than knowledgeability, both are weaker than intentionality in the strict sense. Secondly, both the intergenerational coercion account and Valentini’s account relax the agency requirement. Systemic coercion can also trigger obligations of justice. Thirdly, both accounts lack the ‘necessity-requirement’ and Nagel’s authorship requirement. Coercive

125 _{See: Valentini 2011; Pevnick 2008; Cohen and Sabel 2006; Julius 2006; Abizadeh 2007 and Van Parijs 2007,} p. 48.

126 _{Valentini 2011, p. 208.} 127 _{Valentini 2011, p. 209.} 128 _{Valentini 2011, p. 210.}

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mechanisms that are ‘unnecessary’, as well as instances of ‘pure’ coercion can trigger obligations of justice. If the accounts are indeed similar enough that they identify a similar group of actions as coercive, then the intergenerational coercion account also applies to the global realm, like Valentini’s account.

If the intergenerational account is correct, it follows that there are relevant forms of coercion in the global realm as well as in the domestic and intergenerational realm.129 That means that the scope of justice extends to the global realm as well. This puts the statist coercion theorist in a dilemma. To be consistent, he would need to choose between (1) committing to the narrow account of coercion and accepting that there are no obligations of justice to future people, or (2) committing to the intergenerational account of coercion and accepting that there are obligations of justice to non-compatriots. This is a dilemma because the first option does not correspond with our intuition about justice in the intergenerational domain and the second option does not correspond with the statist position. According to Blake, accepting extensive international obligations of justice would take away the fundamental purpose of coercion theory. He could try to escape the dilemma by denying that the first option does not correspond with our intuitions. While we do not have egalitarian duties of justice to future generations, we do owe them more limited humanitarian duties, related to the protection of autonomy. The argument would be that these duties suffice to account for our intuitions regarding our obligations to future generations. Yet, a concern could be that these

humanitarian duties would not be given enough priority to adequately protect the interests of future generations. According to Barry, framing duties in terms of distributive justice gives them more weight and priority. 130

In conclusion, broadening the coercion-account to accommodate our intuitions regarding intergenerational obligations of justice has a spill-over effect on our obligations in the global realm.

129 _{For instance, border coercion did not trigger obligations of justice internationally because it does not satisfy} Nagel’s authorship requirement, but if this requirement is dropped it might. The coercion of poor states by powerful states did not trigger obligations of justice because it was not in some form necessary, but if this requirement is dropped, it might too.

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