• No results found

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

4.2 Procurement reports submitted to the ODPP by case study organisations

4.2.1 Implications of results on table 4.4

The analysis of the PPPs reveals that the PPA (2003) processes are faced with a lot of challenges. An overview of this is given below:

An effective supplier selection process is very important to the success of any organisation. This process is based on well-defined supplier selection criteria. The main objective of supplier selection process is to reduce procurement risks, maximise VFM and to develop business relationships between the procurer and suppliers (Bhutta, & Khurrun, 2003). According to Tirchelvam and Tookey, (2011); Qiao and Cummings, (2003); Boer et.al, (2000); Pal et.al, (2013); Tahriri, et.al, (2008) and Obanda, (2010), the government should have well-defined quality of goods and services it wants, and should only accept alternative goods if the price is reasonable. While this principle is very clear, it is very surprising that city councils in Malawi choose to contravene this law.

To begin with, for all the three case studies, there was no evidence suggesting that specifications were undertaken before procurements. Even where they attempted to undertake it, the specifications were very murky signifying some lack of skill and capacity. In short, it

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was difficult to conclude that compliance was there given the absence of such benchmarking activities. Table 4.5 presents the cycle of procurement procedures to be adhered to, and areas of non-compliance.

Table 4.5 Cycle of the PPPs and areas of non-compliance.

Activity Roles Non-compliance Name of Council

Procurement plan and budget User department PU Accounting officer

All the councils had no procurement plans.

There was evidence of

contract splitting to avoid the threshold requiring OT in all councils. Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu. Procurement Requisition completed with clear specifications User departments No specifications available to enable procurements. In some

cases, specifications were

made around a particular known item, thus preventing competition. Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu. Confirmation of availability of funds Accounting Officer Finance Office No evidence of confirmation of availability of funds Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu. Review of procurement method

IPC No evidence of specifications

reviews. No evidence of pre-bid meetings conducted to enhance specifications Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu. Review of procurement methods

IPC This was ignored Blantyre, Lilongwe

and Mzuzu. Review of evaluation criteria PU IPC User department

No reviews were undertaken. The evaluation criteria are arbitrarily determined by the PU Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu. Review of potential supply PU User

Evidence of review of supply market being undertaken was available. However, it is

Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu.

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markets department

ODPP

abused where use of RfQ method is used. Very few suppliers are being considered

for quotations hence

competition is reduced. Poor market research as they rely on list of suppliers from the ODPP. This led to selecting to poor suppliers.

Procurement method approval

IPC PU

Ignored by all councils Blantyre, Lilongwe

and Mzuzu.

Preparation of bid documents

PU Standard bid documents not

used.

Difficult to verify evaluation criteria.

Difficult to know type of evaluation method selected due to absence of bidding documents. Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu. Preparation of bidding documents – terms and conditions.

PU General terms and condition

set by ODPP. But many feel they are set in favour of suppliers,

This was the catalyst for exorbitant prices.

Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu.

Approval of

bidding documents

IPC No evidence at all. PUs uses

the bidding documents without

prior approval by the

committee.

Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu.

Advertisement and invitation of bids

PU There was a great

misunderstanding; some

thresholds needing

advertisement were being

procured using quotation

without prior approval from ODPP. Where claims were made that bidding was open,

Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu.

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there was no evidence of advertisements on file.

Receipt and bid opening

IPC and PU Poor record management. Blantyre, Lilongwe

and Mzuzu.

Evaluation of bids PU, UD, and

IPC

Detailed bid evaluation is conducted based on murky criteria creating chances for abuse. In some cases, criteria

used was different from

predetermined ones. No

evidence that the evaluation reports were approved by the IPC.

Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu.

Review of

evaluation reports

IPC The IPC was approving

procurements based on

quotations that were not

evaluated. IPC usurped

powers of the adhoc

evaluation team.

Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu.

Contract award Controlling

Officer

No evidence of contract

notices to winning bidders.

Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu.

Contract signing Controlling

Officer

The controlling officers signed no purchase orders. However, there was no evidence of debriefing to losing suppliers

Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu.

Contract

Administration and Monitoring

PU and UD Some contracts were given

without signed contracts.

Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu.

Payments Controlling

Officer

No evidence about suppliers having been paid. This created the risk of councils losing

money through interest

charges where payments were delayed.

Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu.

The above table revealed that public procurement is faced with problems across the entire cycle. This is in conformity with the observations by O’Neil, et.al, (2014) that established that in Malawi, public procurement in councils is confronted by massive corruption, although he

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did not pinpoint the exact area. In addition to inferred corruption, this study found out that lack of proper structural alignment of the procurement function is also one of the many problems that lead to noncompliance. It will not be surprising to see many suppliers protesting for their bids performance.

Table 4.6 Summarised effects of non-compliance with the PPPs

Main area Key indicator Main reasons Effects

Organizational alignment, culture leadership and management systems Effectiveness of leadership Poor alignment of procurement function.

Poor training programmes for procurement staff and IPC members.

No capacity to carry out internal procurement audits. Poor record keeping.

ODPP limited in terms of capacity to train PEs.

Poor understanding of

PPPs

Fraud and corruption

cannot be detected

Lack of transparency and accountability

Increased level of non- compliance.

Human Resource Development

Procurement staff in place

without procurement

qualifications

Internal auditors in place

without training in

procurement

No evaluation of staff

performance in procurement

Risk of loss of resources due to wrong procurement

Fraud and corruption

cannot be detected. Same problems recur

Monitoring and

Control systems

No proper payment systems for contracts

No procurement transaction captured in cash budgets

No quality control

mechanisms

Suppliers paid twice

Loss of funds through interest on late payments

Government cash-flow

pressured

Poor supplies are accepted Complaints

system and

No proper fairness and

transparency resolution

mechanisms in place for cases

Many court cases due to unfair treatments

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structure established within the legal

system. Information and communication Procurement information searching and dissemination

Lack of awareness to use

procurement websites,

procurement internal notice boards and newspapers

Lack of capacity to use

procurement information

dissemination systems.

Few suppliers participate in tenders

Councils buy at high prices

Interaction with

the marketplace

Lack of knowledge of the market place

Lack of interaction with all procurement stakeholders

Few suppliers participate in tenders Lack of trust in procurement process Procurement processes Procurement planning

Lack of knowledge to define procurement plans

Lack of knowledge to publicise procurement plans

Haphazard procurement

leading to loss of money.

Procurement publicity

Lack for use of OTs

Lack of ODPP website for entities to send placement information

Lack of internal notice boards

Poor feedback

Many stakeholders not

aware about procurements Loss of money

Bid preparation

and invitation

Lack of understanding on how to use SBDs

Lack of clear evaluation criteria in bid documents Lack of specific bid opening date and time

Loss of money through wrong bids

Bidders protest during

contract award stage Cancellation of bids

Submission,

opening and

evaluation of bids

Lack of clear date, time, and venue for bid submission Lack of date, time and venue for bid opening

Lack of minutes for bid opening

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Award of

contracts

Lack of notice of contract award

Lack of public notice for contracts awarded

Lack of knowledge to debrief the losers.

Transparency compromised

Suppliers make same

mistakes

Contract administration

Project planning and mobilisation

Lack of works programmes from contractors

Taking advance payments on very small projects

Projects managed

haphazardly

Loss of money through uncompleted projects

Expediting and

supervising contract

implementation

Lack of project monitoring Lack of project operations reports

Lack of analysis of works versus actual works

Projects performance not properly known

Projects completed outside agreed delivery period Loss of money through fraud

Inspection of

procurements and stock control

Lack of handover certificates

Lack of completion or

delivery reports

Lack of delivery notes and GRNs

Loss of money through liquidated damages

Loss of money through double payments

From tables 4.3 and 4.4, it is easy to deduce that compliance remains a challenge in all the councils. In spite of the existence of the PPA (2003), city councils are not able to comply with its provisions partly because some of the provisions are vague. For example, the PPA (2003) mandates the IPC to open bids, examine, evaluate and compare bids. This function is contrary to the overall mandate of the IPC that it should approve the evaluation and make comparison of the bids. In essence, the law is allowing the IPC to approve its own decisions. The IPC becomes prosecutor and judge at the same time.