Condition of carriage printed at back of plane ticket
The pertinent Condition of Carriage printed at the back of the plane ticket reads “8.
BAGGAGE LIABILITY . . . The total liability of the Carrier for lost or damaged baggage of the passenger is LIMITED TO P100.00 for each ticket unless a passenger declares a higher valuation in excess of P100.00, but not in excess, however, of a total valuation of P1,000.00 and additional charges are paid pursuant to Carrier’s tariffs.”
Contract of adhesion
While it may be true that Ong Yiu had not signed the plane ticket, he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. “Such provisions have been held to be a part of the
contract of carriage, and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter’s lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation”. It is what is known as a contract of “adhesion”, in regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other, as the plane ticket in the present case, are contracts not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent.
Limitation of liability to agreed valuation is not contrary to law
And as held in Randolph v. American Airlines and Rosenchein vs. Trans World Airlines, Inc., “a contract limiting liability upon an agreed valuation does not offend against the policy of the law forbidding one from contracting against his own negligence.”
No declaration of greater value nor payment of tariff for value of luggage The liability of PAL for the loss, in accordance with the stipulation written on the back of the ticket is limited to P100.00 per baggage. Ong Yiu not having declared a greater value, and not having called the attention of PAL on its true value and paid the tariff therefor. The validity of the stipulation is not questioned by Ong Yiu. They are printed in reasonably and fairly big letters, and are easily readable. Moreover, Ong Yiu had been a frequent passenger of PAL from Cebu to Butuan City and back, and he, being a lawyer and businessman, must be fully aware of these conditions. Considering, therefore, that Ong Yiu had failed to declare a higher value for his baggage, he cannot be permitted a recovery in excess of P100.00. Besides, passengers are advised not to place valuable items inside their baggage but “to avail of our V-cargo service.” It is likewise to be noted that there is nothing in the evidence to show the actual value of the goods allegedly lost by Ong Yiu.
Additional notes (but not connected to contracts, di naman yata important):
Technicality yields to the interests of substantial justice
On 24 October 1974 or two months after the promulgation of the Decision of the appellate Court, Ong Yiu’s widow filed a Motion for Substitution claiming that Ong Yiu died on 6 January 1974 and that she only came to know of the adverse Decision on 23 October 1974 when Ong Yiu’s law partner informed her that he received copy of the Decision on 28 August 1974. Attached to her Motion was an Affidavit of Ong Yiu’s law partner reciting facts constitutive of excusable negligence. The appellate Court noting that all pleadings had been signed by Ong Yiu himself allowed the widow “to take such steps as she or counsel may deem necessary.” She then filed a Motion for Reconsideration over the opposition of PAL which alleged that the Court of Appeals Decision, promulgated on 22 August 1974, had already become final and executory since no appeal had been interposed therefrom within the reglementary period.
Under the circumstances, considering the demise of Ong Yiu himself, who acted as his own counsel, it is best that technicality yields to the interests of substantial justice.
Besides, in the last analysis, no serious prejudice has been caused PAL.
8. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS V. IAC
ABACAN, AGUILA, ALCANTARA F, ALCANTARA R, BAUTISTA, BELLO, CAMIÑA, CARANDANG, CARIÑO, CARINGAL, CHING, CLEMENTE, CONSUNJI, DEVESA, ESPIRITU, ESQUIVIAS, EVANGELISTA, Facts: PanAm Airlines refused to accommodate Respondent Tinitigan on Pan Am
Flight No. 431 from Sto. Domingo, Republica Dominica to San Juan, Puerto Rico notwithstanding that she possessed a confirmed plane ticket. While plaintiff was standing in line to board the aircraft, a Pan Am employee ordered her in a loud voice to step out of line because her ticket was not confirmed to her embarrassment in the presence of several people who heard and order. Despite her Pleas she was not allowed to board the aircraft. And her seat was also given to a Caucasian. The plane took off without her but with her luggage on board. She was forced to return to her hotel without any luggage much less an extra dress.
While in Sto. Domingo, Tinitigan is expected to be in San Juan that same day to meet a client to sign a contract or lose it. She was expected to make a profit of $1,000 in said contract but because she was unable to board the flight, said profit was lost.
The refusal of accommodation, and consequent loss of profit, caused Respondent Tinitigan to suffer mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. She prayed that she be awarded moral damages of P500,000.00, exemplary damages of P200,000.00, attorney’s fees of P100,000.00 and actual damages sustained by her in the amount of US$1,546.15. Defendant denied that plaintiff was a confirmed passenger since the ticket issued to her was on an open space basis, which meant that she could only be accommodated if any of the confirmed passengers failed to show up at the airport before departure. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff and awarded the amount of damages as prayed for. Said decision was affirmed, hence the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not the award of damages was proper.
Held: Yes, but subject to modifications. Evidence shows petitioner as confirmed passenger.
1.) Defendant issued a Passenger Ticket and Baggage Check with assigned seat and the corresponding pass and baggage claim symbol.
2.) Plaintiff paid the fare and terminal fee.
3.) plaintiff’s passport was stamped by immigration.
4.) Plaintiff’s name was included in the passenger manifest. There is a contract or carriage perfected between plaintiff and defendant for the latter to take plaintiff to her place of destination. By refusing to accommodate plaintiff in said flight, defendant had willfully and knowingly violated the contract of carriage and failed to bring the plaintiff to her place of destination under its contract with plaintiff. There is showing of bad faith. Self-enrichment or fraternal interest and not personal ill will may have been the motive of defendant, but it is malice nevertheless. Malice is shown by the fact that that plaintiff was ordered out of the line under some pretext in order to accommodate a white man.
SC reduced the moral and exemplary damages to the combined total sum of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos and the attorney’s fees to Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos. The award of actual damages in the amount of One
Thousand Five Hundred Forty Six American dollars and fifteen cents (US$1,546.15) computed at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment was retained and granted.
9. PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES V. OPLE
Facts: Pakistan Intl Airlines (PIA) executed 2 separate contracts of employments in Manila, one with Farrales and the other with Mamasig. The pertinent portions of the contract state that (1) the agreement is for a period of 3 years, but can be extended by the mutual consent of the parties; (2) notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA reserves the right to terminate this agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in advance one month before the intended termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month's salary; (3) this agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of Pakistan, and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under this agreement.
1 year and 4 months before the expiration of the contracts of employment, PIA sent separate letters to Mamasig and Farrales, advising them that their services as flight stewardesses would be terminated. Farrales and Mamasig filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of company benefits and bonuses. PIA contended that F & M were habitual absentees and had the habit of bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities of personal effects.
Issue: WON the provision in the contract that the agreement shall be governed by the laws of Pakistan (first clause) and that only the courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have jurisdiction over any controversy arising out of the agreement (second clause), may be given effect (NO)
Held: NO. The first clause cannot be invoked to prevent the application of Phil labor laws and regulations to the subject matter of the case. The ER-EE relationship between PIA and F&M is affected with public interest and the applicable Phil laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship. The second clause cannot also be invoked because the circumstances of the case shows multiple substantive contacts (no ‘r’) between Phil law and Phil courts on the one hand, and the relationship between the parties on the other: contract was executed and partially performed in the Phils., F&M are Filipino citizens and PIA is licensed to do business in the Phils., and F&M were based in the Phils. in between their flights. All the above contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of contractual disputes between the parties. The challenged portion of the employment agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, PIA did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must therefore be presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the applicable provisions of Philippine law.
As to the dismissal of Farrales & Mamasig: they were illegally dismissed and are entitled to 3 years backwages without qualification or deduction. PIA’s right to procedural due process was observed as it was given the opportunity to submit a
position paper and present evidence. Also, the provisions of the employment contract must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, public policy. The employment contract prevents security of tenure of F&M from accruing.
10. TRIPLE EIGHT INTEGRATED SERVICES V. NLRC
Facts: In 1992, Osdana was recruited by Triple Eight for employment with Gulf Catering Company (GCC), a firm based in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Osdana was engaged to work as a food server for 36 months wth a salary of SR550. She claims that she was required by Triple Eight to pay a total of 11,950 pesos in placement fees, without receipts. She was asked to undergo a medical examination, too. It also asked Osdana to sign another ‘Contractor Employee Agreement’ which provided that she would be employed for 12 months as a waitress with a salary of $280. This 2nd employment agreement was approved by the POEA.
Osdana left for Riyadh, Saudi and commenced working for GCC. She was assigned to the College of Public Administration of the Oleysha University and was made to wash dishes, cooking pots, etc. which were unrelation to being a ‘waitress.’ She was made to work a 12-hour shift, without overtime pay.
Osdana suffered from numbness and pain in her arms, and had to be confined from June 18 to August 22, and wasn’t paid her salaries. She was allowed to resume work as Food Server, where she worked 7 days a week, but was not paid. She was again confined.
She was re-assigned to the Oleysha University, like her first assignment. She was diagnosed as having Bilateral Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. The pain then became unbearable, and she underwent two surgical operations. She wasn’t given any work assignments in between operations. After her 2nd operation, she was dismissed from work allegedly on ground of illness, even after being given a certificate that she was fit to work.
Upon her return to the Philippines, Osdana sought the help of Triple Eight, but to no avail. She was constrained to file a complaint before the POEA for the unpaid and underpaid salaries, for the unexpired portion, and damages. Under the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act, the case was transferred to the arbitration branch of the NLRC and assigned to Labor Arbiter Canizares. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of Osdana.
NLRC affirmed. MR was denied.
Issues:
1. W/N there was GAD because of ruling in favor of Osdana even if there was no factual or legal basis for the award (illegal dismissal)
Please see below for issues regarding Conflict of Laws Held:
1. No. Section 8, Rule 1, Book VI of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code shows that Osdana was terminated in violation of such, as well as Article 284.
“Art. 284. Disease as a ground for termination – An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as well as the health of his co-employees: x x x.”
“Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal – Where the employee suffers from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by competent public authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health.”
Osdana’s continued employment despite her illness wasn’t prohibited by law, and it wasn’t prejudicial to her health, as well as that of her co-employees. The medical report that she got stated that ‘she had very good improvement of the symptoms.’
Carpal Tunnel is not contagious.
Regarding the medical certificate requirement
The Court notes that aside from these allegations, petitioner hasn’t presented any medical certificate or similar document from a competent public health authority in support of its claims. Triple Eight argues that she was employed in Saudi Arabia and not in the Philippines, so there was a physical impossibility to secure from a Philippine public health authority the alluded medical certificate that her illness won’t be cured within a period of six months. But the rule is simply ‘certification by a competent public health authority,’ and NOT Philippine public health authority. The requirement cannot be dispensed with, otherwise, it would defeat the public policy on protection of labor.
The law of the place where the contract is made governs in this jurisdiction. The contract was perfected here, so the Labor Code applies. The courts of the forum won’t enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy.
Regarding the contract
Though the contract that was approved by POEA was only for a period of 12 months, Osdana’s actual stint was 1y 7.5m. The employer renewed her, impliedly, so the award for the unexpired portion should have been $280 x 4.5 months.
Regarding award of moral and exemplary damages
According to the facts of the case as stated by public respondent, Osdana was made to perform such menial chores, as dishwashing and janitorial work, among others, contrary to her job designation as waitress. She was also made to work long hours without overtime pay. Because of such arduous working conditions, she developed Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. Her illness was such that she had to undergo surgery twice. Since her employer determined for itself that she was no longer fit to continue
ABACAN, AGUILA, ALCANTARA F, ALCANTARA R, BAUTISTA, BELLO, CAMIÑA, CARANDANG, CARIÑO, CARINGAL, CHING, CLEMENTE, CONSUNJI, DEVESA, ESPIRITU, ESQUIVIAS, EVANGELISTA, working, they sent her home posthaste without as much as separation pay or
compensation for the months when she was unable to work because of her illness. Since the employer is deemed to have acted in bad faith, the award for attorney’s fees is likewise upheld.
11. PHIL. EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GURANTEE CORP. V. V.P.