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4. Development Ethics as a Conceptual Research Lens

4.4 Inclusive Development – A Development Ethic

The adoption of inclusive development as a development ethic emphasises the significance of the structural dimensions of social justice and injustice. ‘Inclusive development’ as it is referred to here is understood as “…a process that occurs when social and material benefits

are equitably distributed across divides within societies, across income groups, genders, ethnicities, regions, religious groups, and others. These benefits necessarily comprise not only economic and material gains but enhanced wellbeing and capabilities as well as social

and political empowerment being widely established” (Hickey et al., 2015, p. 5). As a development ethic, inclusive development enables analysis to go beyond the consideration of development intervention from a distributional vantage point achieved via the consideration of human rights, to draw attention to issues of exclusion and adverse inclusion, as well as the consequences of such forms of structural social inequality in terms of recognition, voice and participation, being concepts that are developed below.

As already noted, recognising the structural dimensions of injustice is important because structural inequality can prevent or constrain individual and group access to the material aspects of wellbeing and can limit individual and group choice and action, reinforcing cycles of advantage for some and disadvantage for others (von Braun & Gatzweiler, 2014; Young, 2001). Mosse (2010) argues that injustice and exploitation endure as a result of power relations and that the associated invisibility of power within political systems disadvantages the poorest and exacerbates social inequality. The discourses of exclusion, inclusion and adverse inclusion therefore stand relevant to the ethic of inclusive development. While the dualistic discourse of inclusion and exclusion may be obvious, the fact that inclusion doesn’t

always align with development is often overlooked (Hickey et al., 2015). “It is now

acknowledged that being included on adverse terms in dominant political, economic, and social orders can be disempowering for weaker groups, including women (Jackson 1999) and minority ethnic groups (Masaki 2010), who become incorporated on subordinate terms and may be denied the agency that can come from operating beyond the confines of hegemonic

formations” (Hickey et al., p. 6). When included on adverse terms, the livelihoods of those at a structural disadvantage can become constrained by social, economic and/or political elements that engender persistent forms of deprivation (Hickey & Du Toit, 2007).

Exclusion and Recognition

Forms of exclusion have been theorised in two basic ways in development literature: (1) In terms of people being excluded from and/or denied the ability to ascertain rights; and (2) In terms of exclusion from representation and the agency necessary for self-expression (Nathan & Xaxa, 2012, p. 3). Often intertwined, forms of exclusion as well as adverse inclusion assume a structural dimension when they are reinforced through social practices and relationships (Mosse, 2010). They become entrenched through social categories and boundaries established and ingrained within social relations, such as those connected to class privilege or lineage differentiation, and gender norms (ibid.). For example, gender roles and

expectations may systematically exclude the ability of women and girls to rights and to ‘voice’,

which is broadly defined here as being an entitlement to have a say, to be listened to and to be heard (Lister, 2008, p. 106). Where this exclusion occurs and human deprivation and poverty is fuelled as a result, issues of powerlessness and inequality emerge as consequence of these gender norms (Hickey & Du Toit, 2007). Therefore, if development is to be wellbeing focused, the consideration of issues related to voice and representation within the process of development is essential (Hickey et al., 2015).

The concept of ‘recognition’ is consequently relevant in this regard. As advanced by Charles Taylor, recognition22 emphasises the importance of human respect irrespective of social categories and is necessary for the protection of basic rights and the needs of individuals within diverse cultural groups (Taylor, 1992). Fraser, therefore, uses the concept of

‘recognition’ to signal the ideal reciprocal relationship that potentially exists between members of a social interaction (Fraser, 2000, 2003), and, in parallel, the term ‘misrecognition’ to signal the inability of an individual or a group to participate as a party with equal status in a social interaction as a result of social subordination. As established by both Young (1990) and Fraser (1997), recognition acts as a counter to non-recognition and misrecognition, being concepts that closely parallel with the discourses of exclusion and adverse forms of inclusion. According to Fraser, forms of misrecognition exist socially as forms of social subordination (2000), with forms of non-recognition being analogous to being rendered invisible within social life (1997, 2003).

The Relevance of Voice to Participation and Agency

As earlier established, issues of exclusion, adverse inclusion, and recognition connect with the

relevance of ‘voice’. The voice of the non-elite is essential for inclusive development (Goulet, 1995) and is necessary for challenging forms of distributional or structural injustice (Appadurai, 2004). For those living in poverty however, often the resources necessary to give

‘voice’, “…to express their views and get results skewed to their own welfare in the political

debates that surround wealth and welfare in all societies”, are lacking (Appadurai, 2004, p. 63). Integrating micro-level voice into more macro-level decision-making is therefore one of the challenges for inclusive development (Goulet, 1995) and Crocker (2010) believes this to be critical for promoting authentic forms of development. As argued by Crocker, authentic development occurs when groups “…become subjects who deliberate, decide, and act in the

world rather than being either victims of circumstance or objects of someone else’s decisions, the tool of someone else’s designs” (Crocker, 2008, p. 339).

Considering the extent to which non-elite members participate and influence forms of social intervention undertaken in the name of development may therefore reveal insights into the meaningfulness of intervention from a non-elite perspective. The spectrum of modes of

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Taylor elaborates that “…our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition

of others, and so a person or a group of people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or

demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves”, which can inflict oppression or a ‘reduced mode of being’

participation offered by Crocker (2010) is useful in this regard23. Distinguishing between

‘thinner to thicker’ modes of participation in group decision-making, Crocker identifies seven varied modes of participation, arguing that each participatory mode reflects relative degrees of

agency (ibid.). As posited by Crocker, the ‘thicker’ the mode of participation, the more significant the degree of agency and voice held by those participating (ibid.). In essence, the

goal of ‘deliberative participation’ (mode seven) aligns with the concept of ‘parity of participation’, which is a term adopted by Fraser to describe the need for a person to be able to interact as a peer and on par with others within society (2003, 2008, p. 16). As argued by

Fraser, overcoming injustice requires a parity of participation, which may require “…

dismantling institutionalized obstacles that prevent some people participating on a par with

others, as full partners in social interaction” (2008, p. 16). Crocker’s seven modes of participation are as follows:

1. Nominal participation: This is the weakest form of participation in group decision- making and involves negligible forms of participation (e.g. meeting non-attendance). 2. Passive participation: Within this mode non-elites may be able to attend meetings,

but only passively receive updates and reports about decisions made without their involvement. Essentially this mode involves the elite informing the non-elite.

3. Consultative participation: Here non-elites may provide information to elites, but decision-making power remains vested with the elite.

4. Petitionary participation: While elites may have a duty to consider non-elite views within the petitionary mode of participation, decision-making power remains vested with elites.

5. Participatory implementation: Within the mode of participatory implementation, non-elite participation and the exercise of non-elite is limited to the implementation of predetermined (elite-ascribed) goals.

6. Bargaining: Bargaining involves drawing on non-elitist forms of individual and group agency, to bargain with elite decision makers to advance their goals. Crocker explains that the extent to which non-elites can influence outcomes depends on what they are prepared to give up in exchange for the concessions advanced. Further,

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While a variety of participation spectrums exist (e.g. Arnstein; 1969; Wilcox; 1994), Crocker’s participation

spectrum has been used here because itself draws on and advances extensive participatory classificatory work (of Agarwal, 2001; Pretty, 1994; Gaventa 1998; and Drydyk, 2005) and assumes a non-elite, human development focus.

within this mode of participation, alliances with external actors can work to enhance the bargaining power of the non-elite. Outcomes, nevertheless, remain ultimately determined by elites.

7. Deliberative participation: Involves joint deliberation between elites and non-elites.

When applied as a development ethic, inclusive development has the ability to highlight issues of exclusion and adverse inclusion, drawing attention to the extent to which non-elite groups participate in development and on what terms. The adoption of inclusive development as a development ethic within this research therefore underscores the need to consider the processes that inform mining company development intervention on Lihir and Simberi islands, and the extent to which these processes may impact the distribution of mining benefits and burdens within society. As recognised by Crocker (2010), the matter of human agency becomes implicitly recognised within such considerations, with participation in development processes impacting the manifestation of agency, as well as the perceived value of development from a non-elite perspective.

4.5 Conclusion

The multidimensional development ethics research lens developed here attempts to capture the significance of distributional justice and associated structural dimension of justice relevant to the notion of social justice. It does this by drawing on human rights and inclusive development as ethics pertinent to the meaningfulness of development intervention within mining communities. As applied analytically within this research, these development ethics are informed by the ethic of wellbeing and an appreciation of what wellbeing means to customary landowners across Lihir and Simberi islands. Hence the concepts of wellbeing and development within the case study context are explored in Chapter 6, the reality of development intervention in practice is considered in Chapter 7, and narratives reflecting landowner experiences of development intervention are documented in Chapter 8. This then sets the scene for evaluating human rights and inclusive development related to mining company development intervention in Chapters 9 and 10.