Indicators of institutional influence

Historical institutionalist research involves ‘explaining real world outcomes, using history as an analytic tool’ and engaging with ‘the ways in which institutions shaped political outcomes’ (Steinmo 2008, p. 157). In line with this objective, the bulk of the research in this thesis involved processing appropriate source material to facilitate the search for evidence

that policy actors have been influenced or constrained by the layers of rules and structures that have built up over time within the UNFCCC, particularly in terms of power distribution, coalition building, incentives and expectations, and policy choices. Part of this involved looking for self-reinforcing rules (formal policies or logics of appropriateness) or self- reinforcing behaviour (e.g. learning effects, alteration of actors’ expectations), or a combination of the two (Duit 2007, pp. 1102–1103). In other words, this means using information gathered about the policy process over time to pinpoint sequences of events that show either formal policies or actors’ behaviour within an institution reproducing institutional rules, thereby both being influenced by and reinforcing institutional structures that themselves reflect particular problem definitions, priorities, solution preferences and shared understandings. Hotimsky et al. (2006) point out that actor behaviour can also be influenced by logics of consequences based on formal rules and assessments of costs and benefits, and by logics of appropriateness where actors are guided by what they deem as legitimate and how they perceive other actors’ expectations.

In the context of these various logics of behaviour it is important to acknowledge the role of power within the social context of an institution, and consider when actors have power to shape the policy agenda or manipulate shared understandings and the behavioural expectations they generate, in an effort to reinforce or alter institutional structures and advance their own interests. In turn, the effect of such manipulation on the disruption or maintenance of institutional arrangements must also be queried (Hotimsky et al. 2006). Underpinning this analysis was the search for evidence of institutional reinforcement and/or change and the relationship between such observed changes and policy paths and expectations already in place. Incremental change was the most likely form of change; since the UNFCCC remains intact as the site of global climate governance (albeit with other sites of governance emerging at multiple scales, see section 3.2.2 above), a critical juncture where the institution was replaced with another has obviously not occurred. Historical institutionalists claim that ‘aggregate outcomes need to be understood in terms of the actions and behavior of individuals behaving strategically’ (Thelen 1999, p. 377), so tying the various threads of institutional influence together into a temporally constructed narrative was necessary to identify and understand this strategic behaviour and how it leads to the aggregate outcomes. To guide the research, specific mechanisms that can indicate institutional influence on actors and policy outcomes are outlined below:

• Evidence that the behaviour of actors has been stimulated and constrained by structural influences on problem definition and policy options (Thelen and Steinmo 1992).

• Evidence that institutional design and rules reflected power asymmetries, problem definitions, ideology, objectives and shared understandings present in the prevailing national or international system, and subsequent reinforcement of these structural features and policy paths (O’Riordan and Jordan 1999, Hotimsky et al. 2006).

o Evidence that institutional design locked in these power asymmetries and other features, benefitting particular actors and resulting in advantageous rules and norms that reinforce these benefits (Mahoney 2000, Pierson 2004).

• Evidence of “social coalitions” of actors that drive the creation of institutions and are vital to their ongoing stability, even if the constituents of the coalitions change. In turn, evidence of coalitions trying and/or failing to gather sufficient strength required to bring about significant institutional change (Hall 2016).

• Evidence of institutional, ideological and social factors influencing how preference weights are applied by actors (Hall 2009) and how actors’ interests are expressed in political behaviour.

o Evidence that institutional rules and structures have shaped the identity, self- image and preferences of actors (Hall and Taylor 1996).

• Evidence of networks reaching beyond the UNFCCC and connecting it with other institutions, benefitting particular actors or coalitions while further reinforcing

expectations and leading actors to make choices in line with the relevant policy, as well as increasing the strength of coalitions required to alter relevant policy paths (Pierson 1994).

• Evidence of critical junctures where exogenous or endogenous events disrupt the stability of the institution and established policy paths, creating opportunities for major institutional reform (Pierson 2004).

• Evidence that institutional configurations and rules have suppressed the ability of actors to articulate their interests and succeed in having them accepted as legitimate concerns or grounds for change within the political process (Vatn 2015).

• Evidence of overarching policy paradigms, which have shaped goals and problem definitions within the policy process and have become integrated into the institutional design and structure itself (Greener 2002).

o Mechanisms of policy stability should be considered within paradigms, in order to extend our understanding of how the institutional design of the UNFCCC has shaped actors’ behaviour alongside the signals, reward and penalties that policies themselves provide (Pierson 2000).

• Evidence that uncertainty about medium and long term impacts of climate change affected the initial configuration of power, knowledge and formal institutional

properties and, in combination with the overarching policy paradigm, shaped states’ perceptions of the climate change problem and potential solutions, and their willingness to adhere to commitments (Haas 2004).

• Evidence that competing interpretations of institutional rules have mobilised different coalitions into movements seeking particular interpretations of these rules in policy making (Mahoney and Thelen 2009).