Outside of the formal ethical guidance described earlier, there are many informal influences that contribute to what I have called the military’s “informal ethic.” One of the more positive contributions to this ethic is military literature, which is quite popular amongst soldiers. For instance, Steven Pressfield’s novel, Gates of Fire, a fictionalized account of the three hundred Spartans who sacrificed their lives defending the pass at Thermopylae, resonates deeply with soldiers and provides a striking example of the type of selfless devotion to duty and country that the professional ethic seeks to impart. Other contributions come from popular culture such as military-themed films and television shows. Films such as Saving Private Ryan and the HBO mini-series Band of Brothers, while meant as entertainment, can also communicate important ethical lessons, sometimes more effectively than lectures or formal ethical doctrine.
Often, these informal influences complement the formal ethic; however, this is not always the case and without the appropriate guidance, a young officer or soldier can come away having absorbed the wrong lesson from these informal influences. For instance, Saving Private Ryan illustrates how popular entertainment has the potential of transmitting lessons that undermine soldiers’ understanding of their ethical responsibilities. In one particular scene, the company commander, Captain Miller, orders his men to release a German prisoner they have captured. The nature of their mission makes it impossible for them to bring the prisoner with them, and Miller cannot spare anyone to escort the prisoner back to American lines. A significant number of Miller’s soldiers object to this order, and in sorting out the competing reasons for killing the prisoner versus setting him free, the squad is brought to the brink of mutiny. In the end, Miller convinces his men that killing the prisoner, besides being legally impermissible, is an act that will irreparably mar their own moral identity. Unfortunately, Miller and the German prisoner
encounter one other in battle later in the film and the prisoner kills Miller, before being killed himself.
Without the proper perspective, a soldier could easily come away believing that, in
situations analogous to that depicted in the film, prisoners should be executed lest they return to the battlefield to exact revenge. However, if these scenes from the movie were used as a teaching tool in a military ethics class, a competent instructor would go to great lengths to point out the fact that Miller was killed by the very prisoner he took mercy on is completely beside the point. First of all, the law of armed conflict is categorical in forbidding the execution of
prisoners. Once they surrender, prisoners become noncombatants and are no longer legitimate targets. An instructor could also guide soldiers to an understanding of how unnecessary killing, particularly of noncombatants, is an act that is likely to haunt a soldier for the rest of his life. That soldiers might face a former prisoner in combat at some future date is just one more risk, among many, that they assume when they swear to abide by the military’s code of ethics.
In addition to films and literature, violent video games exert their own insidious influence on the psyches of young soldiers and how they view their ethical responsibilities.246 As noted in Chapter One, many psychologists cite the popularity of these games as one reason why modern soldiers are much less conflicted about pulling the trigger than soldiers in previous wars. Unfortunately, the type of operant conditioning provided by violent video games occurs in a moral vacuum, without any discussion of the consequences that accompany the act of killing. In the end, soldiers are bombarded with these types of cultural transmissions and are left free to draw their own conclusions, which are often deeply immoral.
Apart from the media influences described above, the informal ethic is largely a product of the socialization process soldiers experience when they join the military. In the hothouse environment of recruit training, in which access to outside influences is tightly controlled, it is relatively easy to impart the tenets of the professional ethic. However, once recruits leave the training environment and arrive at their operational units, they quickly acclimate to the
prevailing moral climate. 247
One feature of the military’s operational climate that significantly undermines the
professional military ethic is a widespread culture of alcohol abuse. The deleterious influence of alcohol on moral behavior cannot be overstated. As one Vietnam veteran observes:
Looking back to my time in Vietnam, there were a number of things that cost us that war, and I believe alcohol was one of them. Today’s small-unit leaders should never encourage any leeway; they must insist on compliance with General Order No. 1. During pre-deployment training, good leaders will promote the expectation that there will be no drinking in the battle space.248
Over the course of the last three decades, the military hierarchy has come to share this
assessment of the negative affects of alcohol consumption, particular in theaters of war, and has instituted a ban on alcohol in combat zones. However, alcohol abuse remains a significant problem. For instance, military officials estimate that alcohol is a contributing factor in the vast majority of cases of sexual assault reported by service members.249 Instead of promoting a sense of solidarity, alcohol often undermines the sense of loyalty and duty soldiers owe to one
247 The author recalls visiting the Naval Recruit Training Center (RTC) at Great Lakes, Il. Part of the tour included
observing a recruit company undergoing their last strenuous 30-hour drill in shipboard damage control before graduating. The commanding officer of RTC asked us to note how proud the recruits were of what they had accomplished, particularly their enthusiasm for the Navy’s core values. “All this will change in about a month when they report to their follow-on training or first operational command,” he said. Many of the motivated, enthusiastic sailors that graduate from recruit training will be infected by the operational fleet culture and their enthusiasm for the core values will tend to diminish in proportion to the emphasis placed on observing these values in their operational units.
248 Couch, 105.
249 Craig Whitlock, “Military leaders open to power shift in sexual-assault investigations,” The Washington Post
(online), May 17, 2013.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/military-leaders-open-to-power-shift-in-sexual-assault- probes/2013/05/17/e9aed3a6-bf26-11e2-a31d-a41b2414d001_story.html
another, particularly between males and females. One female Air Force officer observes that highly disciplined soldiers can become leering fools under the influence of alcohol and that “the brotherhood of arms ends at the first drink.”250
Along with the influences mentioned above, Kermit Johnson has identified four
“institutional forces” that are woven into the fabric of the military’s operational culture that further undermine the influence of the formal professional military ethic: 251
1. The attitude that if a practice achieves results, then it is right. 2. Unreflective loyalty to one’s superior is an imperative duty.
3. Excessive concern for the image of the unit and the military profession that leads to concealing mistakes.
4. The tendency to emphasize career success at the expense of ethical considerations. One does not have to look too deeply to perceive the deleterious influence of these forces, particularly when they affect the ethical reasoning of those at the pinnacle of the military’s command structure. For instance, the attitude that if a policy achieves results, then it is morally acceptable was the justification for the torture memorandum issued by the Bush
administration.252 In this case, the belief that torture produces reliable, actionable intelligence was a mistaken impression rather than a concrete fact; however, this reason continues to be cited by some as a justification for continuing the practice.
The belief that results alone justify a particular practice is a relatively common perception among soldiers and is often reinforced by the chain of command. Benjamin Overby relates his
250 Elizabeth Robbins, “Alcohol abuse is fueling military sexual assault,” The Washington Post (online), June 13,
2013.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/alcohol-abuse-is-fueling-military-sexual-assault/2013/06/13/da2f5ada- d37c-11e2-a73e-826d299ff459_story.html
251 Kermit Johnson, “Ethical Issues of Military Leadership” Parameters IV (1974): 35-39. 252 Barton Gellman, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency (New York: Penguin, 2008), 174.
personal experience with an Army captain who hid unauthorized spare parts in the false ceiling of his office in order to conceal them from inspectors conducting an annual audit of his supply practices. During the audit, the false ceiling collapsed under the weight of the parts and the captain justifiably received an unfavorable mark for logistics management as the hoarding of parts creates artificial shortages, denying them to forward deployed units that badly need them. Sadly, the only response of the captain’s immediate superior was regret that the ceiling gave way at the inopportune time that it did.
Part of what motivates the illicit practices described above is a concern for preserving the image of the unit, no matter the cost. The fact that the massacre at My Lai remained hidden for so long was largely due to the concern that an investigation would tarnish the image of the division and the U.S. Army. This concern for the unit’s image was also evident in the cover-up associated with the massacre of Iraqi civilians at Haditha in 2005.
The third institutional factor, the perception that unquestioning loyalty is the hallmark of a good officer, also contributes to crimes, such as the cover up of war atrocities, as well as less egregious forms of unethical behavior. For instance, the actions of the Iran-Contra
conspirators, as well as their perjury to investigators and members of Congress, was motivated by the belief that loyalty to the President trumped their oath to preserve and defend the
Constitution.
Perhaps the subtlest of the four institutional forces, and the one that, because of its insidiousness, does the most damage to the professional ethic, is careerism within the officer corps. Unlike many professions, the military does not offer large financial bonuses for superior performance; no matter how many hours a soldier works, his paycheck remains relatively modest compared with the responsibility he holds. The primary way operational success is rewarded is
through promotion, which requires a soldier to earn consistently stellar performance reviews. This contributes to a “zero-defect” environment in which even relatively minor mistakes have the potential to destroy a career. As Richard Gabriel observes:
Every officer knows that a single less-than-perfect efficiency report may well mean the difference between a successful and unsuccessful career. The same is true for the noncommissioned officer. As a consequence, leadership elements too often stress the “wolf-at-the-door syndrome.” In assuming their positions, they take few risks, try to keep the lid on existing problems, and avoid confronting problems directly. To admit that a unit has problems is often perceived as a reflection on the commander’s abilities. Thus commanders often hope to keep everything in order at least publicly, long enough to receive a good efficiency report and then move on to another assignment.253
The careerism described above makes a mockery of the professional military ethic, influencing officers to conceal training and readiness problems and to treat their soldiers merely as a means to an end, with the end being not a more capable military unit, but a favorable fitness report for the officer. The inherent danger in careerism is that it destroys the moral fiber of the military institution and undermines national defense, taking what should be well-trained and equipped military units and turning them into ‘Potemkin villages.’ Careerism and the unethical behavior it spawns took such a toll on the readiness of the armed forces in the immediate aftermath of Vietnam War and throughout the 1970s, that the U.S. military was referred to as a “hollow force.”
While conditions within the 21st century American military are not anywhere as dire as at the institution’s nadir in the 1970s, some of the attitudes that promote careerism still persist. The most damaging of these attitudes is the “zero-defect” mentality described above, in which any mistake, either by an officer or one of her subordinates, threatens to derail the officer’s career. Humans are naturally inclined to conceal their misdeeds and such an implicit policy only exacerbates that tendency by punishing officers who abide by the core values articulated by the professional military ethic. The hypocrisy of promoting one ethical standard while
implicitly rewarding behavior that is diametrically opposed to that standard, results in a type of moral dissonance that destroys faith in the professional military ethic and the values it endorses.