An insider’s view: policy and spin, ‘from abuser to abused’

The senior media and communications expert (P8) interviewed for this project was quite open about the positive and negative aspects of the Carr governments’ media management style and its effects on policy. P8 considered that in the early days of the Labor government the strategy was positive and productive, especially when there was a combination of a clear policy outlook, skilled policy advisors, media advisors and strong Ministers and Attorney Generals committed to positive reform (P8). She argued that when communications staff and policy advisors worked well together they could achieve solid political and policy gains, especially with a coordinated strategy development, which ‘allowed Ministers who were strong and

skilled enough, to pursue a line that might not be immediately popular with the media’ (P8). According to P8, when politicians were sure of their policy position

and were receiving support from the Premier and support from Cabinet, they could stand firm against shock jocks like Alan Jones and Ray Hadley, as well as the tabloid newspapers like the Daily Telegraph. As P8 explains:

To some extent they were happy to stand up to the Jones’s and the Hadleys, if they had a good position to stand on. So the difference was that they would go in and say ‘oh gosh yes this is terrible I’m going to do something about that I’ll fix it! And then maybe a small fix but not a large scale policy thing (P8).

P8 rejected the idea that the media always set policy agendas and directed policy options. She stressed that strong governments with skilled staff do not have to react immediately to strident media demands. She pointed out that ‘if you’re a very good

spin doctor then you can have an immediate response which has no long term effects’ (P8). For example, a confident and strong government would ride out

adverse media stories and respond to any criticism with evidence and examples. According to P8 they would respond by saying ‘here’s a graph that tells you how

often it happens, now go away because it’s not really true’ (P8). According to P8

when there is a separation of policy and communications, clearly mapped guidelines between the business of politics and policy development and when there are skilled staff, there are few problems: ‘when you have very good communications people

who understand what they’re doing, you can keep those things separate’ (P8).

However, according to P8 problems began for the Labor government when there was a convergence between communications work and policy development, and it

8. In the court of Carr: Media, politics and policy became difficult to draw ‘a line between where policy and communication begins

and ends’ (P8). It was argued that this happened during the Labor years when

political and policy advisors were began to be dominated by media based staff: The chiefs of staff, chief policy advisors, media advisors and the Premier had all been journalists…. There were very strong policy advisors who had previously been journalists and there were very strong people in the communications area who had reasonably strong opinions on policy as well (P8).

For P8, the convergence of spin and policy happened in NSW for a number of reasons, one was the resignation of both Bruce Hawker and Dave Britton, which meant that ‘there wasn’t anyone who could actually control what was happening

between the spin and the policy stuff’ (P8). In addition, their departure coincided

with the resignation of key Ministers that changed the composition and the politics of the Cabinet. As P8 explains ‘all of those people went and the next team that

came in were kind of the B-team -… you lost that sort of left wing perspective and lost all their staffers in there who were in their fighting the good fight’ (P8). And

she continued ‘When you have people who are just in the spin cycle the whole time

and you have ministers who are, I guess, seeing the downward spiral and seeing themselves as part of it, then you get far too much convergence between the spin and the policy’ (P8). Without strong ministers leading the policy agenda, or pushing

the good news out there, P8 recounted how policy in NSW ‘got taken over by the

right – wing basically’ (P8). Dempster (2005) in his analysis of the Carr

government‘s media management strategy also highlights what he sees as the blurring of the lines between politics and policy during this period and, as will be discussed below, found the willingness of senior public servants to give in to media and to political pressure, to be a worrying trait.

This study suggests that there were different facets of the media management strategy that had a number of implications for policy decisions. For example, if there is a distinct separation between policy development and the business of public relations and spin, then the potential for policies to retain their integrity in relation to the issue under consideration can be maximised. If senior media advisors are skilled at what they do and are also progressive in their outlook on justice issues, there is a greater chance that juvenile justice policy decisions can maintain a more

progressive tone. This requires governments to be committed to the aims and objectives of the policy so that if ministers are prepared to back those policies then the opportunities for progressive policy windows to open and remain so are increased. However, when those ministers and skilled media staff leave then those opportunities diminish.

This last point was raised by another interviewee (P7), who felt that the resignation of the Hon. Jeff Shaw Attorney General in 2000, contributed to the ‘overall

capitulation of the government to the media’ (P7). As P7 stated ‘...you start to see once Shaw moved on and Bob Debus was appointed as Attorney, a bit of a pull back by the politicians and much more attention paid to the screeching media and fear about what the media might say. So you see the rise of the “Law & Order politics” and ‘we must be seen as being tough on kids’ (P7).

P8 also argued that the Labor government began to run out of ideas by the late 1990s, when there was ‘little policy substance behind media statements’ (P8) and the ‘spin’ started to look hollow. P8 eloquently charts that shift in approach, as she explained:

to their credit in the early days with Carr they led the news cycle and, from a spin doctors point of view, they were amazing they really were. They had the line-up every day, they were keeping everybody busy, and they did it well for a very long time. There comes a time when that becomes very empty and people are very cynical about you because you’re making the same announcement after four years and they’re all going ‘oh we’ve been here before (P8).

P8 argued that at moments when a government or a Minister is not confident, or feels vulnerable or doesn’t have solid support from their department or Cabinet, ‘the

spin and the reaction pushes policy rather than the other way round’ (P8).

Consequently according to P8 ‘you get more and more [overreaction] and that’s

where you get all the backflips, all the changes, all the things happening which aren’t well thought out policy, because you’re still in that little abusive relationship cycle but you’re not the abuser anymore, you’re actually being abused’ (P8). P8

explained ‘if there is a adverse new story that you don’t have control over you

panic’ and P8 stated at that point to regain control governments react with get tough

8. In the court of Carr: Media, politics and policy In these circumstances, the policy space becomes dominated by spin and by quick fix reactions to media demands. Policy decision-making becomes shaped by how the policy will sell to the media and also by the objective of maintaining good relations with those sections of the media that are seen to have populist credentials. P8 provided a contrasting example of how the Victorian government responded to similar media pressure. She explained, ‘they had a government who was willing to

stand up in the midst of some immediate juvenile crisis and say “Oh yes, this is terrible but we’re not going to change anything” – whereas in NSW, we increasingly started changing policy on the way we dealt with people in reaction to media hype and outrage’ (P8).

P10 also remarked that in her view, when politics became focused on leaders, politicians would often resort to familiar territory, or rely on ‘get tough’ statements to boost their individual profile. As P10 stated ‘perhaps every leader whether it’s

the prime minister or premier or whoever, they feel that they are vulnerable and if they are not being seen to be strong on things they may feel at risk’ (P10). P10 also

felt that it was the quick pace of the 24 hour news cycle that made politicians look to quick fix solutions, as she stated ‘politicians wanted to be to be seen to act

decisively before the media moved on to another news story’ (P10).

Young in her book on political advertising also argues that spin becomes more powerful over policy development especially in criminal justice when governments are weakened. She states ‘the focus on leadership, or on get tough policies can be seen to be due to the lack of imagination and failure in Labor governments to have the imagination and skill for developing good policy’ (Young 2004, p.249). Tiernan also sees the kinds of negative effects of media management described above happening in other areas of government (2007a, 2007b). In her overview of the growth of media advisors in Australia, Tiernan describes how public servants expressed their concern that the media-conscious, politically focused advice offered by media staff working in close proximity to ministers, began to supplant the more policy focused advice of departmental officials (2007a, 2007b).