For instance, the biography of hereditary Guard Commander P ’eng Yiin and his descendants P ’eng is described as having the Confucian

virtues of a human-hearted temperament (jen-hsing), and filial piety. His son was noted only for his military prowess, but his grandson was said to have had both culture and military qualities (wen-wu

ts3ai-hsing) . Chia-hsing fu chih 1878:42.10a. See also biography of Hsü Hsing-chien, Yu-chi pien (1605) by Chu Yüan-pi in Yen-i chih lin 46.1a; biography of Wan Piao, DMB:1337-9; biography of C h ’i Chi-kuang, DMB:220.

were perhaps more stringent than elsewhere and military officers did not enjoy a high status. Local civil officials had little reason to be optimistic about the capabilities of military officers in times of emergency.

The isolated pirate attacks recorded in the late 1540s exposed the weakness of Hai-ning Guard as a coastal defence force, seven or eight years before the major pirate raids began. When pirates clashed with government forces near Cha-p’u in 1546, the Guard troops were so inadequate that the son of one of the officers hired irregulars to assist his father.76

Thus, Hai-ning Guard shared the shortcomings of the coastal defence system as a whole. It was an institution without power, without status, without resources. The institutional basis for its effective

functioning had been eroded over a long period. By the 1550s, when the forces had nothing but ill-maintained and obsolete equipment and no sea­ going capacity, they no longer had the financial or administrative power to improve their military capability. Much of the finance originally allotted for coastal defence had been diverted elsewhere by the

provincial civil administration.77

But Hai-ping Guard was not the only resource available for the defence of Chia-hsing on the eve of the pirate invasions. Several institutions had been set up in the course of the dynasty which, unlike the coastal defence forces, were intended to assist in the maintenance of internal opder. Under the control of local civil officials they were supposed to cope with police and security matters and to protect local agencies of the imperial government. These institutions, the police offices (hsün-chien-ssu) and district militia (min-chuang) constituted a reserve army which could be used in emergencies either to protect the local civil administration or to supplement the ranks of the coastal defence forces.

76 Cha-p*u chih 1757:6.2a; Chia-hsing fu chih 1878:42.10a.

77 See, for instance in Fukien, Wang Yii, "Submission on restoring to the coast its absconded forces and surplus funds", in Pu Ta-t’ung,

Pei Wo chi (1554 or 1555) 2:8b-9a, contained in Hsileh-hai lei-pien.

This memorial was written at some time during Wang Yu's term as Governor of Chekiang, between 1552 and 1554.

Police offices, staffed by corps of bowmen (kung-ping), had been established at the beginning of the dynasty under the control of district and prefectural authorities for use in maintaining civil order. They were located at strategic points both inland and in fortified places along the coast.79 The kung-ping were raised as one

Q A

item of the labour service levy. For the most part stationed at points outside the district administrative seats, the functions of the police offices were to watch and prevent the activities of criminals and salt smugglers. They were supposed to drill with the regular army from time to time, and could be absorbed into the ranks of the army in an emergency. At such times, they probably passed out of the control of the district civil official in charge of police matters, into the charge of military officers.

As late as 1530, according to one gazetteer, police offices were re-established at Kan-p’u and Cha-p’u with one hundred bowmen allotted to each,81 implying that the earlier offices had ceased to operate effectively. These coastal towns therefore each contained a police office headed by a civil official, as well as the regular Battalion establishment.82 Some sources suggest that in the 1550s the coastal police offices were manned, not by hired or conscripted civilians, but by troops of the Hai-ning Guard.83 The suggestion is not easily

confirmed, but if true is an interesting combination of civil and military institutions. Whatever the source of its staff, the cost of

84

the service in the coastal district remained part of the service levy. There is also conflicting evidence about the numbers of men at each office, before, during and after the pirate invasions. Most sources

78 Chia-shan hsien chih 1892:13.12a.

79 Che-chiang t3 ung-ohih 1561:57.llb-12a, lists the sites of police offices in northern Chekiang in the 1550s; Hsiu-shui hsien chih

1596:2.18a.

80 Chia-shan hsien chih 1892:13.12a. 81 P3ing-hu hsien-chih 1689:9.3b.

82 See for instance Kan-shui chih 1557:2.9a.

83 Hucker, "Hu Tsung-hsien's campaign against Hsü Hai", p.285. The local gazetteers do not make clear reference to such an arrangement. 84 See for instance Kan-shui chih 1557:3.12b.

agree that each inland office was meant to have a staff of thirty, but

for the coastal offices, the figures vary between seventy and one

hundred and twenty.85 None of these figures needs bear much relation to

actual staffing levels in the early 1550s, and it seems unlikely that

they were at full strength at that time.

The other security institution under the control of civil district

officials was the district militia, an institution dating back to the

first half of the fifteenth century. Late Ming sources indicate that

the service was being performed personally in Chia-hsing prefecture in

the early sixteenth century; that is to say, each Zi (unit of families grouped together for tax purposes) contributed a man or men to do the

service. By the 1550s, the service had become a tax in cash, at least

in the inland districts, and the men were hired at a figure set for each

district at one man per li.6k In the 1550s, three inland districts should have had militia corps of 235, 316, and 300 men respectively, and

the coastal districts, 161, and 160.87 In the inland districts, militia

came under the control of the Chief Officer (ohu-pu) called in Hsiu-shui district the Chief Officer for Superintending Police Matters (hsiin-pu yü chu p u ), but in the two coastal districts, the officials designated as

Registrar (tien-shih), were in charge of such matters.88

85 Che-chiang t*ung-chih 1561:57.llb-12a; Kan-shui chih 1557:3.12b; P-* ing-hu hsien chih 1689:9.3b.

86 The system is described in Hsiu-shui hsien ohih 1596:2.18a; Chia- shan hsien-ohih 1892:13.3b. In 1441 when banditry was widespread in Kiangsi province it was proclaimed that each district should raise one thousand militia for its own defence. In one inland district of Chia-hsing prefecture, Chia-shan, five hundred of the one thousand set off to fight in Kiangsi led by the Chief Officer of the district. Chia-shan hsien chih 1892:13.3b; Chia-hsing fu chih 1600:8.29a.

87 Chia-hsing fu chih 1600:8.29a-b. Figures for the other two inland districts are not clear in the text. PJing-hu hsien chih 1689:9.3a

(9.2b has one per li = 160 men, but 9.3a has that there was a fixed figure of 316). Chia-hsing hsien chih 1685:4.16b has 361, but I have taken the figure in the earlier gazetteer as correct.

88 The functions carried out by subordinate district officials varied from district to district according to local conditions. According to the Ming shih, the Registrar was responsible, as the title

implies, for documents and accounting, while police matters rested with the Vice-Magistrate or Chief Officer, his superiors. However in some districts, including Shun-an in the north-west of Chekiang, and P ’ing-hu and Hai-yen districts of Chia-hsing, it was the

Over the long years of peace, the district militia had been used to perform more immediately necessary tasks than that of defence prepared­ ness. They were employed as messengers or as guards of grain stores and public buildings. Unlike the employees of the police offices, they generally had no police function and were not often the "able-bodied men between twenty and fifty that they were originally required to be.

The min-chuang were originally founded to raise troops for suppressing insurgency in adjacent provinces and for protecting the local district city. But in fact, local defence had never been part of their duties in Chia-hsing prefecture. Although their function had changed, they still had potential as a reserve army or, more accurately, as reserve military funds.90 In the late 1540s, one-fifth of the hire money (yung-chih) for the militia of the inland district of Chia-shan had been diverted to coastal defence expenditure (hai-tao pei ping fei). It was only restored after the pirate incursions escalated in the mid- 1550s and Chia-shan district needed its own defence force.91

From the above outlines of the three existing institutions — the coastal defence forces, the police offices and the district militia — it is obvious why the gazetteer of 1549 expressed some disquiet about the current state of military preparedness.92 But in the wake of Chu Wan's disgrace, the climate for decisive administrative action was unfavour­ able, and the apprehensions of Chia-hsing officials were tentatively expressed and difficult to act upon.

Registrar who was in charge of police and security, the financial and documentary duties lying with his colleagues. Cartier, Une

re forme locale, pp.37, 111; P3ing-hu hsien chih 1689:9.3a.

89 The reason for the difference in evolution of function between the