could be institutionalized as a standing component of the global internet governance ecosystem. Of course, if one is of the view that a convincing case for doing this has not been and cannot be made, then the following options will be of little interest. But if one believes that with proper elaboration there could be something here worth exploring further, the question of where the function might be housed inevitably must be addressed. We briefly outline five options:
Status Quo+. If the prospect of constructing a new organization cannot attract sufficient support, the global community could try to approximate the function by committing more resources to enabling groups that are already on the scene. Communities of expertise like the Internet Society, the Global Internet Gover- nance Academic Network, and the new Network of Centres; capacity development programs such as the various schools of internet governance and the Diplo Foundation; organizations like the various technical community bodies, consultancies, think tanks, and academic research centres and observatories; civil society and private sector organizations and associa- tions; national, regional and global technical assistance programs and development banks; dialogue forums like the national, regional and global IGFs—these and other entities could simply be encouraged to “step up their game” with respect to the kinds of informa- tion resources and relationships they already provide to varying degrees. This could be the path of least resistance, but there are reasons to wonder whether, absent some rather demanding coordination efforts, this would really come close to helping users like LDC
governments work their way through the cacophony to focused and locally viable decision-making.
Intergovernmental Organization. IGOs already provide some of the elements described above within the constraints of their respective mandates. Some would undoubtedly welcome the expanded mandates, resources and staffing that a systematically coordinated clearinghouse function would require. And for many G-77 governments, this could be the preferred solution that would inspire the highest level of trust and buy- in. But there would be some significant barriers to overcome with this option, e.g. a view of governments (or even particular government ministries) as their primary clientele; variable and sometimes poor relations with the nongovernmental actors that are often best positioned to provide certain kinds of information and expertise; commitments to suboptimal governance models; the possibility of politicization and bureaucratization unduly constraining the functions’ performance; focused mandates that could not easily encompass many of the more pressing issues; and the political inability to facilitate cross-organizational assessments of governance performance.
A New Multistakeholder Organization. Over the years, when a functional need has been identified, the global internet community has proven able to create new and sustainable entities that operate in a fairly transparent, accountable and inclusive manner. It is easy to forget that not so long ago we did not have ICANN or all the Regional Internet Registries, internet service provider associations, network operator groups, internet exchanges, security entities, standards processes, root server operators and so on. Given this track record, one would think it possible to create a lean but expert organization that would complement and effectively interface with the others, as well as with potential users. Such an organization also could take on the role, addressed by Anriette Esterhuysen in her contribution to this volume, of providing models, good practices, lessons learned and so to help interested governments establish multistakeholder processes at the national or regional level.
The NETmundial Initiative could get the ball rolling. During the six month boot-up phase in which the World Economic Forum (WEF) will serve as the convening platform, a working group could be constituted to flesh out the concept and define a sustainable organizational model. Transparent and inclusive online consultations could be held to solicit input from diverse stakeholders and experts worldwide, and contacts could be initiated with potential users, such as developing country governments, to undertake a needs assessment.
A global community of supporters could be constructed to guide the execution of the project after the WEF’s convening role is concluded. And the WEF could use its 2015 annual meeting to bring together high level political and industry leaders and encourage commitments of financial and other support. The NETmundial Initiative’s Steering Committee could oversee the project.
A major challenge here would be to obtain and sustain the buy-in of developing and transitional country governments that are not used to working in a multistakeholder setting and may be more strongly inclined toward an intergovernmental formulation. The sort of riotous debate and factionalism that sometimes mars multistakeholder processes ideally would be tempered somewhat to increase the comfort levels of governments and other potential partners who are not used to the culture. Even then, a historically nurtured and sometimes deeply embedded lack of trust in some quarters could pose a serious challenge unless forward-looking, first-moving client governments had good experiences and encouraged others to abandon their reluctance.
The IGF. A fourth option would be to return to the sort of vision civil society participants advanced a decade ago and perform the function within the IGF. This could entail developing an expert grouping within the secretariat that would engage in networked collaboration with people from the IGF community. There are arguably natural synergies between the dialogue and clearinghouse functions that could be exploited, e.g. by pairing face to face with online activities. As Wolfgang Kleinwächter has argued, “With regard to the clearinghouse function, the dialogue among various governmental and non- governmental organizations and institutions can clear the air with regard who has to do what. It could lead to a more enhanced and developed division of labour where institution can spin a web of interactions.…12
Moreover, the IGF provides a pre-established global multistakeholder platform that could be rapidly leveraged to ramp up outreach and promote inclusion. And in at least some circles, it would provide greater legitimacy and continuity with prior long-running global processes.
On the other hand, the organizational culture, budgetary rules and political constraints of the United Nations could make it difficult to organize an innovative and independent activity with significant multistakeholder
12 Wolfgang Kleinwächter, “Multistakeholderism and the IGF: Laboratory, Clearinghouse, Watchdog,” in, William J. Drake, ed., Internet Governance: Creating Opportunities for All---The Fourth Internet Governance Forum, Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, 15-18 November 2009 (New York: The United Nations, 2010), p. 91.
participation. The IGF itself has already faced many challenges in this respect, and one would not want the project to become a political football or bargaining chip in the General Assembly, or to be interfered with in terms of staffing, project management, finances, etc. Moreover, if legitimacy and political support are thought to be an argument in favor of placing it under the IGF umbrella, it is worth bearing in mind that there are many G-77 governments that already choose not to engage seriously with the IGF.
Mixed. The final option would be to combine the last two models, by establishing an independent multistakeholder clearinghouse with its own financial supports and community control, but develop some sort of working relationship with the IGF. This might square the circle and provide the benefits of both approaches while attenuating their potential downsides. The modalities of cooperation would take some work to hammer out, but depending on various factors this could prove doable.
Conclusion
Our discussion clearly provides more questions than answers, and is intended only to be a suggestive appetizer. Further research and analysis will be needed to flesh out the concept in greater detail, including by drawing on similar endeavors in other global policy spaces. Also needed would be a focused and inclusive global dialogue about ways to improve the circulation of knowledge and information and the facilitation of policy networks in the global internet governance ecosystem. Whether the ensemble of activities here referred to as the clearinghouse function could help to provide a solution is a question that could be taken up in an expanded NETmundial Initiative and other venues. In the meantime, the authors of this chapter have organized a workshop on the subject to be held during the IGF at Istanbul in September 2014.13
There a group of expert panellists will consider such questions as:
• Is the status quo sufficient, or is there a compelling case for institutionalizing the clearinghouse function in some manner?
• If one believes that in principal this is worth exploring, what elements of the function most need to be thought through and clarified in order to make it a viable project?
13 Workshop 153, “Institutionalizing the Clearinghouse Function,” Thursday, 4 September 2014, information available at, http:// sched.co/1mJ0A2M. As with all IGF workshops, a transcript of the discussion will subsequently be available from the IGF website.
• How do we assess the relative costs and benefits of the five models above? Which ultimately seems like the most promising path forward? Or is there another, better model to consider?
William J. Drake is an International Fellow and Lecturer in the Media Change and Innovation Division of the Institute of Mass Communication and Media Research at the University of Zurich. He is also the Chair of Noncommercial Users Constituency and a member of the Board of the European At Large Organization in ICANN; a member of the Multistakeholder Advisory Group of the Internet Governance Forum; a member of the 1Net coalition’s Coordinating Committee; and a core faculty member of the European and South schools on Internet governance. Previously he was, inter alia: Senior Associate and Director of the Project on the Information Revolution and World Politics at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; founding Associate Director of the Communication, Culture and Technology Program at Georgetown University; Assistant Professor of Communication at the University of California, San Diego; and adjunct professor at the School of Advanced International Studies and at Georgetown University’s School of Business. He also was co-editor of the MIT Press book series, The Information Revolution and Global Politics; a two-term member of the Generic Names Supporting Organization Council in ICANN; a member of the UN Working Group on Internet Governance; and Vice-chair and a founding Steering Committee member of the Global Internet Governance Academic Network. Drake received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University.
Lea Kaspar works as a program lead at Global Partners Digital (GPD), a UK-based internet policy organization, where she focuses on internet governance, digital rights, and civil society engagement in international internet policy debates. She works closely with governments in the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC), for which GPD is performing a secretariat function. As a member of the UK Multi-stakeholder Group on Internet Governance (MAGIG), she has been participating in the consultation processes with the UK government on international internet freedom issues since March 2013. Originally from Croatia, Lea holds an MSc in Global Governance and Ethics and an MA in Comparative Literature and Hispanic Studies.