Status and Dynamics
Igor zadorin – Head of a research group in the Centre for Intellectual Resources and Cooperation in Social Sciences (ZIRCON) since 1989. Graduated from the MIPT, Department of Management and Applied Mathematics (1982), and postgraduate studies in the Institute of Sociology (1991, majoring in socio- political processes and management). In 1997-1999, Public Opinion Research Section Head, PR Department, in the Presidential Administration, Russian Federation. From February 2006 – Executive Director of Eurasian Monitor, International Research Agency. At the moment, he is a senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology, permanent expert in a number of leading Russian think tanks and expert clubs, member of the 2020 Strategy Expert Group. His scientific and professional interests include social research and policy advice. Author of over 150 scientific and popular publications.
E-mail: [email protected]
Victor Moissov – Project Manager in Zircon. In 2001, graduated from the Volgograd State Technical University, majoring in crisis management. Research interests include: mass media sociology, advertising and mass communications, political orientation and voting behaviour of the population. Author of 18 scientific publications.
E-mail: [email protected] Igor zadorin,
Victor Moysov
This article provides an overview of the key results of the second wave of the EDB Integration Barometer study implemented jointly by the EDB Integration Studies Centre and the Eurasian Monitor International Research Agency1. The article contains an analysis of the integration preferences of the citizens
1 The full version of the EDB Integration Barometer 2013 report with annexes and other supplementary materials on which this
of CIS states and Georgia, particularly in the context of their attitude towards the Customs Union (CU) and the Single Economic Space between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus (SES), and an assessment of the foreign policy, foreign trade and sociocultural stance of the population of these countries in 2013 in comparison with 2012.
The integration processes in the former Soviet states have been the focus of attention of various interested groups since the very moment of disintegration of the Soviet Union. Politicians talk about integration; business circles call for integration; political scientists, economics, sociologists and other professionals study integration (see, for example, Bolshakov (2012), Vertinskaya (2013), Vinokurov et al., (2009), Spartak (2011), Strategy 2020 (2011a), Yastremsky (2012). In some cases, this interest is strong enough to eventually lead to institutionalisation of integration processes, especially in the economic and international security spheres. For example, in the post-Soviet space, the existence of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, the Eurasian Economic Community, the Customs Union, the Single Economic Space, and the CIS Free Trade Zone points to a codification of integration processes.
However, integration has other facets besides the economic, military or political. “Top-down” integration in the form of various political alliances or intergovernmental agreements cannot be efficient unless based on support from the “bottom”, i.e. the general population’s integration preferences (orientation) and assessment of the processes which take place at the top level. Moreover, certain aspects of integration cannot be formalised or institutionalised at all, since they belong to the sphere of intercultural interaction and can only be expressed in a population’s opinions and assessments.
Whereas economic ties or political interaction can easily be reflected in statistics, analytical reports and official documents (see, for example, Zadorin (2008a), Zadorin (2008b), the humanitarian measurement of integration in the post- Soviet space reflected in public sentiment and activities until recently has had no reliable and permanent tool for identifying and recording. A few occasional studies, albeit informative, used methodologies that were unsuitable for their purpose, hence the impossibility of measuring the dynamics of integration sentiment or forecasting public reaction to certain foreign policy decisions. The EDB Integration Barometer project was launched in 2012 to fill these information gaps. Under the project, a methodology and tools were developed for annual opinion polls with a focus on the assessment of foreign policy, foreign trade, sociocultural and other integration preferences of the citizens of the post- Soviet space.
The general objectives of the study are to monitor integration preferences of the population of the post-Soviet space (citizens of CIS countries and Georgia) and to assess the degree of “humanitarian integration” of this space, as expressed by
Igor zadorin, Victor Moysov. “Integration Sentiment
in Post-Soviet Countries: Status and Dynamics” INTEGRATION PROCESSESMONITORING
the foreign policy, foreign trade and sociocultural orientation of the population. The project studies public attitude towards particular aspects and forms of interstate integration activities. In so doing, both economic and political aspects of integration and their humanitarian measurement at the level of social contacts or cultural consumption are taken into account. The results of the study allow the real preferences of the former USSR population to be identified in connection with different facets of integration.
In April-June 2012, the first wave of the study under the EDB Integration Barometer project was carried out (see Zadorin, Moysov, Glod (2012), EDB Integration Studies Centre (2012), and the second wave was completed in March-May 2013. In this paper the authors attempt to present the key results of the second wave and describe the dynamics of integration preferences. MEtHoDoLoGY
The EDB Integration Barometer study is based on regular monitoring of public opinion using compatible methodologies (and a consistent approach towards selection of the tools to use and to sampling). This allows not only the current status of the population’s integration preferences to be recorded, but also how they change over time.
The study’s concept is based on the assumption that, the more frequently people from prefer another country of the same region in connection with certain sociocultural, economic or political circumstances, the deeper humanitarian integration is, and the greater potential for public support of real political and economic cooperation the region has. In other words, the fact that the citizens of post-Soviet countries are increasingly inclined to choose from among the other countries of the region rather than from any other parts of the world in their everyday decisions (consumer behaviour, employment, education, tourism, cultural needs, etc.) indicates that the humanitarian integration of the former Soviet countries has a positive dynamic and positive prospects. And, vice versa, preference for other parts of the world in real or hypothetical circumstances indicates the population’s orientation towards other geopolitical centres of gravity.
The main methodological problem of the study is that, typically, the issues of international cooperation and integration are not topical to an ordinary citizen, and respondents’ preferences for particular countries with which their own country should cooperate or integrate are often based solely on their limited experience of interaction with the respective countries or peoples, or their personal sympathy or interest. Therefore, the term “integration preferences” of an individual is interpreted by the authors as the simpler, generic term “inclination towards a country”. This concept, “inclination”, at an individual level embraces interest, sympathy, the existence of a connection (through employment, relatives, etc.), and readiness to interact, while at the level of
a country’s population it reflects the incidence of the respective directions of inclination towards other countries, i.e. implied popular support of cooperation and integration expressed in the overall public sentiment.
The concept of “inclination” is largely the same as sociocultural distance, but with a positive rather than negative value. A degree of inclination towards a particular country expressed as the frequency of selecting that country for various purposes (tourism, employment, education, source of investments, military and political support, etc.) characterises the respondent population’s closeness to the selected country.
To provide a deeper insight into the subject of this study, inclination towards a country was measured on three scales: sociocultural, economic and political. Each of these aspects can in turn be examined by identifying respondents’ specific interests using corresponding questions.
The basic method of measuring the integration preferences of the population under the EDB Integration Barometer is a mass survey of adults (over 18 years) from 12 post-Soviet countries using national representative samples. Such surveys are based on a system of periodic international Eurasian Monitor polls (active since 2004, see Zadorin (2010). The second wave of the EDB Integration Barometer study was conducted within the framework of the 19th round of Eurasian Monitor polls.
In 2012, 11 countries participated in the project (ten CIS countries and Georgia), and Turkmenistan joined in 2013.
Data collection in the form of interviews based on a formal questionnaire was conducted in CIS countries from April 10 to May 28, 2013. The ZIRCON Research Group (Centre of Intellectual Resources and Cooperation in Social Sciences, Moscow, Russia) prepared the questionnaires, processed the data and prepared reporting documents. A total of 14,254 questionnaires were processed. Thus, in 2013 over 14,000 people were polled (from 1,000 to 2,000 in each country of the region).
The main thematic block contained questions all of the same type: respondents were asked to choose from among 25 listed countries in accordance with certain criteria (friendly/hostile, interesting/not interesting, etc.), i.e. a dichotomised scale was used to record the results. The methodology of the study is described in more detail in the full version of the report available on the EDB’s website. The list of answer options allowed three groups of conclusions to be formed on each topic: integration preferences within the post-Soviet space (selection of countries from among the former Soviet republics); integration inclination towards other parts of the world (selection of countries other than the former Soviet republics); and a degree of isolationist sentiment (refusal to name “attractive” countries). Notably, integration inclination towards other parts of
the world has two vectors: inclination towards EU countries and the rest of the world (“other countries”).
tHE DIRECtIoNS oF GEopoLItICAL INCLINAtIoN
The results of the second wave of the Integration Barometer project allow important conclusions and generalisations to be made on the current status and dynamics of integration preferences (sentiment) in the post-Soviet space2. On the whole, the second wave of polls in CIS countries and Georgia ascertained the dominating integration preferences (inclination) of the citizens of those countries and the positions of each country in the overall structure. If we divide all integration preferences into four classes: 1) towards other post- Soviet countries, 2) towards EU countries, 3) towards “other countries”, and 4) anti-integration (isolationist) preferences, we can see that all these preferences are present in all the twelve studies countries, albeit not to varying extents. In Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), and in Armenia and Belarus, inclination towards post-Soviet countries (predominately Russia) prevails.
In Russia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, integration with the EU is often given preference (in Georgia there is equally strong inclination towards the USA, and in Moldova towards Russia). The most common preference in Azerbaijan is “other countries” (Turkey foremost). Finally, Russia, Ukraine and, in some matters, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan demonstrate strong isolationist sentiment (“no inclination towards any country”).
Therefore, we can conclude that the greatest potential for support of post-Soviet integration exists in those countries which have already joined the Customs Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. Azerbaijan and Georgia have effectively withdrawn from the post-Soviet space. Moldova, Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, Uzbekistan, demonstrate multidirectional integration sentiment. Whereas Russia is a centre of gravity to many other post-Soviet states, its population shows little interest in integration, and is even inclined to isolationist views. This is a source of problems in gaining sociocultural support for integration in the post-Soviet space.
Taking into consideration the three factors of economy, politics and culture, the priority integration direction for most countries is the post-Soviet space (see Figure 7.1), and the key grouping factor is politics. In 2013, citizens of seven countries preferred integration with other post-Soviet countries. The same situation was observed in 2012, except that by the second wave’s results, Moldova had shifted to the EU inclination zone, and Turkmenistan took its place in the CIS inclination zone after joining the project.
2 The contents of this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of the Eurasian Development Bank. Igor zadorin, Victor Moysov. “Integration Sentiment
Figure 7.1. Countries grouped
by priority geopolitical vector
Countries were grouped on the basis of the calculated indexes of inclination towards country groups. The priority direction for each country is that with the highest inclination index. The index calculation procedure is described in the analytical report (see subsection 4.1, Index calculation scheme) Inclination towards former Soviet countries vector
Inclination towards EU countries Inclination towards other countries vector
Culture Economy
Politics All spheres
Kazakhstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Azerbaijan Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan Armenia Belarus Georgia Moldova Russia Ukraine Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan Azerbaijan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Armenia Belarus Georgia Moldova Russia Ukraine Kazakhstan Azerbaijan Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Ukraine Russia Moldova Georgia Belarus Armenia Kazakhstan Belarus Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova Russia Ukraine Armenia
SoCIoDEMoGRApHIC DIFFERENtIAtIoN oF INtEGRAtIoN SENtIMENt
The inclinations that prevail in some countries almost never become dominant (i.e. shared by the overwhelming majority of the population). There is notable differentiation of popular views in practically all countries. In some countries (e.g. Ukraine, Moldova, Uzbekistan) this differentiation can be interpreted as a real split in public opinion resulting from citizens’ polar opposite inclinations. Obviously, such differentiation seriously complicates political decision-making on integration issues, since it is difficult to reach a compromise that would satisfy a majority of the population and the main stakeholders.
The nature of this differentiation varies from one country to another and warrants scrutiny, as well as collection of additional data. Of all sociodemographic factors, only the respondent’s age materially influences his/her integration preferences: the post-Soviet direction is far less attractive to younger generations, and, vice
versa, orientation towards other countries is becoming more and more common (see Figure 7.2).
Although the disintegration of the Soviet Union was formalised quickly at the political level, at the sociocultural level it is being finalised only now, when the people who grew up after independence become economically active or assume positions in national governments. They are free from the social ties of the Soviet era, and independent development of their own countries seems more natural and habitual to them than development under the Union; they even doubt its very worthiness. By contrast, the older generation has no illusions about the restoration of the former USSR, and they have adapted themselves to most of the consequences of the break-up. This succession of generations coupled with the increasing differentiation of geopolitical sympathies determines certain integration trends which are based on new interests and views rather than the restoration of old ones.
Figure 7.2. Dependence of migration preferences on age [ukraine’s data] 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-59 60 and older Other countries Post-Soviet space EU Other countries Post-Soviet space EU
Which of the listed countries, in your
opinion, are friendly to our country? From which countries could our country receive military and political support?
59% 67% 64% 71% 72% 49% 39% 38% 35% 30% 34% 24% 19% 22% 20% 36% 43% 44% 48% 48% 30% 23% 25% 21% 20% 25% 19% 16% 16% 17%
the three components of integration preference
As we mentioned above, integration preferences of a population are measured in three dimensions: sociocultural, economic and political. Thus, integration inclination has three components, and each of them contributes to each country’s overall inclination towards each other. Which component makes a decisive (or simply more important) contribution remains an open question. However, when studying integration relations, we elect to start with questions that concern the respondent’s personal experience (relatives residing in other countries; which countries he/she has visited; which countries he/she would like Igor zadorin, Victor Moysov. “Integration Sentiment
to visit; which countries seem interesting to him/her, etc.) and then proceed to ask questions that concern opinion rather than experience (from which countries should investment or labour resources come from; with which countries should economic alliances be formed), i.e. invite respondents to act as objective “experts” instead of relating subjective, anecdotal evidence. Finally, we ask questions that require “high expert competence”: which countries should be viewed as allies or enemies.
One important factor that influences integration preferences is the respondent’s experience of sociocultural interaction with other countries, including ties with relatives, friends or colleagues residing in such countries. It should be noted that, in addition to the old ethnic diasporas inherited from the Soviet period that were responsible for intensive private communication between citizens of different countries (Ukrainians, Belarusians, Armenians and Azeri in Russia; Russians in Central Asia and Ukraine, etc.), new diasporas have emerged as a result of labour migration in the 21st century (Kyrgyz and Tajiks in Russia; Moldovans in Russia and Ukraine; Uzbeks in Russia and Kazakhstan). These migration flows (both temporary migration and expatriation) strongly influence the integration inclination of many respondents.
Another important factor is experience relating to education and tourism. However, in these aspects, Russia and the post-Soviet world are far less competitive than other destinations such as the EU, the USA and Arab countries. Russia, Ukraine and Belarus used to be attractive centres of education in the 1990s, but now more and more young people from CIS countries wish to receive professional education in countries further afield.
Figure 7.3. to which of the listed countries would you go to study (or send your children to study)? [three directions]3
3 Hereafter, in charts of this type (with groups consisting of “Former Soviet countries”, “EU countries” and “Other countries”),
percentage is calculated as the share of respondents who have mentioned at least one country from the respective category. For example, in this chart, 52% of respondents from Tajikistan mentioned at least one post-Soviet country, 18% mentioned at least one EU country, and 51% mentioned at least one country from the rest of the world (see the “Tajikistan” column for 2013).
2012 2013
Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan
Turkmenistan
Moldova
Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Azerbaijan Armenia Ukraine Georgia
Belarus Russia 41%52% 41%48% 44%
28%30%32%29%
19%23% 23%20%18%17% 9% 11% 9% 9% 13%
8% 3%3% Former Soviet countries:
The same is true of respondents’ views on scientific and cultural cooperation (see Figure 7.4). In these spheres the potential for integration is formed solely by the persisting interest in Russia expressed by the population of Central Asian countries. However, in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan there is also strong interest in the Arab, Persian and Turkic cultural clusters (and in Azerbaijan, moreover, this is the prevailing direction).
The attractiveness of a particular country from the economic perspective is largely determined by the respondents’ perception of that country’s wealth and economic development in comparison with their own country. Thus, in
Figure 7.4. With which countries should our state or companies cooperate in the scientific and technical fields, e.g. conduct joint studies and exchange findings, technology and scientific ideas? (three directions) Igor zadorin, Victor Moysov. “Integration Sentiment
in Post-Soviet Countries: Status and Dynamics” INTEGRATION PROCESSESMONITORING
2012 2013
Eu countries:
Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan
Turkmenistan
Moldova
Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Azerbaijan Armenia Ukraine Georgia
Belarus Russia 28% 18%24%31% 19% 43% 41% 27%32%32%29%31%30%41% 47%41%45%54%58%39% 33%35%34% other countries: 2012 2013 59% 51% 43%50% 28% 17%17% 31%35%38%32%45% 47% 16%22%17%22% 33%35% 17%13%18%15% Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan Turkmenistan Moldova
Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Azerbaijan Armenia
Ukraine Georgia Belarus Russia
2012 2013
Former Soviet countries:
61%63%
Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan
Turkmenistan
Tajikistan
Kazakhstan Moldova
Belarus Ukraine Armenia
Azerbaijan Georgia Russia 49%60% 67% 55% 59% 60% 49%49%43%46%40% 32%39%41%37%25% 20%16%19% 9%10%
relatively prosperous countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Azerbaijan, the population favours economic integration with the developed countries of Europe and the USA (in Kazakhstan, however, inclination towards Russia is as strong). This concerns both simple economic integration such as consumer preferences (goods) and more complex concepts such as attraction of labour resources and investments (see Figure 7.5). By contrast, in poorer