Intelligence and control

Like most armies, the FOCA has an intelligence department (Bureau 2). This ‘Bureau 2’ consists of three sections: research, espionage and counter-espionage. Besides ‘Bureau 2’,

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According to some citizens of Ruhengeri province, people also supported the ALIR for pragmatic reasons; the ALIR was for a while strong in the northwestern provinces of Rwanda and people chose their allegiance partly based on their estimate of who they thought would win the conflict. As parts of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi were for some time strongly influenced by the rebel movement, they considered it safer to support the rebels instead of the government. When the government’s armed forces gained the upper hand, they changed their allegiance.

there is also a civilian intelligence gathering structure. This civilian structure is extensive and powerful; it even spies on the FOCA military. Many interviewees in Rwanda and the DRC confirm that there is a perception that everybody spies on everybody. As a result, nobody has the courage to discuss sensitive subjects, not even with friends or family members. This has resulted in a situation where few dare to discuss the most sensitive issue of all – repatriation. People suspect each other of being ‘moderates’, i.e. willing to repatriate or, at least, to discuss the subject. Some repatriated former combatants explained that even those in favour of repatriation may betray others who have expressed the same desire. This contradictory behaviour is a result of the informer dilemma – one can never be sure whether the person who raised the subject of repatriation is sincere or a security agent setting a trap.

A repatriated lieutenant-colonel and a former FDLR magistrate explained that most cases brought to trial by the combatant’s justice system are related to treason (where treason equals repatriation or the intention to repatriate). The former magistrate explained that the punishments for treason are severe. Senior members of the movement, like officers and political agents, are usually executed if convicted, while the rank and file, along with civilians, receive a severe beating and are subsequently condemned to forced labour. E.g. a certain lieutenant Sierra was summarily killed because he was suspected of wanting to desert the movement.

In addition to the security services and the harsh punishments from the internal justice system, the FDLR has raised a number of barriers to prevent FOCA combatants from repatriating:

 Only selected persons are allowed to attend markets or other locations outside the area of (FDLR) control from where one could potentially repatriate;

 The refugees and militias can only travel outside their sector when they have the required documents (feuille de route) from their commanders;

 It is rare that an entire family is allowed to travel. Usually part of the family has to remain in a location where the FDLR is in full control, and until the person who travels returned, the remaining family members are under extreme scrutiny;

 Visitors (e.g. family members) from Rwanda or other parts of the Kivu are interrogated about the objective of their visit and their baggage and clothes are searched;

 All communications, including letters from and between senior commanders, are read and censored by the FDLR security services;

 If the family of a combatant disappears and is suspected of having returned to Rwanda, the person who stayed behind is, after interrogation and sometimes torture, transferred to a location from where it is difficult to escape the control of the FDLR;  The refugees are not allowed to talk with strangers or people who are suspected of

collaborating with institutions that favour repatriation77;

 Ordinary combatants and refugees are discouraged from fraternising with Congolese host communities. Contacts with host communities are usually limited to senior members of the FDLR.

 Military and security people are deployed to check whether travellers have the required documents. To this end, the FDLR maintains hundreds of check points, which are also used to raise taxes, throughout the Kivu provinces. Moreover, the FDLR has deployed hundreds of informers, of which several are Congolese, in locations that are considered to be high risk (e.g. in places where the refugees and combatants might

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When the Mayi-mayi joined the DRC transition in 2003, the FDLR forbade its members to talk to combatants of this militia. Their former allies had become potential enemies and casual contacts were thus broken off.

encounter MONUC, other foreigners, or Congolese who are suspected of being prepared to assist Rwandans who want to be repatriated).

Figure 3: FDLR control check-points around Mwenga-town

The map is not to -scale. The red positions are FDLR check-points78.

In some locations, the FDLR is also assisted by Congolese allies. For example, in the territory of Fizi there is strong collaboration between the FDLR and the local authorities, often former Mayi-mayi militiamen. It is claimed that the local FARDC brigade commander in Kilembwe (southern Fizi), along with the local PNC (Police Nationale Congolaise) chief, assist the FDLR in search-operations every time the militias believe that one of their members is trying to escape their control.

Some FDLR officers and other sources alleged that the FDLR has been able to recruit spies within MONUC or that they have managed to place some of their own people within MONUC as local D&R agents. We could not confirm these claims. What is clear is that repatriation candidates appear to trust certain MONUC units and offices more than others. In particular the Indian battalion (In-Bat) in Masisi is regarded with suspicion because of its relations with influential FDLR security agents, including ‘big Patrick’, the younger brother of General Mudacumura.

In sum, the FDLR has an efficient and ruthless intelligence structure within the DRC. Combined with the harsh punishments for suspected deserters, this system is a key factor in slowing the D&R of combatants from the DRC to Rwanda.