Intentionality as a Relation to the Forms

Following (Armstrong, 1997, pp. 108) and (Kriegel, 2011b, pp. 252), we can call properties that exist outside of space and time, ante rem, and properties that depend on instantiation, properties in re. The former are what Plato calls the forms, and have more recently been invoked by philosophers such as Russell (Russell, The World of Universals, 1967/1997) to account for similarity (or dissimilarity) between concrete particulars.

Several metaphysical/ontological challenges arise for those who posit what I will hereafter call Platonic properties—p-properties for short. Quine is notoriously anti-ante rem, so to speak (Quine W.V.O., 1953), as is (Devitt, 1997). Both argue against ontological commitment to such things. Indeed, from a physicalist point of view, it would seem that p-properties cannot be tolerated. From (Shoemaker, 1997), one might construct an indirect argument against p-properties. Shoemaker notes that observing something is one way to be causally affected by it (Shoemaker, 1997). If we assume that some properties are observable—not such a stretch given that observed similarities/differences is one of the chief purposes of invoking properties— then some properties are causal. However, if properties are p-properties and exist outside of space and time, then it is difficult to see how they could exert a causal influence in the realm of spatiotemporal concreta. But I digress; what is important here is whether or not p-properties can be one of the relata in the intentional relation.

To be sure, the problem of intentional inexistence disappears with the positing of p-properties: When I think about unicorns, I bear the thinking- about relation to the abstract p-property of unicorness, or perhaps the abstract properties of horseness and hornedness, or some such. Likewise, when I think about the morning star, I bear the thinking-about relation to some p-properties; and when I think about the evening star, I bear the relation to others.

So far, so good. However, a number of issues arise here. First—stemming from the argument we adduced on Shoemaker’s behalf just above—the causal impotency of p-properties in the spatiotemporal realm would appear

to preclude providing a causal theory of intentionality (Kriegel, 2011b).16

Second, one might reasonably ask what kind of relation intentionality is such that it can traverse the divide between the realm of spatiotemporal concreta, and Plato’s realm of the forms, a fantastical one to be sure.17 _{Of course,}

Plato’s own story is that before we take corporeal form (before we are born), we are in direct contact with this posited realm, and that our thoughts are recollections of the p-properties we encountered there. However, I am not sure whether this would satisfy many current theorists. For one thing, it is patently dualistic.18 _{For another, it ties the intentional relation essentially to}

memory. All thoughts turn out to be species of recollection. Russell’s account of how exactly we become acquainted with p-properties is by abstraction:

“When we see a white patch, we are acquainted, in the first instance, with the particular patch; but by seeing many white patches, we easily learn to abstract the whiteness which they all have in common, and in learning to do this we are learning to be acquainted with [the universal] whiteness (Russell, The World of Universals, 1967/1997, p. 51).”

Of course, Russell was not focused on the same issue I am; but nevertheless, it is unclear whether this kind of answer is adequate to account for how intentionality relates mental states to p-properties. For one thing, this kind of answer seems to require contact with instances of the relevant property. And there again, we seem to run into difficulties with properties that are

16 _{I do not hold a causal theory, but for those who do, p-properties might not be suitable}

candidates for intentional contents.

17 _{Mendelovici (2010; MS) raises similar complaints. Her arguments focus on the}

mysteriousness of saying when two things from different ontological categories belong together.

18 _{Being dualistic does not necessarily condemn a view. It is just that contemporary}

philosophical orthodoxy is not dualistic. Hence a theory that implies dualism would undoubtedly enjoy a less than enthusiastic reception.

never instantiated, and so are not the kinds of things that we may abstract from.

Third, whether I am thinking about unicorns, dogs, tables or chairs, the intuitive answer as to what kind of thing I am thinking about is that I am thinking about ordinary concrete objects, not abstracta. As Kriegel notes, phenomenologically, these things present themselves in thought as ordinary concrete things (Kriegel, 2007, p. 310). So this view too appears to imply fairly widespread error about what we take ourselves to be thinking about. Fourth, Kriegel explains that on such a view, there emerges a “veil of abstracta” over the realm of ordinary concrete objects (Kriegel, 2007). His argument focuses on perception and proceeds in several steps. First, he distinguishes between two models of the relation that holds between perceptual experiences and perceptual beliefs: the inference model, and the endorsement model. On the inference model, we infer beliefs about the objects of perception from our perceptual experiences. On the endorsement model, “some perceptual beliefs are justified simply by taking at face value one’s current perceptual experience” (Kriegel, 2011b, p. 247). According to Kriegel, for most perceptually based beliefs,19 _{the correct model is the}

endorsement model (Kriegel, 2011b, p. 247).

While Kriegel does not offer much in the way of argument for favouring the endorsement model, reasons are not hard to divine. First, inference requires a level of intellectual sophistication that certainly eludes animals, small children, and probably some adults. Hence, the inference model implies that the way animals, small children and some adults form perceptually based beliefs is different in kind from the way the rest of us do. Second, inference is

19 _{Kriegel recognizes certain instances where the inference model is probably better}

more temporally expensive than endorsement, and so is rather a hindrance both evolutionarily, and in our day-to-day lives: imagine how the inference model would account for driving a car. For most of our perceptually based beliefs, such beliefs are acquired by endorsement of our perceptual experiences.

The second step is the veil thesis:

“There is a class of entities X1,…,Xn, such that for any perceptual

experience E and some perceptual belief B, (i) E does not bear an epistemically and subjectively relevant intentional relation to a member of X1,…,Xn, and (ii) B does bear an intentional relation to a member of X1-

,…,Xn (Kriegel, 2011b, p. 249).”

Kriegel adds that a relation is epistemically irrelevant “if the experience would justify the same beliefs even if it did not bear it,” and subjectively irrelevant “if the subject could not tell the experience apart from another, otherwise similar experience” (Kriegel, 2011b, p. 249). The problem with the veil thesis is that it denies that the objects about which we have perceptually based beliefs—the ordinary objects that furnish our surroundings—are the same objects that we perceive. It therefore mandates the inference model: we infer our beliefs about the concrete objects around us from the objects we

perceive, where the former is different from the latter. This, as Kriegel notes, is one of the central concerns for the sense data theory (Kriegel, 2011b, p. 248).

But notice that the veil of abstracta only arises when the property theory of perceptual intentionality is paired with the view that perceptually based beliefs are not about the relevant properties. But why would someone who

seeks to account for intentionality in terms of relations to p-properties not think that beliefs are such relations? That is, why would someone construe the perception relation as obtaining between perceptions and p-properties, but the belief relation as holding between beliefs and the ordinary concrete objects that furnish our surroundings? Taking one’s beliefs about tables and chairs to actually be beliefs about p-properties is a live option, and one that would undermine Kriegel’s argument. The so-called veil emerges because one’s perceptions are of p-properties and one’s perceptually based beliefs are not; hence the justification for one’s perceptually based beliefs must be by inference, not by endorsement; and that is the wrong model. But the veil would not emerge for someone who thinks perceptually based beliefs are about p-properties.

Of course, this may be a moot point, since I doubt anyone thinks that one’s beliefs about the ordinary objects in her surroundings are actually about p- properties. But that alone would count as yet another concern for the p- property theory of intentionality. At any rate, if you assume that your perceptually based beliefs are beliefs about the ordinary concrete objects in your surroundings, and that perception is a relation to p-properties, then the veil of abstracta does arise.

To summarize, the view we have been considering is that intentionality is relation to p-properties—universals that exist outside of space and time. Setting aside whatever metaphysical/ontological issues arise by positing such things, there are several reasons why p-properties are not good candidates for being that to which we are related by intentionality. First, the causal impotency of non-spatiotemporal entities (e.g. p-properties) would seem to preclude giving a causal account of intentionality. Second, this view makes the intentional relation look a bit fantastical—able to cross between

the realm of ordinary spatiotemporal concreta and the realm of the forms. Third, the view conflicts with the phenomenality of intentional episodes about ordinary concrete objects: such things present themselves in experience as ordinary spatiotemporal concreta, not abstracta. Hence, this view too threatens introspective knowledge—probably not something to be given up just to allow for our representational contact with the realm of the forms. Fourth, if we assume our perceptually based beliefs are beliefs about the ordinary concrete objects in our surroundings, but that perception is a relation to p-properties, then Kriegel’s veil of abstracta arises. On the other hand, the alternative to erecting the veil—denying that our perceptually based beliefs are about the concrete ordinary objects we think they are, but are instead about the very p-properties the perceptions are about—seems worse. It seems fair to say that p-properties are not unproblematic candidates for one of the relata in the intentional relation.