B. Legal Framework of the Iran Sanctions Regime 874
2. International Sanctions: Multilateral Resolutions 891
in sanctioning Iran, spawning a rich unilateral sanctions regime that
existed in some form for the majority of four decades.
294However,
unilateral sanctions—even controversial extraterritorial unilateral
sanctions—packed little punch in comparison to comprehensive
multilateral sanctions.
295While even some of Washington’s closest
allies were hesitant to sanction Iran through much of the US sanctions
regime, European attitudes soured over the course of the
Ahmadinejad presidency, especially following the reignition of the
nation’s nuclear program and the deterioration of Iranian human
rights in the aftermath of Ahmadinejad’s contested reelection.
296The first truly multilateral resolution concerning Iran occurred as
a response to its resumption of uranium enrichment in 2005, related to
the government’s nuclear development program.
297UN Security
Council Resolution 1696 provided a basis for future rounds of
multilateral sanctions, promising that the Security Council would
adopt “appropriate measures” if Iran failed to cease its uranium
enrichment operations.
298Although Resolution 1696 included no
sanctions itself, it set a one-month deadline for Iran to comply or be
subject to further action.
299Such further action came in the form
Security Council Resolution 1737, passing unanimously in the
Security Council in late 2006.
300Resolution 1737 advised all UN
Member States to raise sanctions targeting the transfer of nuclear-
related materials to Iran, including ballistic missile technologies.
301Additionally, Resolution 1737 demanded Member States freeze the
294. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing US sanctions against Iran).
295. See generally Egle, supra note 145 (arguing the inefficacy of unilateral sanctions); Clawson, supra note 27, at 116 (questioning whether unilateral sanctions were successful).
296. See Clawson, supra note 27, at 117; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 349 (asserting the global sanctions consensus by
late 2010).
297. See Jason Starr, The U.N. Resolutions, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at 119;
MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 463
(identifying the origins of multilateral sanctions against Iran).
298. See S.C. Res. 1696 (July 31, 2006); Starr, supra note 297, at 119 (overviewing Resolution 1696).
299. See S.C. Res. 1696; Starr, supra note 297, at 119 (noting Resolution 1696’s one- month compliance deadline).
300. See S.C. Res. 1737 (Dec. 23, 2006); Starr, supra note 297, at 120 (observing the adoption of Resolution 1737).
assets of 22 entities involved in the Iranian nuclear program or the
IRGC, and urged Member States to limit the travel of anybody
connected to Iran’s nuclear program.
302Three months later, the
Security Council followed up with Resolution 1747, another
unanimous proposal that placed multilateral limitations upon Iran’s
access to military equipment and purchases.
303In addition to this
military angle, Security Council Resolution 1747 also targeted Iran’s
access to international financial institutions, suggesting that States
limit financial commitments involving Iran to mere humanitarian-
related transactions.
304Additional names and businesses with ties to
Iran’s nuclear program and/or the IRGC were included on Resolution
1747’s list of sanctionable entities, and the Resolution further
stipulated international reporting requirements when any individual
with ties to Iran’s nuclear program traveled or entered Member State
territory.
305Following this first round of multilateral sanctions, there were
some positive signs that Iran was beginning to comply with its
International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) obligations.
306Still,
encouraged by the United States and some European allies, the UN
Security Council further adopted Resolution 1803 in March 2008.
307While Resolution 1803 was comprised primarily of non-binding
recommendations, it strongly urged UN Member States to cease any
involvement with Iranian financial institutions suspected of serving
Iran’s nuclear program and/or overseas terrorism.
308Fifteen additional
302. See S.C. Res. 1737; Starr, supra note 297, at 120 (identifying Resolution 1737’s sanction provisions).
303. See S.C. Res. 1747 (Mar. 24, 2007); Starr, supra note 297, at 120 (introducing Resolution 1747).
304. See S.C. Res. 1747; Starr, supra note 297, at 120 (highlighting the financial sanctions within Resolution 1747).
305. See S.C. Res. 1747; Starr, supra note 297, at 120 (pointing out Resolution 1747’s expanded list of sanctioned Iranian entities).
306. See Starr, supra note 297, at 120 (“ . . . several council members initially questions the need for further sanctions against Iran. Libya, South Africa, Indonesia, and Vietnam were especially hesitant to pursue new punitive measures, arguing that Iran had begun to cooperate with IAEA inspections.”); Walter Isaacson, A Way Out for Iran’s Nuclear Impassse?, TIME, Mar. 14, 2007, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1599725,00.html (acknowledging initial hopes for Iranian nuclear compliance).
307. See S.C. Res. 1803 (Mar. 3, 2008); Starr, supra note 297, at 120-21 (presenting Resolution 1803).
308. See S.C. Res. 1803; Starr, supra note 297, at 120-21; William Maclean & Andrew Quinn, Analysis: Iran Sanctions Push is Test for West Diplomacy, REUTERS (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-sanctions-analysis-idUSTRE80415Q20120105 (articulating the financial measures of Resolution 1803).
entities were subjected to asset freezes, and Member States were
authorized to seize and inspect any cargo traveling to or from Iran if
there were “reasonable grounds” to believe that the cargo contained
previously-banned materials.
309Later that year, the Security Council
also adopted Resolution 1835, which simply reaffirmed the existing
multilateral sanctions in light of new evidence related to Iran’s
ongoing nuclear noncompliance.
310Although the Security Council
unanimously passed Resolution 1835, growing tensions between
Washington and Moscow related to further sanctions began to show
the limitations of the multilateral sanctions regime.
311At the same
time, however, Iran’s stark noncompliance in the face of both IAEA
and UN demands helped bring individual European States toward
adopting their own unilateral measures to target Iran.
312In response to another major negotiating impasse as well as the
discovery of Iran’s secret uranium enrichment site at Qom, the UN
Security Council passed Resolution 1929 in June 2010.
313The
Resolution demanded that States adopt measures to keep sensitive
technologies from reaching Iran.
314Likewise, it blocked all Iranian
commercial access to uranium mining operations and other nuclear
material production operations outside Iran.
315Further targeted
309. See S.C. Res. 1803. Importantly, the language of Resolution 1803 provided no definition or guidance as to what constituted “reasonable grounds,” thereby leaving enforcement to the discretion of individual member states. See id.; see also Starr, supra note 297, at 121 (further expounding on the suggestions under Resolution 1803).
310. See S.C. Res. 1835 (Sept. 27, 2008); Starr, supra note 297, at 121 (explaining Resolution 1835).
311. See Starr, supra note 297, at 121 (“[i]n its final U.N. measure on Iran before leaving office, the Bush administration was forced to accept a compromise resolution after Russia balked at more sanctions.”); Egle, supra note 145, at 45 (noting Russian and other nations’ resistance to Washington’s call for intensified sanctions).
312. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 463 (“the Bush administration began to reap the rewards of a new coordination with Europe on Iran, in the form of incipient European and multilateral actions to penalize Tehran.”); DINA ESFANDIARY, ASSESSING THE EUROPEAN UNION’S SANCTIONS POLICY:
IRAN AS A CASE STUDY,34 EUNON-PROLIFERATION CONSORTIUM,7-10 (December 2013),
http://www.nonproliferation.eu/web/documents/nonprolif
erationpapers/dinaesfandiary52b41ff5cbaf6.pdf (identifying European unilateral sanctions against Iran).
313. See S.C. Res. 1929 (June 9, 2010); Starr, supra note 297, at 121 (introducing Resolution 1929); see also Meshkat, supra note 200, at 44 (detailing Iran’s NPT noncompliance on the eve of Resolution 1929).
314. See S.C. Res. 1929; Starr, supra note 297, at 121 (explaining Resolution 1929). 315. See S.C. Res. 1929; Starr, supra note 297, at 121 (detailing the further restrictions of Resolution 1929).