Interpersonal dependency

Dependency on others seems to be an inescapable reality. There is a fundamental dependency that people have on one another, some more than others (Swartz, 2010, 2012). Moreover, in some cultures, dependency is more valued than in others. In society in general, a large part of disablism entails disabled people being designated as dependent, and, as Fraser (2003) said, the problem lies with the designation of dependence as inferiority because when people are designated as dependent, they are designated as being of a lower status to others.

At the centre of Nussbaum’s work (2009; 2011) is her notion that equal and just participation of people in life depends fundamentally on their being accorded equal moral standing. How one is accorded status and whether one is accorded equal moral standing depends on one’s interrelationships with others. To be able to live a dignified life, people need to live in the social space, and to participate in life in relation to others. In terms of this study, that means to be in a world in which one can communicate with others. This brings me back to

Habermas (2004) again, who related his experiences growing up with a cleft palate. He stated,

Needless to say, I can no longer remember that first operation on my cleft palate. But when I was forced to repeat the same experience at the age of five – in other words at a point when I had a clear memory – my awareness of how one person always depends on others undoubtedly became more acute.” (2004, p. 3)

In relation to participation, an African understanding of the interdependence of people on one another has normative connotations. This interpretation of interdependence is that it is only through interdependence that one can be self-realised (Mji et al., 2011). Any behaviour that takes away from cooperation with others, be it selfishness or ignoring a person, results in the diminishing of one’s personhood. One is considered less of a person – sometimes even considered to be an animal – if one does not interact in positive ways with others, but also if one does not act in ways that are for the communal good (Metz & Gaie, 2010).

There is a contrast here with Western ideals of the treatment of the individual in society. In many African cultures, the belief is that one is bound to the community, so that harmony is the combination of “solidarity and identity” (Metz & Gaie, 2010). This principle suggests that people derive their identity from their interconnectedness to others (Mji et al., 2011). It would

49 seem, then, that although interpretations of the type and nature of the interrelationship differ across cultural groups in the world’s societies, participation is reliant on the interrelationship of people with one another.

However, despite the centrality of dependency on human development and being, Kittay (2011) pointed out that most Western theories of justice assume independence and autonomy to be fundamental tenets of dignity. Challenging these theories, she wrote,

People do not spring up from the soil like mushrooms. People produce people. People need to be cared for and nurtured throughout their lives by other people, at some times more urgently and more completely than at other times. (Kittay, 2005, p. 443)

As a result, when disabled people are misrepresented by most theories of justice, it brings into question whether these theories of justice are, in fact, just. Kittay (2011) rejected

an ethics that puts the autonomous individual at the forefront, that eclipses the importance of our dependence on one another, and that makes reciprocal exchanges between equals, rather than the attention to other’s needs. (p. 51) Tronto (2010) suggested that the role of values of caring including attentiveness,

responsibility, nurturance, compassion and meeting others’ needs, be recognised as intrinsic to moral behaviour. Society has a role in embracing care – and hence the acceptance of human vulnerability – as part of the fabric of its moral existence. Care, then, is a precondition for social justice, and the right to give or to receive care is an issue of social justice. For example, Kittay’s work on the ethics of care is based on her belief that “the ability of a being to give and receive care is a source of dignity for humans no less than the capacity for

reason”.

Within the capabilities approach, the aim of functionings and capabilities is the achievement of a dignified life. One of the weaknesses of this approach is that it does not explicitly take note of individuals, such as people with severe communication impairments, for whom making choices to take advantage of that which is available to them is not always possible. Nevertheless, it could be implied that having a person to help, who acts in their interests, is inherent in the capabilities aspect.

African morality considers all people to be part of a family that deserves care. A fundamental notion of Ubuntu is the strong identification with others; strong togetherness, such that how

50 one is cannot be separated from how others are. How one treats others is reliant on how one treats oneself and how one treats all others (Metz & Gaie, 2010). Furthermore, the idea is that personhood is acquired as one develops, hence the respect accorded to the elders who are considered to have come closer to full development of full personhood (Metz & Gaie, 2010). If no one is a full person, and all life’s activities are carried out in such a way that the person works towards achieving full personhood, then no person can be considered to be of less worth or dignity than oneself because no one is complete (Metz, 2010a). In Sub-Saharan African ways of caring, it is considered one’s duty to care for all, and not only care for those who are able to reciprocate this care. What the notion of Ubuntu does is embody the idea that who one is, and who one becomes, is in relation to one’s belonging to a community (Metz, 2010b).