Intimates

Alongside recordings of non-familiars, a corpus of recordings was collected with participants at social occasions to which the researcher was privy. These recordings were conducted between familiar ‘recurrent parties’ (Schegloff, 1979a: 26) – such as relatives, colleagues and friends – at prescheduled events; events organised not for a recording, but other social functions (here, see Drew, 1989: 96) – or “dominant involvements” (see Goffman, 1963: 44). The procedure by which data-collection was conducted paralleled that performed with non-familiars (see §3.4.2.2) save three points of divergence. Firstly, not all recordings were conducted in public locations.

The sites in which recordings were collected were instead contingent upon the nature of the occasion, resulting in recordings in both “public” and “private” environments, such as within cafés and homes, respectively. Secondly, these participants (qua

“intimates”) could be contacted in advance of the recording. Prospective participants were thereby given greater opportunity in which to consider their participation.

Thirdly, whereas I was excluded from the interactions between “non-intimates”, I frequently featured within these interactions qua co-participant.

This practice has an uncertain status in CA research. Traditionally, as Heritage (1988:

130; 1990: 29) observes, CA has been used to analyse data ‘which is as uncontaminated as possible by social scientific intervention’ (see also, Schegloff, 1967: 239-240; ten Have, 1999: 48-50). In this vein, to feature within one’s data effectively contravenes such a non-interventionist commitment. Illustrations of this position are readily available. This includes occasions in which analysts eschew recordings in which they feature (e.g. E. Holt, 1991: 64), or diminish the extent of their contributions qua co-interlocutors (e.g. C. Goodwin, 1996: 381; Schegloff, 2007a: 6; Schegloff and Lerner, 2009: 95) – casting themselves, in effect, as ‘out of

Hammersley, 2010: §3.4). To be clear, it was not employed in an attempt to eventuate explanations of/for participants’ interactional conduct, ex post facto (see R. Watson and Weinberg, 1982: 76, fn. 4; Psathas, 1990: 9), nor to appeal to their intentions thereof. On related concerns, see, e.g., Zimmerman and Pollner (1974 [1970]: 91, fn. 27), Heritage (1984[a]: 135-[1]78 in Drew, 1989: 113, fn. 3), Wootton (1989: 254), Nelson (1994) and Schegloff (1998b: 252, fn. 18).

play’, to borrow Goffman’s (1963: 40) phrase. One’s inclusion within one’s recordings, therefore, furnishes the basis for both pragmatic and professional dilemmas (see e.g., Maynard, 1984: 21-22). ⁸⁷ One such concern, regarding the capacity of analysts to influence the trajectory of an interaction, has been assuaged above (recall fn. 61). Further concerns, however, warrant review.

One refers to that which Wowk (2007: 148, fn. 27) has referred to as ‘a post hoc

“archaeology” of motives’. EM/(M)CA, it will be recalled, commits to a prohibitive stance towards non-relevant psychological ascriptions (e.g. Schegloff, 1996a: 184).

Analysts, again, are not permitted to stipulate claims concerning the putative psychologies of co-interlocutors (howsoever described) when these are not demonstrably relevant to some locally unfolding sequences of social action.

Traditionally in CA research, provided its non-interventionist commitment, this practice is associated with stipulating claims concerning the psychologies of co-interlocutors. In this respect, such a manoeuvre is not merely infelicitous, but, theoretically, defeasible. Recourse can be made, in other words, to the opinions of participants, post hoc, who can license or falsify such claims. The nature of this defeasibility is distorted, however, when analysts also figure as present co-interlocutors. Minimally, for instance, their participation, as such, affords an additional party onto which they could, theoretically, impute psychological states, intentions and/or motives. What is threatened uniquely, however, is that their joint status, as co-interlocutor and analyst, positions them as epistemic authorities over these claims (here, see §7.4.1). This entitlement, after all, is one that is endowed by their very opportunity to lay claim to continuity in personhood. Thus, provided the EM/(M)CA position on underhanded cognitivism, one’s involvement within one’s data represents a resource – or a temptation, at least – that analysts could use to accredit or demerit assertions by invoking some ostensibly privileged access to the interaction.

87 This practice is, of course, no less erroneous than that of ascribing un-explicated mental states upon co-interlocutors with whom they do not share a transpersonal connection.

Nonetheless, it does, presumably, alter the rhetorical (i.e. unassailable) status of such claims.

A second concern relates to the risk of adulterating the integrity of an interaction through the analyst’s presence; a problem related to notions of “observer effects” or

“demand characteristics” (see Wooffitt, 2007). On this reading, one might contend that the interaction would have progressed differently had the research not been conducted, and/or the researcher absent – a requirement of Potter’s (2003 in Jackson, 2011a: 97) “Dead Scientist” test. Whether this would, indeed, be the case, however, remains equivocal; a contingency captured by Labov’s (1972: n.p.g. in Clayman and Gill, 2004: 591; see also, Maynard, 1984: 20-21) “observer’s paradox”. It is possible, however, that providing an overview of the research to one’s participants compromises the status of data as “naturally-occurring”. Minimally, the very co-presence of the researcher, for example, might foreground, and/or inadvertently privilege the relevance of other than normative (e.g. “academic”) relevancies (see Moerman, 1968b: 165; 1992: 27). Conversely, when conceived maximally, it is possible that co-interlocutors (qua “co-participants”) could be understood to align with and/or to facilitate the interests of the researcher, and to be understood accordingly (i.e. to be “in league”). My research therefore contrasts inquiries on

“social class” that resist foreshadowing such a focus (see, e.g., Lawler, 1999: 6; M.

Holt and Griffin, 2005: 252).

Unique dilemmas are therefore occasioned by the study of data in which the analyst features. These problematics are not necessarily insurmountable, however. The former, for example, concerning privileged access to the interaction, would be rendered visible within my analysis, and would thus be available for sanctions.

Furthermore, good reasons provide for this analysis despite the potential for researcher-effects. Conceptually, for instance, as C. Goodwin (1981: 44 in Clayman and Gill, 2004: 591) notes, the condition of being observed is generic to social interaction; it is not one that is unique to recording conditions. It is therefore considered unlikely that the presence of the researcher, or recording equipment, for example, would necessarily interfere with, and/or vitiate, the integrity of the interaction. Moreover, the inclusion of this data was also supported logistically.

Specifically, these interactions would have been unavailable for recording in my absence; my presence at the occasion was, at once, a condition for their collection.

The alternative scenario, of withdrawing myself, would have defeated the very possibility of recording; equally, not participating, but remaining co-present (qua

“bystander”), may have been more artificial than, indeed, participating. Thus, it was on conceptual and logistical grounds that I have aligned with previous EM/(M)CA research in which my presence within my recordings was not removed, but retained (e.g. Wiggins, 2002: 83-84; Jackson, 2011a: 97-104).

3.4.2.3 Summary

The EJBH corpus comprises 59 face-to-face interactions. Data was collected with

“intimates” and “non-intimates” and included both video- (n=39) and audio-only (n=20) recordings. The total number of different participants in the corpus was 78, with several participants recurring throughout. When aggregated with the secondary-data, the total number of interactions analysed in this research were 959, after

“cleaning”, ⁸⁸ amounting to 393 hours, 2 minutes and 35 seconds, comprising both face-to-face (n=326) and telephonic (n=633) interactions. This is an uncharacteristically large quantity of data for CA research; a method that has been bracketed, traditionally, as a species of ‘microsociology’ (e.g. Scheff, 2006: 3005) – or ‘ultra-micro-analysis’ (e.g. Mennell, 1975: 300). ⁸⁹ A further qualification on the quantity of data is therefore merited.