Ever since ‘Christian capitalist’ West started to advance towards the Muslim-Arab world, particularly from the late 18th century, Muslims have engaged in a debate over the
cultural and political role Islam should play to stand against, or if necessary to adapt to, the challenges of the West (Ayubi, 1991, p. 48). One important or rather urgent issue was the process of development, which was frequently linked to two ‘cultural’ notions: Westernisation and secularisation.
According to Ayubi (1991, pp. 48-49), development is a process to reach maximum potential, but for this to happen the effectiveness of its objectives should be defined within a society’s “cultural frame of reference”. He argues that when development involves a bunch of ‘imitative’ activities, such as the case in many Third World countries,
this may result in intensive feelings of alienation. He gives the example of development in the Middle East, which was not a completely ‘natural’ process, as it did not correspond to domestic intellectual, social and technical improvements. Instead, development started as an act of defence against colonial powers of the West, which was later reinforced by the latter to serve their interests.
Modernisation processes, through impact from the West, started in the Muslim World at the end of the nineteenth century and then the pace accelerated throughout the twentieth century. These processes began with economic changes, which were generally welcomed as they facilitated life, and because they usually do not entail any “serious emotional strain” (Hitti, 1962, p. 88). However, as economic transformation invites social changes, and in turn, the two (socio-economic) changes pave the way to political disorder, social transformation was considered “more painful” (Hitti, 1962, p. 89). Transformation in the social structure of society implies a measure of intellectual adaptation, which may ultimately bring about religious changes. For example, Pakravan (1980, p. 117) reports that economic development in the Middle East, which was made possible by oil revenues in the 1950s and 1960s, was accompanied by growing signs of Westernisation and “a parallel decline of religious and traditional values”. He maintains that since Islam was viewed as a “backward force” that obstructed the path of development, the shortest way to modernise was by absorbing the values of the powerful Western civilisation, i.e. economic, political and cultural modernisation.
Modernisation, in the sense of introducing and adopting Western-like institutions, technologies and ideas, was equivalent to Westernisation (Hitti, 1962). In fact, improvement in the developing countries was based on a modernisation theory that associated it with Westernisation and secularisation of society, as secularisation was regarded a “sine qua non for modernization” (Esposito, 1999, p. 7). According to Ayubi (1991, p. 49), modernisation is “an extremely confusing” and “potentially misleading” concept, especially when linked to Westernisation, as the latter is merely a process of ‘borrowing’ of certain cultural and social customs and habits that might not only be alien, but also not superior. Secularisation, on the other hand, which is also frequently associated with development, is a very Western concept that emerged as a solution to free the state from the control of the church. Islamic history, however, has never gone
through such process, and thus secularisation in some Muslim countries is a modern phenomenon (Ayubi, 1991).
Modernisation processes in newly emerging Muslim countries were initiated and guided by a few indigenous elites and their foreign advisers, who were both Western-educated and Western-oriented, whereas the majority of Muslims “did not internalize a secular outlook and values” (Esposito, 1999, p. 7). For example, British, French and American Catholic and Protestant missionaries initiated the modernisation of education. Westernised education is one of the most important among the boons presented by the West to the Muslim world, as it deals with intellect, which is the source of all changes (Hitti, 1962). On the political level, the concept of nationalism, a unique phenomenon and dynamic force introduced from the West and led by Christian rather than Muslim Arabs (Hitti, 1962; Nasr, 1980), was “undoubtedly the most explosive” (Hitti, 1962, p. 91). Projecting secular beliefs, recognising geographical borders and defining economic values, modern Arab nationalism was a movement not only alien to Islam, but it also clashes with its core principles. Islam does not know any geographical frontiers, emphasises spiritual values and demands utmost loyalty from its believers. Both Muslim elites and Western experts viewed religion as hindrance to change in Muslim countries (Ayubi, 1991). So, reformers started to question Islamic law or ‘Shariʻa (also spelled Sharia and this latter spelling will hereafter be used for ease of reading). The results were met with success with regards to some practices, for example abolishing religious courts in Turkey and polygamy in Turkey and Tunisia, but failure with others such as attempting to abolish the practice of fasting (Hitti, 1962, pp. 91-93). In general, attempts to use Western formulas, such as socialism, Marxism, pan-Arabism or nationalism did not succeed in the Muslim-Arab countries. In addition, Western capitalism was rejected as being part of the problem for the contracting socioeconomic conditions in many a country. The result has been some kind of a crisis of duality, as admiration and resentment towards the West co-existed in the Muslim World (Esposito, 1999), and still do.
In short, modernisation is accepted, but Westernisation or secularisation is condemned, as the latter ‘twin process’ did not only change culture and values, but it meant over- dependence on the West. Putting this perception to the test, Ayub, Kassim, and Zain (2013) conducted a self-administered questionnaire among 237 Saudi and non-Saudi
respondents from the city of Jeddah. The objective of the study was to examine the radical but incremental changes introduced by the Saudi Arabia government under the slogan ‘modernisation without Westernisation’. The results showed strong support for modernisation, but only some support for aspects of Westernisation, implying a degree of negativity to the latter. Both modernisation and Westernisation are acceptable so long as they do not interfere with the basic beliefs of Islam. The authors argue that even though it is not easy to distinguish between the two processes, it seems that modernisation is linked more to economic, political and educational changes, whereas Westernisation is viewed more as cultural (Ayub et al., 2013).
All the same, some writers (Huntington, 1996; Inglehart & Welzel, 2009) maintain that modernisation and economic development are processes that do not require or effect cultural Westernisation. Instead, Huntington (1996, p. 37) argues that modernisation creates “feelings of alienation and anomie”, which lead to an identity crisis, an answer to which is usually found in a “return to indigenous cultures”, often in a religious form. This is why he believes that “the global revival of religion” and particularly the Islamic Resurgence in the 1990s are directly linked to modernisation. He concludes that the argument of modernisation equals Westernisation is “misguided, arrogant, false, and dangerous” (1996, p. 28).
4.6. Islam and Democracy
Arthur M. Schlesinger once wrote that “ideas of individual liberty, political democracy, the rule of the law, human rights, and cultural freedom . . . These are European ideas, not Asian, nor African, nor Middle Eastern ideas, except by adoption” (Cited in Huntington, 1996, p. 35). Huntington (1996, p. 34) further emphasises that individualism is a unique characteristic and “the central distinguishing mark” of Western societies, compared to collectivism, which prevails in most non-Western societies.
Indeed, many question the compatibility of Islam and democracy. For example, secular- minded people, including those originally Muslim, regard Islam to be a static religion, “doctrinally and socioculturally, hence anti-modern and retrogressive” (Esposito, 1999, p. 260). Others view Islam as antidemocratic because governments in many Muslim and Arab countries are considered authoritarian: either dictatorships or monarchies with one political party or no opposition at all. Moreover, institutions of civil society are weak.
However, these conditions also exist in other parts of the World that are neither Muslim nor Arab.
Esposito (1999) argues that democracy could have different meanings to different people and cultures, and that even if Muslims accept the idea of democracy, they may differ in its approach and definition. First, Islamic fiqh (jurisprudence) consists of and promotes a tradition of shura (consultation), ijmaʻ (consensus), ijtihad (independent interpretation or reasoning) and qiyas (deductive analogy), which are, in some respect, similar to and could potentially help establish the so-called ‘democratic’ values. Second, Islamists (those who call for a return to Islamic fundamentals) and Muslim intellectuals have argued that Islam supports equality and pluralism of community. They contend that although Islam is the ultimate religion, it acknowledges Christianity and Judaism as ahlu adh-dhimma (protected people) who are free to worship. Finally, in many Muslim countries, democratic values, such as the openness and transparency of governments, have been accepted as an integral part of modern political thought and practice, albeit not truly achieved.
Stepan and Robertson (2003) reviewed two sets of independent data produced by the Western-based Polity Project and Freedom House, covering the period from 1972 to 2000 and analysed the electoral competitiveness (not equivalent to democracy but a required condition for it) in both Arab Muslim-majority countries and non-Arab Muslim- majority countries. The results were so striking that they concluded that it is an ‘Arab’ more than a ‘Muslim’ democracy gap. Thus, they warned of theorising about a democracy gap in Muslim countries and then attributing it to the nature of Islam. Islam, by itself, cannot explain why Arab Muslim-majority countries lag behind in democratisation process. Trying to make some sense of the data, the authors ruled out high ethnolinguistic fragmentation in the Arab world, which, according to an old hypothesis in social science, is inimical to democracy. To understand the particularities of these countries, they decided to look at Arab history. Many Arab states are new creations cut out of the Ottoman Empire, then occupied, and configured by European (Western) powers. The notion of a political identity in the form of a modern ‘nation- state’ in these countries was weak after independence, especially due to the Pan-Arabism or nationalism ideology. The ‘Arab nation’ or al-watan al-arabi was the core element of
national identity. This coupled with what is labelled as ‘the Arab-Israeli conflict’, the authors argue, have shaped the distinctive political identity of the region.
In fact, the only example of an ‘original’ Arab-Islamic democracy can be seen in the Omani experience. Ghubash (2006), who argues that “Western democracy does not necessarily provide an exemplary alternative to the way other societies function” (2006, p. 3), has extensively studied the Omani democratic model, whose origins stem from the traditions of the moderate, tolerant Ibadhi doctrine of Islam. He praises how in the course of its political development “Omani society had conceived and elaborated its own appropriate democratic paradigm, taking account of the cultural and religious environment and the prevailing values” (2006, p. 203). This unique Omani model, attributed to Ibadhi Islam, has also been reported by Omani authors. For example, Al- Farsi (2013, pp. 17-18) maintains that while the democratisation process in the Arab world is quite applicable to Oman, the latter remains “distinctive in so far as it is the main centre of a unique form of Islam which has its own philosophy, political norms, and cultural perspectives: Ibadism”. The way Omani context, in particular its religious culture, differs from the rest of the Arab world is thus expected to play a role in the way Omanis perceive Western methods, perhaps towards more acceptance.