ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT RESPONDENT'S RIGHT TO ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS WAS VIOLATED

RULING:

No, due process was not violated because Hernandez was given the chance to answer the charges, to submit countervailing evidence, and to cross-examine the witnesses against her.

The mere fact that respondent questioned the impartiality of the fact finding committee will not automatically result in a denial of due process because what matters is that respondent had actively participated in the proceedings against her. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even many times more creditably than oral argument, through pleadings. Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not even strictly applied to administrative proceedings, and administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense. Further, a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him – he is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against him during the hearing of the investigation committee. It is the administrative resolution, not the investigation report, which should be the basis of any further remedies that the losing party in an administrative case might wish to pursue.

Administrative proceedings are governed by the “substantial evidence rule.” A finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that the respondent has committed the acts stated in the complaint or formal charge. As defined, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This is different from the quantum of proof required in criminal proceedings which necessitates a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Case # 72

People v. Morato G.R. Nos. 95358-59 July 5, 1993 FACTS:

Ernesto Morato and Emmanuel Cacatian were charged with the crime of murder in an Information dated February 8,1989. In a separate Information also dated February 8, 1989, Ernesto Morato was charged for illegal possession of firearms.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PD 1866 is vague and therefore, violative of accused-appellant’s due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

RULING:

No. The supposed vagueness arises from the fact that the law does not allegedly specifically define what constitutes the crime of illegal possession of firearms. Upon a perusal of Presidential Decree No. 1866, we find no vagueness in the wording of said law.

The first two paragraphs of Section 1 of the decree are specific enough.

It is plain from a reading of said decree and general orders that the crime of illegal possession of firearms is committed by a person who has in his possession a firearm without a license or permit to do so from the proper authorities, or by a person, although authorized to possess such firearm, nevertheless carries it outside of his residence without permit to do so from the proper authorities. The pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms are clear and unambiguous.

Said laws, not being contrary to any provision of the Constitution, are constitutional.

CASE # 73

PEOPLE vs. EUSEBIO NAZARIO FACTS:

The case is all about due process of implementing the Municipal ordinances covering tax payments The prosecution would want to show to the court that the accused, as lessee or operator of a fishpond in the municipality of Pagbilao, refused, and still refuses, to pay the municipal taxes for three consecutive years as per Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by ordinance no. 15, series of 1965, and as further amended by Ordinance No. 12, Series of 1966, of the municipality of Pagbilao, Quezon. The accuse by his evidence, tends to show to the court that the taxes sought to be collected have already lapsed and there is no low empowering municipalities to pass ordinances taxing fishpond operators. The defense, by their evidence, tried to show further that, as lessee of a forest land to be converted into a fishpond, he is not covered by said municipal ordinances; and finally that the accused should not be taxed as fishpond operator because there is no fishpond yet being operated by him, considering that the supposed fishpond was under construction during the period covered by the taxes sought to be collected. The defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ultra vires as it is outside of the power of the municipal council of Pagbilao, Quezon, to enact; and that the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ambiguous and uncertain.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the tax ordinance is a valid adherence to due process?

RULING:

Yes, the privilege taxes on the business of fishpond Maintenance are not charged against sales but rather on occupation, which is allowed under Republic Act No. 2264. They are what have been classified as fixed annual taxes and this is obvious from the ordinances themselves.

CASE #74

Montemayor v. Araneta University, 77 SCRA 321 (1977) FACTS:

Petitioner was a professor at the Araneta University Foundation. On July 8, 1974, he was found guilty of making homosexual advances on one Leonardo De Lara by a faculty investigating committee.

On Nov 8, 1974, another committee was appointed to investigate another charge of a similar nature against petitioner. Petitioner, through counsel, asked for the postponement of the hearing set for Nov.

18 and 19, 1974, but the motion was denied. The committee then proceeded to hear the testimony of the complainants and on Dec 5, 1974, submitted its report recommending the separation of petitioner from the University. On Dec 12, 1974, the University applied with the NLRC for clearance to terminate petitioner’s employment. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a complaint with the NLRC for reinstatement and back wages. Judgment was rendered in petitioner's favor, but on appeal to the Sec. of Labor, the latter found petitioner's dismissal to be justified.

ISSUE:

Whether Montemayor was absolutely denied of due process in the proceedings relating to his dismissal from AUF.

HELD:

No, the guarantee of security of tenure is reinforced by the provision on academic freedom. In denying petitioner's motion for postponement of the hearing, the committee did not accord procedural due process to the petitioner. This was, however, remedied at the mediation conference called at the Dept. of Labor during which petitioner was heard on his evidence. There he was given the fullest opportunity to present his case.

CASE #75

CHR vs CSC 227 SCRA 42 (1993) FACTS:

Atty. Elias Pacete, a permanent appointee to the Commission of Human Rights (CHR) based in, filed an application for optional retirement pursuant to Rep. Act No. 1616 because of failing eyesight. On July 17, 1989 he was informed by the Chairman of the CHR through a telegram of the acceptance and approval of his application for optional retirement effective July 31, 1989 and the appointment of Atty.

Rodrigo Roy as his successor effective August 1, 1989.On August 25, 1989 (GSIS) informed private respondent that his application for optional retirement cannot be favorably considered due to his failure to meet the condition provided for in Section 12 (c) of Rep. Act No. 1616 requiring three (3) years of

continuous service preceding retirement. Consequently, the GSIS advised the CHR to allow Pacete to continue in the service to complete the said requirement. Accordingly, Pacete requested the CHR that he be reinstated to his former position with back wages and allowances and the recall of the appointment of his successor, Atty. Roy. On October 18, 1989, the CHR through a resolution, denied his request and instead formally charged him with incompetence, gross inefficiency in the performance of official duty and failure to account for public funds. On May 27, 1990, Pacete, after being informed of the action taken by the CHR elevated his case to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). On August 31, 1990, the MSPB ordered the immediate reinstatement of private respondent his former position with payment of back wages and other benefits, allowed by law without prejudice to the outcome of the formal charges against him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the dismissal of Pacete was illegal due to the fact that the resolution denying reinstatement was issued without conforming to the requirements of due notice and hearing.

HELD:

Yes, it constituted a blatant violation of Section 46 of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Section 36 of Pres. Decree No. 807 which provides that “No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process,”. If petitioner wishes to dismiss private respondent for cause, the latter must be allowed to return to his previous position so that he may avail himself of the opportunity to refute the charges imputed to him.

Moreover, if petitioner were sincere in its denial of reinstatement to private respondent, it should have filed the administrative charges beforehand, not after it had allowed private respondent to undergo the process leading to his retirement from the service. Granted that an employee is guilty of incompetence and inefficiency, an employer should seasonably file administrative charges against him and marshal the needed evidence instead of springing these, on him as he is about to retire. Such a treatment is, to put it mildly, unfair and certainly, totally unexpected and uncalled for from a government agency whose avowed mission is to protect and promote human rights.

CASE # 76

U.P. vs Ligot – Telan (227 SCRA 342) FACTS:

U.P. administration conceptualized and implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments through the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP), popularly known as the

"Iskolar ng Bayan" program. In the interest of democratizing admission to the State University, all students are entitled to apply for STFAP benefits which include reduction in fees, etc. Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnaire where, they state the amount and source of the annual income of the family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances from which the University may evaluate their financial status and need on the basis of which they are categorized into brackets.

Ramon P. Nadal, applied for STFAP benefits, a student of the College of Law. A team composed of Dona and Manalo conducted a home investigation at the residence of Nadal. Urbino, Scholarship Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies between the report and Nadal's application form. In compliance with the

said Committee's directive, Villanueva wrote Nadal informing him that the investigation showed discrepancies. Nadal was required "to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees" with "interest based on current commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the withholding of clearance and transcript of records. U.P. charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) that he committed acts which find him guilty of willfully and deliberately withholding information about the income of his mother, who is living abroad and that he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car. In executive session, the BOR found Nadal"guilty" and imposed on Nadal the penalties of suspension for one (1) year effective March 29, 1993, non-issuance of any certificate of good moral character during the suspension and/or as long as Nadal has not reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with 12%interest per annum from March 30, 1993 and non-issuance of his transcript of records until he has settled his financial obligations with the university.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Board of Regent violated Nadal's right to due process when it rendered a decision finding Nadal guilty of the charges against him" during the March 29, 1993 meeting.

HELD:

NO, University rules do not require the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of students whose disciplinary cases have been appealed to the Board of Regents as the final review body. At no time did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation. He would make an e x c e p t i o n o f t h e M a r c h 2 9 , 1 9 9 3 m e e t i n g f o r i t w a s supposed

reconsider the decision made on March 28,1993 exonerating respondent Nadal from all administrative charges against him. Unlike in criminal cases which require proof beyond reasonable doubt as basis for a judgment, in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence required, that which means more than a mere scintilla or relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as a d e q u a t e t o s u p p o r t a c o n c l u s i o n , e v e n i f o t h e r m i n d s equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.

Therefore deciding that the BOR did not violate Nadal’s right of due process.

CASE # 77