ISSUE 4: COMMUNICATION AND INTERFACE MANAGEMENT SHOULD BE IMPROVED

Systems for communication in construction are inevitably many and varied and the skills available vary too. Time pressures, contractual issues and interpersonal relationships will all influence the degree of success there is in achieving successful communication.

The underpinning influence which needs to be recognised is the organizational complexity of most construction projects. Not only is there complexity, it is usually handled by different teams of people on each project. Although some of the individuals (during the construction phase) may be co-located at site, many will meet only occasionally, if at all.

It is essential to appreciate this complexity and the fragility of the processes involved, arising from the difficulties. The people managing through all the difficulties appear to accept these problems (they have no choice) but they are real difficulties, as evidenced by the case studies examined (see Section 8).

Construction projects invariably involve complex relationships, making good communication essential.

Managing communication about safety risk is essential.

It is appreciated that interfaces between people and between organizations are important when considering safety risk and the following key issues were identified during the research:

§ Failure to work as a team in identifying risk of catastrophic events § Failures in communication about particular problems (‘silo mentality’) There was also evidence (from consultation) of in-company resistance to facing up to potentially catastrophic hazards which had been identified: the ‘good news’ syndrome in which senior managers make it plain that they do not want to hear about problems – just progress.

Reference was made during consultation to the need for procurement to be undertaken in a manner which encouraged cooperation and communication, as required by CDM 2007. The research identified both human failures and organizational failures in the case study analysis; both people and company behaviour will however be affected by the contractual environment and further examination of this subject may be fruitful.

Taking CDM as the basis for interface management, the research suggests that there is often scope for better management of interfaces involving the designers and contractors, assisted by both the CDM Co-ordinator (including where temporary works design is concerned) and the Principal Contractor (or the Main Contractor for smaller projects), whose role on site is crucial in managing safety risk.

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Organisations and individuals seeking to improve their management of these issues need to examine their cultural values as well as their systems; one question which was suggested for assisting in making improvements was ‘What to do when you see a potential problem’. This issue underlies many of the difficulties which adversely affect efforts to improve in-company and inter-company communication and cooperation; if people feel that raising a concern is not acceptable, they may well keep quiet.

4.6

ISSUE 5: COMPETENCE IS KEY

In many of the case studies it was apparent that hazards had not been appreciated and risks managed in a competent manner. This must spring partly from the concerns about knowledge, skills and experience expressed earlier but also from the lower degree of competence available on some projects, for a variety of reasons including smaller, less structured organisations being in control and sometimes the need for intermittent working by visiting teams, without a

continuous site management presence.

Examination of the case studies suggested that the issue of competence (which underpins CDM 2007) was as expected seen to be important – but in particular in the fulfilment of the role of Principal Contractor. The organization fulfilling the role needed to be active on site. This role was vital because it often involved managing smaller companies with less reliable competence and also managing the interfaces between a number of organisations.

In particular, management of work on smaller projects which carries potential catastrophic event risk needs to be improved but is obviously problematic, due to cost constraints. Note that whilst the largest events are likely to occur on large projects, there is scope for catastrophic events to occur on smaller projects, or small elements of larger projects, and about half the case studies examined involved work by smaller, less structured organisations. Some of these projects involved smaller organizations working for larger companies but without adequate supervision and control by the Principal Contractor1. It has been notable that recent

prosecutions have laid blame on Main/Principal Contractors as well as those immediately culpable and this will hopefully encourage them to choose and supervise their subcontractors more carefully.

The issue of competence (which underpins CDM 2007) was as anticipated seen to be important – but in particular the competent fulfilment of the role of Principal Contractor on site was identified as

central to avoiding many catastrophic events in construction.

At present any person can set up a contracting company and any client can appoint such a company to carry out work next to a road, railway or adjacent structure etc. Although not within the definition used in this project to define criminality (see Glossary), the behaviour of some (particularly small or occasional) clients and some contractors was criminal in terms of compliance with CDM; they may be described as ‘evasive duty-holders’. Under current UK legislation there is no system of licensing (or ‘permitting’) of contractors and/or responsible

1 _{Noting that on smaller projects where there is no legal requirement for a Principal Contractor, the Main Contractor will assume}

individuals. Without that, society is reliant on the better training of the workforce as a whole having a trickle-down effect.

The industry should consider how best to ensure that all those responsible for sites where there are risks which could lead to

catastrophic events have the necessary competence.

It must be borne in mind that using permits to work would bring with it additional bureaucracy and cost, which would have to be weighed against the potential benefits.

Many catastrophic events have occurred on projects where the designers and constructors

would have been able to show competence. In the case studies examined, although there was

more evidence of incompetence than of error by competent people, there will always be incompetent people even in nominally competent organisations. For example, in the USA there have been many tower crane collapses despite apparently strict controls, suggesting that driving out poor attitudes and lack of competence etc is far from easy, even when there is strong inducement to do so.

It therefore appears that improving general levels of competence should be the prime objective. The bodies responsible for education, training and qualification will need to consider how to ensure that this objective is achieved, as discussed in 4.4 above.

This research has highlighted the heavy responsibilities placed upon site managers within contracting organisations, who are required to fulfil a wide range of roles. However, to maintain control of safety, any site manager’s skill-set must include good safety risk management skills and in selecting and training for this role those who lack this skill, regardless of their other skills, will present risks which should not be taken.

Only managers who are clearly competent in safety risk management should be put in charge of sites.

Principal Contractors need to appreciate this and have in place systems to ensure that site managers have (a) been trained to a high level of competence and (b) have a high level of commitment to safety.

One aspect of risk which was noted in some case studies was management of change; three categories of risk were considered (a) design change, (b) change of planned method of work and (c) unplanned, last-minute change of method of work. Whilst design changes are clearly a concern, they did not feature highly in the case studies, but changes in work method did. Some were very late changes and obviously thereby at risk of not being thought through. One aspect of safety risk management which was evidenced was ‘dynamic risk assessment’ (see

Glossary). It was apparent that considerable care is needed in the use of this technique where risk of a catastrophic event has been identified; additional time should be allowed and a fresh view sought before pressing ahead. It is likely to be the Principal Contractor who is best placed to ensure that the decision-making process and preparation of a thought-through amended and complete method statement is properly carried out without rushing and preferably with

4.7 ISSUE 6: EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF TEMPORARY WORKS

IS