An important task in any influence operation is choosing a desired behavior that can be measured or observed. Failure to do so is a common pitfall in behavioral-intervention programs, according to Fishbein and Ajzen. Although not essential for a successful campaign, measurements of behavior are useful in assessing influence campaigns and validating target audience analysis.
Adjusting the design of influence operations is difficult without an effective way to assess progress.
Another problem commonly cited in the literature is that of properly identifying the motivations of a target audience. In the U.S. military, the method currently used to conduct target audience analysis is ineffective and offers only a simplistic approach to understanding human behavior.
Finally, as mentioned earlier, the military often fails to conduct effective influence operations because it understands behavioral change mostly in terms of attitudes. Many influence operations are designed to alter the target audience’s attitude as the end goal, rather than as a means toward behavioral change, the real goal.
1. Measuring Behavior
According to Fishbein and Ajzen, a key component in understanding behavior is accurate measurement and observation of the behavior of interest.
Quantitative data is commonly missing in contemporary influence operations, and MISO/PSYOP must rely heavily on anecdotal evidence to measure behavior and effectiveness.28 The problem for planners is to understand and predict the behavior of a target audience when they cannot accurately measure whether, when, and if a behavior is performed. Although the need for quantitative data is obvious, measuring behavior is very difficult.
28 David H. Sammons, PSYOP and the Problem of Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) for the Combatant Commander, May 18, 2004, 14–15,
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA425993.
Influence planners typically rely on three sources to measure behavior, starting with raw data. If an influence planner wants to find out whether people are calling a rewards hotline, for example, an analysis of call logs will determine the answer. Raw data such as this is extremely valuable, but often unavailable, for a variety of reasons.
The second data source available to planners is intelligence and atmospherics. While using intelligence to determine how frequently a behavior is performed is highly anecdotal,29 it is typically the closest military planners have to direct observation, the “gold standard of behavioral assessment.”30 Unfortunately, ever-changing collection requirements and the limited availability of collection assets make this type of measurement unreliable.
The third source of measurement is public-opinion polls, which assess the attitudes of a target audience.31 The military uses polls with the assumption that attitude is the most important determinant of behavior—a highly flawed supposition that has been proved false.
The difficulty of determining whether a behavior is being performed makes it hard for influence planners to validate their key assumptions about the target audience and assess the effectiveness of a campaign. This lack of validation and assessment typically causes influence operations to run longer than scheduled.
2. Target Audience Analysis
A good target audience analysis is essential in any effective campaign,32 but the framework offered by military doctrine oversimplifies this task and makes
29 Ibid., 7–15.
30 Fishbein and Ajzen, Predicting and Changing Behavior: The Reasoned Action Approach, 31.
31 Arturo Munoz, U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan: Effectiveness of Psychological Operations 2001-2010 (RAND Corporation, May 2012), 19–29,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1060.pdf.
32 U.S. Army, FM 3-05.301: Psychological Operations Process, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2007), 2–1,
https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_c/pdf/fm3_05x301.pdf.
meaningful analysis difficult. The military employs cause-and-effect analysis—
commonly used in marketing—to understand human behavior. This model requires planners to identify a current behavior, determine what causes it, and predict its consequences.33 This model naively assumes that discerning motivation is not difficult, and its continuing use is cited as problematic, indicating unwarranted confidence in marketing and advertising principles that poorly fit a military context.34 For example, in business, market research may show a customer’s need for something to address a certain problem. That “something” is assumed to be a product to be sold to the customer. This assumption does not translate to the battlefield, as Mackay et al. observed in Afghanistan:
Just because Afghans say they lack food and shelter does not mean that they will be persuaded by arguments promising better food and shelter. This is an egregious assumption, and would be to the detriment of your message campaign from the outset.35
3. An Attitude-Based Approach to Influence
According to Mackay et al., a focus on attitudinal communications is the reason the United States and allies fail to conduct effective influence. This is not to say that attitude is unimportant; but attitudinal communications aim at changing people’s attitudes as a goal or end state, rather than focusing on changing their behavior.36 While Mackay et al. observe that this type of communication works in business, where the target audience is compliant,37 there is little evidence that attitudinal communications work where the audience is noncompliant. With compliant audiences, the desired behavior is, for the most
33 Ibid., 2–11.
34 Andrew Mackay, Steve Tatham, and Lee Rowland, The Effectiveness of US Military Information Operations in Afghanistan 2001-2010: Why RAND Missed the Point (Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, December 2012), i,
http://www.da.mod.uk/publications/library/central-asian-series/20121214_Whyrandmissedthepoint_U_1202a.pdf.
35 Andrew Mackay and Steve Tatham, Behavioural Conflict: Why Understanding People and Their Motivations Will Prove Decisive in Future Conflict (Essex, United Kingdom: Military Studies Press, 2011), 168.
36 Mackay, Tatham, and Rowland, Why RAND Missed the Point, 3.
37 Ibid., 5.
part, congruent with beliefs already held. In their 2012 report on the effectiveness of MISO/PSYOP, Mackay et al. give an example of how compliant audiences respond to attitudinal communications:
One brand of toothpaste, for example, is not significantly different [from] another, but if you associate with it, through an attitudinal marketing campaign, certain “desirable” qualities or characteristics (for example, extra whitening capability, pleasant breath qualities, etc.) you effectively differentiate it from your competitors in the eyes of the consumer who is now more likely to purchase your brand. As a consumer walking into a supermarket you will be confronted by an array of different toothpastes and your decision to purchase may well be swayed by an [advertisement] you have seen for a particular brand. The key to this, however, is that you have already made the decision to purchase; your behaviour [sic] has been predetermined by your upbringing (always clean your teeth before bed), your education (not cleaning your teeth will cause you painful medical problems) and other social factors (guys with bad breath don’t get girls!) for example.38
In this example, the decision to behave in a certain way (i.e., to purchase toothpaste) has already been made—the consumer just needs to be steered or
“nudged” toward a particular brand. By contrast, in military influence operations, the target audience is often noncompliant, in the sense that the behavior the military wants them to perform is not consistent with the beliefs they hold.