Introduction
This paper is based on the proposition that a research base is necessary for the development and improvement of practice in social work, but that concerns about epistemology and methodology have influenced responses to research by practitioners. It argues that social work can benefit from the contribution that feminist writing has made to the research debate, and that the issues for social work might be pertinent to other areas of study, or disciplines. Therefore, it has to be read as complementary to a number of others in the reader, particularly the papers by David Avison, Jackie Powell and Pat Usher.
That the need for research into practice is particularly relevant to social work is postulated by Powell when she argues that evaluating social work practice leads to more fundamental questions about the nature of social work. As she rightly points out this only becomes significant for those who regard social work as more than a set of skills (or competencies, in current parlance) and perceive the need for a knowledge base for social work practice which is informed by research and reflection. Hence the practitioner moves away from routinization and technical expertise (Schon, 1987). Moreover, Avison’s account of the search for a discipline in Information Systems echoes some of the challenges facing those theorizing and researching in social work.
In his other paper, Avison argues the case for action research, suggesting that the identification of a discrete methodological approach helps to establish the identity of a discipline. Action research does have its limitations. Mies (1983), points out that it may fail to integrate science and knowledge, and asserts that it is necessary to go beyond a particular method. The limitations of particular methodologies leads her to focus on the process of research, the engagement in the activity, and an exploration of how this contributes to the construction of the knowledge. Hence she argues for the integration of praxis and research claiming that ‘the demand to link praxis and research consistently follows an historical, dialectical and materialist theory of knowledge. According to this concept the “truth” of a theory is not dependent upon certain methodological principles and rules, but on its potential to orient the processes of praxis towards progressive emancipation and humanization’ (1983, p. 124). Such an approach has particular relevance to social work where a degree of resistance to the research process has arisen out of the value base of practice.
Social Work in the Academy
Powell implies that there are those in the profession of social work who deny the need for a theoretical base for social work. They resist attempts to legitimize social work’s academic role in making a contribution to the theory base of practice and to knowledge formation, either as a discrete activity, or drawing on other disciplines. To develop an integration of knowledge and praxis is fraught for any subject area, raising questions of what constitutes knowledge, the criteria established for the recognition of knowledge and the processes of knowledge formation. However, for social work this is further confounded by a lack of consensus about the role and function of the activity within society, and in some cases what constitutes the activity of social work. There are some (Brewer and Lait, 1980) who have explicitly challenged the need for social work as a practice, thereby negating the need for an academic discipline. Others (Bailey and Brake, 1975; Wilson, 1977) have questioned the basis on which social workers intervene in the lives of individuals, and while not wanting to eliminate the practice of social work, would base it on different understandings of social problems, and therefore offer different responses to dealing with those problems. In the case of Bailey and Brake this was from a Marxist perspective, whilst Wilson was one of the earliest writers to present a feminist critique of social work practice. More recently, government committees have been established to identify what social workers do, to speculate about what they might do, and to consider whether the tasks need to be performed by social workers at all (Barclay, 1982; Griffiths, 1988; Audit Commission, 1989).
However, the purpose of this paper is not to document the current precarious state of social work and its educational base, but to explore the resistance to the creation of a research base, which is integral to the development of an academic discipline and a set of professional practices. The aim is to explore further how the inextricable link between the activity and the research (the practice and the theory), as documented by Powell, can influence the validation of epistemology and methodology. If research practice is alien to the principles of the subject being researched then there will be resistance. Alternatively, the conduct of the research and the application of its results can contribute to, and influence practice. As Goldberg and Fruin comment, the lack of definition of the social work task ‘does not excuse social workers from becoming more explicit about the problems they are trying to tackle, with or on behalf of their clients, the specific goals they set themselves and the expertise and resources required to explain these objectives’
(1976, p. 7).
The need to explain the aims of social work is precisely the stimulus for research, but the resistance to the use of research findings and consequent involvement in the research process has been identified as a particular drawback in social work. In plotting this resistance Everitt et al., argue for ‘research minded practice [which] is concerned with analytical assessment of social need and resources, and the development, implementation and evaluation of strategies to meet that need’ (1992, p. 4). Hence the invocation from Goldberg and Fruin could be answered by the process of practice research, but also for research praxis which incorporates the dialectics of doing and knowing (Mies, 1983).
Social work, with its emphasis on intervention and change should be attracted to the
argument that ‘the object of research is not something static and homogeneous but an historical, dynamic and contradictory entity’ (Mies, 1983; p. 125).
The tension between theory, as represented in a research base, and practice is not a recent phenomenon in social work. The conflict which surrounded the introduction of the first social work course in the London School of Economics (for psychiatric social workers) in 1929 was seen to be between ‘instilling of disciplined habits of thought’ and
‘the business of training, or imparting particular skills’ (Brewer and Lait, 1980; p. 37).
On the one hand, the academy became the site where ‘“purists” fear the distortion of theory by pragmatists who seek to tailor it to meet the needs of practice’ (Brewer and Lait, 1980; p. 38). On the other, there was a concern that practitioners and their practice, or more particularly their clients, might be used for research purposes but that this might not necessarily enhance practice (Everitt et al., 1992). Hence the debate was about who takes preeminence, the theorist or the practitioner. In exploring the notion of praxis it can be argued that neither need to; the dialectic of doing and knowing can create a partnership between practitioner and researcher.
While the development of theory and praxis relating to the research process did not originate in feminist thinking, it has been feminist discussions of epistemology and methodology which have most fruitfully questioned the process of knowledge construction (Mies, 1983; Stanley and Wise, 1983; Stanley, 1990). The challenge to the established methodologies presented by feminism has been documented by Pat Usher, as are the alternative ways of knowledge formation, or at least the processes of seeking after knowledge. Just as Powell documents her commitment to evaluation as a methodological framework, so I hold firmly to the view that feminist approaches offer the means to move forward for a social work research tradition.
It is not suggested that social work has accepted the arguments of feminism, but that the concerns that are raised for social workers can be met by feminist approaches to research. There are many reasons why social work needs to attend to the position of women in society, not least because women constitute the majority of workers (Nottage, 1991) and clients (Hanmer and Statham, 1988). Moreover, the resonance between social work practice and feminism provides compelling reasons for a synthesis. Both are committed to social and personal change and both seek an understanding of private and public worlds. More significantly, both stress the dialectic relationship between theory and practice, but in doing so accept feelings as facts and value self knowledge (Dominelli
& McCleod, 1989). It is because of this that the feminist exploration of praxis can allay some of the resistance of social workers to research.
Resistance
The nature of this resistance has been identified as coming from a number of sources, often contradictory. Hanvey (1990) has suggested that it was the immaturity of social work which has to ‘come of age’ as a profession. The implication being that in doing so it will encompass a research base. This fails to recognize the need for social work to establish its research base before it can reach maturity. The concept of the reflective practitioner, who can reflect on the practice (or action), and reflect on the reflection in action (Schon,
1987) is predicated on the need for research. What is contentious is the nature of the research practice which will facilitate this reflection.
Others suggest that the modernist managerialism of social work accountability (Parton, 1994) involves the collection of statistics and data which do not relate to the quality of practice and alienates the practitioner, making him or her resistant to the activity. This process is challenged in Stanley’s account of the role of researchers in social services departments. Her case study method (1990), indicating the ‘invisibility’ of much of the data, highlights the manner in which official accounts, based on monitoring and statistical information, tell little about the work that is being done. This, she suggests, is because researchers are constrained to connect human relationships to numerical research. In undertaking this exercise they often fail to discover all the information, and as such produce findings of limited value. That the case study was of her own family which meant that she had a great deal of private/personal information further illustrated the limitations of the methodology. Such an approach challenges the orthodox understanding of objectivity. However, it amply demonstrates the feminist claim that the personal is the political, that one person’s experience is as valid a piece of knowledge as the sum total of the experience of many. For social work this claim is echoed in Ungerson’s work on the documented experiences of individuals who are involved in caring roles and relationships of the most intimate nature. Her title Policy is Personal (1987) reflects not only that each individual’s experience is valid, but also that global policy decisions impact on these individuals in different ways.
The inefficiency of positivistic methods is therefore a shared concern of social work and feminism. A further resistance to research from social work practice is that the reductionism of research practices associated with positivism is alienating. Social sciences research is into the sensitive areas of people’s lives. It makes public what is often kept private. This is much more pertinent in social work where the power to pathologize individuals because of perceived patterns of behaviour or problems can have significant effects on the outcomes of intervention, which in turn have implications for justice and liberty. To avoid such inappropriate uses of power and damaging interventionary processes it is necessary to acknowledge both the individual experience and the social circumstances which contribute to that experience. As Goldberg argues ‘putting people into categories and quantifying phenomena, which in the last analysis are subjective experiences, cuts right across the social worker’s belief in the uniqueness of individual experiences and the need to individualize problems in order to help people in their difficulties’ (1972, p. 139).
Research Practice
Such concerns can of course be met by any challenge to positivist styles: for Everitt et al.,
‘interpretive epistemologies reject the possibility of objective social facts. Rather, social phenomena are given meaning by those who define and make them explicit. Thus different people will have different subjective understandings of social phenomena’ (1992, p. 7). Such a standpoint is consistent with the definition of one of the core values of social work, individualization. The classic explanation, ‘that clients are not regarded as fulfilling
certain types and paradigms but as presenting a particular problem which needs to be considered against its own particular background’ (Plant, 1970; p. 9) would seem to negate a research base for social work practice, if such a base is created from an amalgam of information about individuals, their problems and methods of intervention. While interpretive epistemologies might reflect the concept of individualization, it is feminist research which has drawn attention to the ‘particular problems’ of women and the
‘particular background’ of patriarchy which have provided some of the significant developments in practice in social work. These developments pertain not only to intervention in the lives of women, but have also facilitated analysis of the delivery of social work services to black and ethnic minority people. A more recent development has been the acknowledgment that feminist praxis, that is a specific dialectic between theory and practice, precipitates significant changes in service for men. Hence Carlen’s (1989) work which originally focused on the treatment of women in the criminal justice system now proposes a feminist jurisprudence, capable of bringing about a more humane treatment of all who are dealt with within that system.
A further shared concern about research practice is the power differential which is reflected in the process of knowledge creation (Mies, 1983; Croft and Beresford, 1986).
This is particularly pertinent to social work when the knowledge base is extrapolated from the experience of selected individuals. When notions of power and legitimacy are explored in relation to epistemology then the ‘desire to know is a desire for power, but knowledge of itself does not give power. On the contrary it is those who are authorized
“to know” and whose “knowledge” is afforded privilege’ (Worrall, 1990; p. 7).
Individuals or groups of clients of agencies who become the ‘subjects’ or ‘objects’ of research are not empowered to know. It is the researcher whose position is most validated, even though that position exists only because of the collection of data about the experiences of others. Those who are objects of knowledge are frequently described as the ‘subjects’ of research. Such a definition reflects the worst aspects of positivist practice.
The extremes of such practices are summarized by Guba and Lincoln thus:
In order to accomplish rendering the study as confounding or contamination-proof as possible it is thought sometimes appropriate or even necessary to deceive the
‘subject’ (humans who are by that very term dehumanized and objectified, that is, made into objects), to invade privacy without prior knowledge, to place them at physical or psychological risk, or otherwise exploit them for the researcher’s or evaluator’s own private and professional ends. (1989, p. 120)
Such practices, or even those which are less extreme, arise directly out of epistemological claims to be objective and value free, and the assumption that there is an external reality which can be identified and measured, independently of either the measurer or the individuals or groups being measured.
As Pat Usher has noted, feminist researchers make a direct challenge to such assumptions and it is this challenge which has resonance for social work. In acknowledging that the
objects of social science research are also distinguished from those of natural sciences by being subjects in their own right, indeed by producing their own understanding and theories of their independent experiences, but also those which involve researchers and their activities. (Stanley, 1990; p. 9)
This reverses the standard perception of the relationship between the researcher and the persons researched and is consistent with another fundamental principle of social work practice, respect for persons. Such a principle requires that in the methods chosen for the collection of data, the conduct of the research, the interpretation and dissemination of the results the rights of individuals should be respected (Orme and Forbes, 1991).
A further feminist critique of the positivist approach which echoes the concerns of social work is that the process of research separates the knowledge constructed from the origin of that knowledge,
by constructing ‘what is known’ at a conceptual and categorical level, even if reference is made to ‘research findings’, then how these are known are rendered invisible. Their indexical properties denied, their contextually specific meaning glossed in universalist terms. The result is alienated knowledge, a product apparently complete, bearing no apparent trace of the conditions of its production and the social relations that gave rise to this. (Stanley, 1990; p. 11)
For social work and feminism the construction of knowledge through research, and separation of that knowledge from its source, is a way of controlling those who are the very subjects of that knowledge creation (Croft and Beresford, 1986). The production of large data sets of, for example, abortion broken down into sub-categories of nationality, age and marital status have no connection with the personal and, in some cases, traumatic decision to terminate a pregnancy. To reduce such an experience to a statistic which is then used to speculate on the morality of women, and on which to argue future policy is part of the alienation to which Stanley refers.
This form of reductionism has precipitated concerns about the involvement of practitioners in the process of knowledge creation, and has, for social work, contributed to the resistance identified at the beginning of this paper. The concerns relate not only to the conditions in which the research is conducted, but also to the assumption that acquiring the knowledge contributes to the professionalization of social work. Power relations are evident in the professional relationship and ‘professional ways of knowing in our society have served to objectify and control others. Professionals are regarded as knowledgeable: others are objects of this knowledge’ (Everitt et al., 1992; p. 18).
Reactions to the striving for professionalism have been associated with the search for a knowledge base and the establishing of an academic discipline of social work. The concern is that a knowledge base, or theory, of social work intervention will dictate the outcomes of intervention, legitimating the performance of some tasks rather than others. Moreover, this legitimation is controlled by the environment in which the research is generated, and by factors such as who funds or commissions it. The role of the researcher and those who disseminate research thus becomes critical in influencing what is actually done under the
name of social work. The validation of knowledge and its role in legitimizing certain kinds of activity also presents specific problems for social work in the academy and this leads to a questioning of the validity of the academic project. Within the current climate, for example, funded research into the criminal justice system is framed by the current
name of social work. The validation of knowledge and its role in legitimizing certain kinds of activity also presents specific problems for social work in the academy and this leads to a questioning of the validity of the academic project. Within the current climate, for example, funded research into the criminal justice system is framed by the current