"Tu Nghi Quyet lich su den Duong Ho Chi Minh" in Su
Kien 17a Nhan Chung, Number 4 (17 January 1994), p. 32.
United States Department of State "Working Paper on
the North Vietnamese Role in the War in South Vietnam"
(27 May 1968), Appendices, Item 73: Interrogation of a Senior Sergeant, 5th Military Region, captured in 1964 in Tra Bong District, Quang Ngai Province.
highway "bristled with enemy positions and was controlled day and night by armoured patrols".10 It was the most difficult and dangerous part of the Trail. By 20 August 1959, the 301st Battalion had constructed relay station 9 in Pa Lin, west of Thua Thien, which made it possible for the first time to transport 500 kilogram of material, including weapons and ammunition to Interzone V. To ensure absolute secrecy, the weapons and equipment were camouflaged as products meant for sale. The cadres and soldiers were also instructed to limit their contact with people and avoid unnecessary engagements with the enemy. By the end of 1959, the 301st battalion had transferred to Pa Lin 1667 rifles, 788 bayonets, 188 kilogram of explosives, some binoculars, compasses and topographic maps. This was excluding the 1174 rifles of all types, bullets and ammunition which the units carried with them when they manoeuvred into the South through the newly-built roads. All these weapons and equipment were meant for Interzone V and the newly formed self-defence forces in the Central Highlands and the plains, as well as the provinces in central Vietnam.11
Tran Van Tra recounted a meeting between himself, Nguyen Van Vinh, and Le Duan one evening in the summer of 1959. The meeting had its origin in a BBC news bulletin that Tra had chanced to hear. It was a report of a skirmish between a platoon of Diem's forces and a platoon of the Vietcong in the Plain of Reeds. After two hours of fighting, both sides withdrew. There was no report of any casualties. The news of this inconclusive two hour long fight amazed Tra who thought that either the BBC report was inaccurate or the training of the communist cadres in the South was inadequate. The next day, he visited his old friend, Nguyen Van Vinh, and they both agreed that there was an urgent need to train the communist cadres in the South. This could be done with the help of the regrouped Southern cadres still based in the North, who had been well honed militarily for the eventual reunification of the country. They then decided to convey their views to Le Duan, who according to Tran Van Tra, was at that point already the First Secretary of the Party Central Committee. The initial proposal by Tra and Vinh was for sending 100 young cadres to the South. After much thought, Le Duan said that that would be difficult as the
The Ho Chi Minh Trail, (Hanoi: Foreign Languages
Publishing House, 1982), p. 13.
Politburo had not arrived at a decision regarding this matter. Tran and Vinh pleaded for their cause. Le Duan then asked whether the number could be reduced. This time they proposed 50. Again Le Duan was deep in thought. Because this matter had yet to be discussed by the Politburo, by right, approval could not be given. But he was prepared to bear the responsibility if the number was smaller. Le Duan came up with the figure of 25. The team of 25 was selected by June 1959. By 25 December 1959, they were ready to move into the South. By this time, the Party Central Committee had given
its blessing.12
Tra's account is particularly revealing for two reasons: Firstly, it showed that during this period, the Hanoi leadership was still very cautious about escalating the struggle in the South. Secondly, it gives a glimpse of the extent of Le Duan's authority and how decisions were made by the North Vietnamese leadership.
II
At about the time when the North Vietnamese made public their decision to renew the struggle in the South, in Laos, 1500 Pathet Lao troops refused to be integrated into the Royal Laotian Army.13 The November 1957 agreement reached between the RLG and the Pathet Lao had specified that the Pathet Lao troops would be demobilised and integrated into the Royal Laotian Army and receive ranks and positions in accordance
2>
with the procedures of the government. But there were disagreements between
* •
the two armies over the proportion Pathet Lao officers in the integrated
Tran Van T r a , Nhung Chang Duong Lich Su Cua B2 Thanh
Dong (Tap I): Hoa Binh Hay Chien Tranh, (Hanoi: Nha
Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1992), pp. 160-162.
The events of this episode can be obtained from Sisouk Na Champassak, Storm Over L a o s : A Contemporary History, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961), Chapter
8? Arthur J. D o m m e n , Conflict in Laos; The Politics of
Neutralisation, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971),
p p.117-118; Huge T o y e , Laos: Buffer State or Battleground, (London: Oxford University P r e s s , 1968),
p p . 124-126; The following account is according to the BBC: Summary of World Broadcast (Far East).
army; and the rank to be conferred on Colonel Singkapo Chounlamany14 of the Pathet Lao army.
On 11 May 1959, Singkapo Chounlamany refused to accept the rank of colonel given to him and failed to turn up for the award ceremony in Vientiane, on the pretext that there were irregularities in the integration procedure, Souphanouvong also made a similar charge. Over on the Plaine des Jarres, 500 Pathet Lao troops boycotted a similar ceremony on the same day. The government reacted by ordering an alert in the areas where the Pathet Lao troops were stationed. The two Pathet Lao units, stationed at Xieng Khouang and Luang Prabang were encircled by the Royal Laotian Army and their supply lines were cut. The Pathet Lao troops were given a choice of either accepting the new ranks and being integrated into the national army or surrendering their weapons in order to be discharged as civilians within 24 hours. Failure to do either would be an act of treason. When the deadline had passed, only 50 of the Pathet Lao troops had come forward. It was reported on 17 May that the RLG had sent the police to encircle the residences of Souphanouvong and other NLFiX leaders in Vientiane. On the same day, the DRV Foreign Ministry issued a statement which accused Phoui Sananikone's government of serious violation of the Geneva Agreements and the creation of tension in IndoChina. The North Vietnamese proposed that the ISCC in Laos should resume its duties and called upon the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference to take appropriate measures to prevent any worsening of the situation in Laos. The statement further added that as a signatory of the Geneva Agreements and a neighbouring country which had a common boundary of over 1000 kilometres with Laos, the DRV was very anxious over the gravity of the developments in Laos. On 18 May, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement which was almost identical to that of North Vietnam's.
On 17 May at lOOOh, the first Pathet Lao battalion consisting of 750 Pathet Lao troops stationed south of Luang Prabang surrendered. A letter from Souphanouvong written some weeks earlier found on the battalion commander instructed him to delay integration till after the Laotian
Biographical data of Singkapo is extremely scanty. He belonged to one of the prominent regional families of Laos - Khammouane/Thakhek. He was a member of the Central Committee of the Free Lao Front (Neo Lao Issara) in the 50s and a member of the Central Committee of the Lao Patriotic Front (N L H X ) from 1956.
elections; but Souphanouvong subsequently changed his mind and ordered the battalion to comply. During the night of 18-19 May, the second Pathet Lao battalion which was stationed in a former French Foreign Legion Camp on the Plaine des Jarres, the Thong Mai Hin camp, escaped into the mountains. Information provided by the RLG a n d , not contradicted by any foreign military attache showed that the battalion had fled into the virtually inaccessible mountainous areas in eastern Xieng Khouang, with many of them crossing over into North Vietnam.15 We do not know whether the escape of the second battalion was authorised by Souphanouvong or by higher echelons either in Sam Neua or Hanoi. What followed was a series of military engagements between the Royal Laotian Army and the Pathet Lao, with the assistance of the North Vietnamese.
In an interview on 21 May in Saigon, the Laotian Foreign Minister, Khamphan Panya, who was at the time visiting South Vietnam at the invitation of the South Vietnamese government, declared the RLG's intention to outlaw the NLHX. He also said that the RLG would seek help not only from SEATO but from any other international organisation or any stronger a n t i communist nation. According to an AFP report on 24 May, the South Vietnamese and Laotian governments had agreed on civil and military security cooperation and the transportation of supplies from South Vietnam to Laos through Saigon and Da Nang. On 25 May 1959, after a special cabinet meeting, the RLG announced that it would use force to annihilate the Pathet Lao. The Thai Foreign Minister then visited Laos at the invitation of the RLG from 27-29 May. On 27 May, the Deputy-Minister of Information stated that the NLHX leaders in Vientiane would be placed under closer surveillance16 and that Pathet Lao-sympathisers would be severely punished. The lines were clearly drawn between the Pathet Lao, North Vietnam and China on the one side and the RLG, the United States, South Vietnam and Thailand on the other.
On 28 May 1959, it was reported that there had been a clash between the RLG forces which had been deployed in the mountainous region between
C U S S D C F : 751 J. 00/8-1359, 13 August 1959, from
Vientiane to Secretary of State.
These included Souphanouvong, Singkapo, Phoumi Vongvichit, Nouhak Phoumasavan, Sithone Komadam, Phoun Sipraseuth, and the editor of Lao Hak Xat, Khamphay B o u p h a .
Xieng Khouang and the Vietnamese border. Hanoi radio stated that the troops and police of the DRV had been ordered to strengthen their defence along the Laotian border and to be alert for any provocations. Fighting was again reported on 29 May in the Muong Ngan area. According to the Pathet Lao 2nd. Battalion, they had reached the Muong Ngan region by 30 May. The fighting was particularly serious on those two days. Not long after that, the battalion succeeded in moving to the south eastern part of Xieng Khouang province. On 10 June, it was reported that the Pathet Lao 2nd Battalion had safely reached its former revolutionary bases. Nhan Dan hailed the battalion's safe withdrawal as "a new epic of the Laotian people... Like fish returning to water, the Pathet Lao Battalion Number 2 is again enjoying the devoted help of the local people..." To the North Vietnamese, the Battalion was justified to continue their self-defence fight because the government of Phoui Sananikone on the orders of the US imperialists had reneged on the Geneva Agreements.17 Sporadic fighting persisted throughout May, June and July 1959.
Ill
While the Ho Chi Minh Trail was being built and the fighting in Laos was going on, Ho Chi Minh was in the Soviet Union, ostensibly on vacation. There was no report of Ho's departure from Hanoi for Moscow.18 The first knowledge that Ho was in Moscow was a one sentence report that he had arrived by TU 104 on 2 July 1959 to spend his summer holiday in the Soviet Union.19 At Moscow, he was met by Voroshilov (Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet), Mukhitdinov (Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee), Mikhail Geogadze (Secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet), and Vladmir Servemov (Deputy-Foreign Minister).20 We know
V N A , 10 June 1959, SWB/FE/50/A3/6.
FO 371/144391, DV 1016/28, 3 August 1959, from Hanoi
to Foreign Office.
SWB/FE/69/4 July 1959/(i).
T A S S i n R u s s i a n f o r A b r o a d , 2 J u l y 1959,