Justifying Deviance

Why do people engage in deviant behaviour even though they know it to be wrong, or at least could be perceived as wrong by others? Sykes and Matza’s (1957) theory of techniques of neutralization, offers an explanation as to why people sometimes violate societal norms and laws. Sykes and Matza challenged claims that there was a distinctive subculture amongst offenders and

delinquents. Instead, they asserted that most delinquents are essentially in agreement with larger society and know that delinquent behaviour is wrong, and that they share conventional beliefs about conduct. Sykes and Matza supported this contention by pointing out that if a delinquent subculture were to exist then we would expect the delinquent to view their illegal behaviour as morally correct and to display no feelings of guilt or shame upon exposure. Yet the evidence indicates that many delinquents do experience “a sense of guilt or shame” (Sykes and Matza, 1957:664-5). This confirms that offenders identify

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with the dominant norms regarding right and wrong behaviour, and encounter negative emotions when confronted with their rule-breaking actions.

If the deviant shares the same value commitments as the non-deviant, then how are we to understand the processes that enable someone to engage in

“criminal” behaviour? Sykes and Matza’s solution to understanding this

quandary appears in the form of their techniques of neutralization, which they define as “extensions of defences to crimes, in the form of justifications for deviance that are seen as valid by the delinquent but not by the legal system of society at large” (1957:666). Influenced by existential thought and what Sartre (2003:72) refers to as “bad faith” (mauvaise foi), the techniques of

neutralisation echo a form of self-deception in which we lie to ourselves in order to evade moral responsibility for our actions. This notion of

metaphorically ‘burying our heads in the sand’ and turning a ‘blind eye’ to elements of our behaviour because they might have negative repercussions, was further explored by Cohen (2001) in his work ‘States of denial.’ Cohen (2001) considered how it is possible that people are both knowing and unknowing at the same time, where the mind unconsciously (or consciously) keeps troublesome information away. Everyday denials are conducted to ensure that uncomfortable truths are expelled from the forefront of our knowledge, however, we are aware of them in the back of our minds. When faced with the supressed realities the self-deception is interrupted and further denials are turned to in the form of techniques of neutralisations.

The techniques of neutralisation equate to rationalisations that offenders use to convince themselves that it is admissible to transcend dominant norms of conduct, thereby allowing them to deviate and justify that deviation. The use of these techniques also serves as an emotional functionality as they help

mitigate the feelings of remorse, guilt and shame that would otherwise be experienced in the aftermath of criminal or deviant behaviour. Although the legal, moral, and ethical issues are not entirely rejected, individuals are able to temporarily absolve themselves from these codes. The neutralization process means that deviant behaviour can be engaged in without assuming a

permanent criminal identity, because the opinions of the dominant society

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have been sufficiently neutralized. The usual social controls that restrict deviant and criminal behaviour are inefficient, allowing individuals the ability to contravene societal conventions (Sykes and Matza, 1957).

Sykes and Matza’s (1957) techniques of neutralization comprise various

denials and appeals. Denial of responsibility involves the offender denying that the wrongdoing was their fault and blames instead an external factor such as alcohol or drugs. Denial of victim sees the offender claiming the victim was in the wrong, for example in a rape case where the offender claims that the victim led them on. Denial of injury involves the offender claiming that the victim was not really hurt by the crime; this could be used to justify theft from companies as opposed to the individual in that they can afford it. Appealing to higher loyalties is also a way of justifying deviant behaviour, for example if the rule of law had to be ignored due to the fact that more important issues were at stake such as standing up for race/religion/political beliefs etc. In addition, the offender may feel a sense of unfairness in being singled out and punished for an action that they feel is not unique from what others have done. The individual turns accusations of wrongdoing back upon those who have condemned them for their behaviour. Criticism might be expressed of those who pass judgment, therefore condemning the condemners; for example the government might be viewed as corrupt.

Matza and Sykes (1961) also explored why rule-breaking and risky activity can be appealing in their article ‘Juvenile delinquency and subterranean values.’

The simple answer purported by Matza and Sykes is fun, the search for excitement, thrills and kicks drives transgressions. The fact that an activity is breaking the law is what makes it exciting (Matza & Sykes, 1961). Although the focus is again on delinquent youths, the concept is transferrable because it highlights a cultural perspective, one that sometimes celebrates daring and adventure. Rule-breaking behaviour is not always abhorred, it can be

commodified, consumed and celebrated (Ferrell et al. 2008).

These ideas explained how juveniles could shift from being law-abiding to criminal and then back to law-abiding again in a process of ‘drift’ (Matza, 1964). This was further developed where the deterministic notion of the

‘constrained delinquent’ who is fundamentally distinct from law-abiding

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citizens was rejected. Matza claimed that the drift into delinquency may occur from either inner or outer compulsion along with underlying influences. Matza indicates a firm difference between mundane drifters who do not become criminals in adulthood and those who do, due to processes such as

compulsion or constraints for example. Taylor, Walton and Young criticized this distinction for ignoring the “full implications of his sociology of motivation”

(1973:140) suggesting a major contradiction in Matza’s critique of determinism.

A cultural response towards threats concerning social status involves the process of ‘othering’. Weis (1995:17) argues that othering not only “serves to mark and name those thought to be different from oneself” but is also a process through which people construct their own identities in reference to others. Providing a means to justify privilege, the normal are distinguished from the deviant, and the law-abiding distinct from the criminal. Ferrell et al.

(2008) claim that othering is a means of highlighting a lack of culture. ‘Others’

have failed to share the values needed to assimilate into the moral order, hence acquiring the status of deviant. These deviants cause problems for the rest of society who are moral and virtuous. Othering, in the context of

healthcare, has also been discussed by Johnson et al. (2004), in their study of the interactions between healthcare providers and South Asian immigrant women, where social and institutional contexts created conditions for othering behaviour.

Cultural criminology argues that such psychodynamics are not a result of an individual’s past experiences, but are instead determined by current social problems and stresses arising from the existing social structure (Ferrell et al.

2008). Hence an appreciation of the present situation and current social issues is necessary to understand othering and how deviancy comes to be recognised as such.

Deviance can be justified as a way to seek control over one’s life. Lyng (1990) and Ferrell (2005) have undertaken edgework studies investigating individuals who voluntarily engage in extreme acts of risk-taking such as sky-diving, illegal graffiti writing and illicit motorbike racing. These studies have found that

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participants are not dangerously out of control or self-destructive, instead they are pushing themselves to the edge. They squander control to regain control (Ferrell et al. 2008). Such risky acts are a means of reclaiming control over one’s life, retaliation against the structures that deprive individuals of their autonomy (Lyng, 1990). Edgework allows people to develop the very sorts of skills that authorities seek to control.

Cultural criminology acknowledges the externalisation of excitement

associated with resistance. Influenced by Katz’s (1998) work, which highlighted that crime is about presence and ‘sneaky thrills,’ cultural criminology moves beyond the objective perspective to consider the subjective view of the criminal. Many deviant activities that appear to be about risk-taking actually represent an attempt to exercise control and take personal responsibility. In a society where people are increasingly controlled, rule-breaking/ deviancy offers excitement and the opportunity to regain control (Jewkes, 2010). The Web enables individuals to bypass regulatory controls and challenge authoritative restraint, especially in relation to healthcare choices and purchasing medicine.

This can also be viewed as an act of self-expression.

Deviance can also be viewed as an expressive act; Presdee (2003) claims that everyday life is filled with drama and emotional intensities that impact upon even the most mundane of routines. Social life is suffused with emotive extremes from the phenomenology of everyday lived experiences to the phenomenology of crime (Katz, 1988). These ideas merge with those of

Goffman’s ‘Presentation of Self’, which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

In contemporary society the search for excitement and the tension of conformity are more intense and ambiguous (Ferrell et al. 2008). This emphasis on expression is antithetical to rational choice theory (Cornish &

Clarke, 1987), which dominated orthodox criminology. Embodying an uncomplicated rational/ instrumental discourse, rational choice theory

maintains that crime occurs where opportunities are available and individuals have low levels of social-control, especially where people are impulsive and focused on the short-term (Felson, 1998). Existential motivations are neglected, and individuals are presented as calculating, deliberate actors,

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taking advantage of criminal opportunities where possible. In this sense criminality can be understood as behaviour similar to consumerist decision making, with cost-benefit economics affecting choices. However, this approach overlooks the lived experience, the meanings attributed to transgression that provides insight into the emotional perceptions of individuals. The previous chapters have addressed the challenges to authority that are involved in the purchasing of medicine online, and the excessive commodification of

consumer culture, these issues along with potentially engaging in behaviour that is deemed to be risky, highlight that expression is significant in deviancy.

Jack Katz’s (1998) Seductions of Crime helped to establish a phenomenological focus, where the complexities of social interaction, emotions, consciousness and situation are central to understanding crime and deviancy. Focusing on the foreground experiences of people, rather than the background factors such as class or ethnicity, Katz claims that emotions are ambiguous. On the one hand we are unable to control our emotions, such as when we feel guilty or

ashamed, or find something funny; on the other hand emotions are a subjective part of our lives and we are able to own our reactions, such as providing an expected response to certain situations for example sympathy towards someone who has received bad news. Therefore Katz in his later work

‘How Emotions Work’ (1999: 1-2) questioned:

“when shame or rage flood through experience, where is the source of inundation, where are the gates that let the rush of feelings come

through, if they are not within. If we idiosyncratically own our emotions, why can’t we fully own up to them?”

Katz suggested three answers to these questions. The first considered

emotions as ‘situationally-responsive’ and ‘situationally transcendent’ narrative projects. Here, the individual attempts to make sense of what is socially visible in both the immediate situation and the aftermath. The second, Katz described as ‘interactional processes’, which explore how people shape their emotional conduct in response to the readings and reactions given to their emotions by

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others. Lastly, ‘sensual metaphors’ refer to the framework of actions changing as people move in and out of their emotional states such as shame anger and rage. Katz’s ideas accentuate the earlier symbolic interactionist work and Matza’s state of drift.

Much of this discussion of deviance is about identity management as actors shift, or drift, between different moral and legal positions. Having considered how deviance is constructed and how those labelled in turn justify the

deviance, I now consider how and why deviance is managed. I draw on

Goffman’s conceptual contributions concerning dramaturgy, the presentation of self and stigma, in order to underpin further the concept of respectable deviance.