On 16 April 1991 President Bush announced US ground troops would establish safe zones for the Kurds in northern Iraq. Provide Comfort was only the second time in more than 50 years a safe area was established to protect civilians in a conflict zone.143 Bush called the safe zones “encampments”,144 conjuring images of refugee and other temporary disaster relief camps, rather than protected areas more commonly associated with combat zones like field hospitals or civilian shelters. Bush
143. Harrington, “Operation Provide Comfort: A Perspective in International Law,” 637; The first had been established in Sri Lanka by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1990 with the consent of the LTTE separatist movement and the Sri Lankan government. Phil Orchard, “Revisiting Humanitarian Safe Areas for Civilian Protection,” Global Governance 20 (2014): 3.
144. George H. W. Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference, ed.
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 16, 1991.
thus continued framing Provide Comfort in terms of disaster relief, even as it became, in his words, “greatly expanded and more ambitious”.145 In his speech and press conference on 16 April 1991 Bush used the terms “relief” and “humanitarian” a combined total of seventeen times to describe the expanded mission.146
Talking about Provide Comfort in terms of disaster relief did not insulate Bush from the fact American soldiers were effectively occupying Iraq by mid-April 1991. The US safe zone in northern Iraq was never formally negotiated with the Iraqi government.
Without what Phil Orchard calls “tactical consent of the belligerents”,147 US armed forces were required to ensure the zone was indeed safe.
With Provide Comfort’s operational approach shifting from an aerial mission to one involving ground forces, Bush could no longer rely on his operational disengagement exit strategy. He thus developed a new, UN transition exit strategy. Bush justified this new exit plan as consistent with his expanded scope of American moral responsibility to protect the Kurds, not just alleviate the humanitarian crisis. He also argued the strategy assured exit because American soldiers would not need to wait until the Kurds were fully protected from future Iraqi government attacks; the UN would act in America’s stead, fulfilling the moral obligations of US humanitarian intervention. The difficulty, however, was Bush continued connecting exit with victory, and according to him, victory could not be achieved without America fulfilling its moral obligation to guarantee Kurdish safety. He also failed to explain when and under what conditions the UN had agreed to take over from America, making US exit even more dependent on meeting protection obligations itself.
During this phase of Provide Comfort Bush continued talking about American victory in Iraq but not in the context of the humanitarian intervention. Instead, Bush’s rhetoric reinforced his Gulf War victory narrative from which Provide Comfort was notably excluded. Bush railed against critics who insisted Provide Comfort
145. Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference.
146. Ibid.
147. Orchard, “Revisiting Humanitarian Safe Areas for Civilian Protection.”
demonstrated Gulf War victory was overstated, accusing them of “revisionistic thinking (sic)”.148 Bush reminded the American people of the limited scope of their country’s Gulf War aims: “our objective was to repel aggression, and we did it”,149 “the objective was to throw [Hussein] out of Kuwait, and boy did our people perform well”,150 “the goalposts were, aggression will not stand and aggression didn’t stand”.151
Bush’s focus on America winning went beyond discussing the “success”,152 “vic-tory”153 and “triumph”154 of US soldiers; Bush emphasised winning as a result of
148. George H. W. Bush, Remarks at a Meeting of the American Defense Preparedness Association, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 9, 1991.
149. George H. W. Bush, Remarks at an Arbor Day Tree-Planting Ceremony and an Exchange With Reporters, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 26, 1991.
150. George H. W. Bush, Interview With Linda Douglas of KNBC, Jim Lampley of KCBS, and Paul Moyer of KABC in Los Angeles, California, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 15, 1991.
151. Ibid.
152. George H. W. Bush, Remarks Following Discussions With President Hassan Gouled Aptidon of Djibouti and an Exchange With Reporters, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 24, 1991; George H. W. Bush, Remarks at the University of Michigan Commencement Ceremony in Ann Arbor, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 4, 1991; George H. W. Bush, Remarks to Members of the Defense Community at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 11, 1991; George H. W. Bush, Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters in Kennebunkport, Maine, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 29, 1991; George H. W. Bush, Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony for the Presidential Medals of Freedom and Presidential Citizen’s Medals, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 3, 1991; Bush, Remarks at a Meeting of the American Defense Preparedness Association; George H. W. Bush, Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony of the Declaration of the Legion of Merit, Degree of Chief Commander, to General Michel Roquejeoffre in Rambouillet, France, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 14, 1991; George H. W. Bush, Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony for the Declaration of the Legion of Merit, Degree of Chief Commander, to Sir Peter de la Billiere in London, United Kingdom, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 14, 1991; George H. W. Bush, The President’s News Conference With Turkish President Turgut Ozal in Ankara, Turkey, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 20, 1991; George H. W. Bush, Toast at a State Dinner in Ankara, Turkey, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 20, 1991.
153. George H. W. Bush, Remarks at the Presentation of a Point of Light Award to the United States Naval Academy/Benjamin Banneker Honors Mathematics and Science Society Partnership in Annapolis, Maryland, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 23, 1991; George H. W.
Bush, Remarks at the Yale University Commencement Ceremony in New Haven, Connecticut, ed.
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 27, 1991; Bush, Interview With Linda Douglas of KNBC, Jim Lampley of KCBS, and Paul Moyer of KABC in Los Angeles, California; Bush, Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony for the Presidential Medals of Freedom and Presidential Citizen’s Medals;
George H. W. Bush, Remarks at an Independence Day Celebration in Grand Rapids, Michigan, ed.
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 4, 1991; Bush, Remarks at a Meeting of the American Defense Preparedness Association; Bush, Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony for the Declaration of the Legion of Merit, Degree of Chief Commander, to Sir Peter de la Billiere in London, United Kingdom; Bush, Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony of the Declaration of the Legion of Merit, Degree of Chief Commander, to General Michel Roquejeoffre in Rambouillet, France.
154. Bush, Remarks at the Yale University Commencement Ceremony in New Haven, Connecticut ; Bush, Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony for the Presidential Medals of Freedom and Presiden-tial Citizen’s Medals; George H. W. Bush, Remarks at a Dinner Hosted By President Turgut Ozal in Istanbul, Turkey, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 21, 1991.
resisting mission creep, explicitly contrasting the Gulf War with the Vietnam War.
Bush acknowledged expanding the Provide Comfort mission would invite comparisons to Vietnam, a parallel he explicitly resisted with Vietnam Syndrome language of
‘quagmire’ and troops ‘bogged down’:
All along I have said that the United States is not going to intervene militarily in Iraq’s internal affairs and risk being drawn into a Vietnam-style quagmire.
This remains the case. Nor will we become an occupying power with US troops patrolling the streets of Baghdad.155
I don’t want to see us get into a quagmire or get further militarily involved with some permanent presence required.156
I did not want to get bogged down.157
Instead of laying out an exit plan or explaining why troops would not be “bogged down” in northern Iraq, however, Bush virtually stopped talking about exit all together. Of all the statements he made during this phase of the intervention, only four percent were about his exit strategy. The comments Bush did make about exit were imprecise, amounting to little more than reassuring his audience the mission would be short, even if he sounded like he barely believed it himself as the quote at the beginning of the chapter illustrates, as do other statements at the time:
I don’t think it has to be long-term.158
[US ground troops are an] interim measure designed to meet an immediate, penetrating humanitarian need.159
We have always looked at this relief effort as limited in duration.160 And all of us understand this force will not stay permanently.161
When Bush finally mentioned his new exit strategy was a UN transition, he was similarly imprecise about when the UN would take over, if at all:
155. Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference, Emphasis added.
156. George H. W. Bush, Remarks Announcing the Resignation of William H. Webster as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and a News Conference, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 8, 1991.
157. Bush, Remarks Announcing the Resignation of William H. Webster as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and a News Conference; See further references to not getting ‘bogged down’
George H. W. Bush, Remarks on the London Economic Summit and an Exchange With Foreign Journalists, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 8, 1991, (Emphasis added).
158. Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference.
159. Ibid.
160. George H. W. Bush, Remarks Following Discussions With Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar de la Guerra of the United Nations, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 9, 1991.
161. Bush, Remarks at a Dinner Hosted By President Turgut Ozal in Istanbul, Turkey.
JOURNALIST: How long do you think that it will be before the United Nations forces can take over from the US and other allies?
PRESIDENT BUSH: You mean in this new operation? We don’t know that.
We don’t know that, but clearly the sooner the better. [. . . ] [W]e’ll have to see what we do.162
Despite Bush’s imprecision we can find two main justifications for his new UN transition exit strategy: first, avoiding a Vietnam-style quagmire; and second, fulfilling an even wider moral responsibility to protect the Kurds rather than just providing disaster relief. These justifications supported one another but were also in tension, creating challenges for Bush successfully implementing his exit plan. Bush also failed to explain exactly what the UN transition exit strategy entailed, making the threshold of American victory that would justify exit unclear.
Avoiding another Vietnam-style quagmire meant withdrawing troops, not deploying additional soldiers to a more risky operation. To explain this apparent contradiction to his American audience, Bush focused with more intensity on US moral duty, increasing the relative time he spent discussing moral responsibility from two-thirds to almost three-quarters (74 percent) of all statements made during this phase of the intervention. Bush also expanded the scope of America’s moral responsibility in Iraq widened from providing disaster relief to include defeating evil and protecting Kurds from future attacks and atrocities.
Bush continued describing US soldiers as “taking care of these people”,163and“toil[ing]
on behalf of suffering Kurds”,164 but now he argued America had a responsibility to “do everything in our power to save innocent life”,165 to do “what we ought to do”.166 Bush committed America to delivering the Kurds from oppression and
162. Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference.
163. George H. W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Federal Energy Management Executive Order, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 17, 1991.
164. Bush, Remarks at the University of Michigan Commencement Ceremony in Ann Arbor . 165. Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference; For another mention of “saving lives” see: George H. W. Bush, Remarks at the United States Air Force Academy Commencement Ceremony in Colorado Springs, Colorado, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 29, 1991; George H. W. Bush, Remarks at the Annual Southern Baptist Convention in Atlanta, Georgia, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 6, 1991.
166. Bush, Remarks at the United States Air Force Academy Commencement Ceremony in Colorado Springs, Colorado.
protecting them inside Iraq, arguing this was a logical part of America’s moral duty in intervention:
Our long-term objective remains the same: for the Iraqi Kurds and, indeed, for all Iraqi refugees, wherever they are, to return home and to live in peace, free from repression, free to live their lives.167
We’ll be able to protect not only our own people but we’ll be able to protect the people that we’re setting out to protect, which is these refugees.168 . . . these people will be protected.169
[W]e’re prepared if any force should be used against these helpless people in the refugee camps.170
We are not going to say to them,“Come down from the mountains; you will be protected”, and then not protect them.171
Bush framed America providing Kurdish protection as morally incumbent throughout the rest of April-May 1991. No longer was Kurdish repression an internal Iraqi issue of no interest to the US:
[W]e want these people’s lives to be protected against this violence that’s been wrought on them for many, many years.172
[W]e’re responding to another challenge too: the need to protect and care for tens of thousands of refugees who fled home and hearth to escape the brutality of one man, Saddam Hussein.173
While it may be true Provide Comfort was still “motivated by humanitarian con-cerns”,174 its success now hinged on US forces adequately protecting the Kurds in safe havens from renewed attacks. Fulfilling this moral responsibility thus became part of Bush’s exit strategy justification; it was the marker of victory that would justify exit:
[US troops are] going to stay there as long as it takes to be sure that these refugees are taken care of, and not a minute longer.175
167. Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference; Repeated: Bush, Remarks Following Discussions With Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar de la Guerra of the United Nations.
168. Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference.
169. Ibid.
170. Ibid.
171. Ibid.
172. Bush, Exchange With Reporters Aboard Air Force One.
173. Bush, Remarks Following Discussions With Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar de la Guerra of the United Nations.
174. Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference.
175. Bush, Remarks at an Arbor Day Tree-Planting Ceremony and an Exchange With Reporters.
However this effort to “keep our commitment to be sure that these people are safe”176—to fulfil America’s moral responsibility—challenged Bush’s other promise not to involve the US in in a drawn-out military engagement, a point he acknowledged:
And the only little difficulty now in terms of coming home is that we have a responsibility to do what we can to help these refugees.177
The claim the American people had a responsibility to protect the Kurds, while self-imposed, was not easy to shirk. Having placed the Gulf War in the pantheon of US military victories, Bush argued America had to live up to “the responsibility imposed by [its] successes”,178 because “never before has the world looked more to the American example”.179 The Gulf War was part of Bush’s new world order “quest”
“to keep the dangers of disorder at bay”.180 The president foregrounded the moral bases for foreign policy action in Iraq and elsewhere arguing:
This nation’s foreign policy has always been more than simply an expression of American interests; it’s an extension of American ideals. This moral dimension of American policy requires us to remain active, engaged in the world.181
Bush’s protection goal in Iraq was consistent with domestic American discourse and the demands of US allies. Bush’s assessment appeared correct: there was indeed “a lot of understanding” about his expanding Provide Comfort mission and shifting exit strategies.182 So long as Bush demonstrated he was discharging America’s moral duty to the Kurds, he received bipartisan Congressional support and relatively little comment. To the extent Congress members criticised US ground troop deployment, it was on the basis the US was still not doing enough to secure ‘long-term‘ protection for the Kurds. Senator Joe Lieberman (D-Connecticut), for example, commended Bush’s expanded operation but called for a deeper commitment, apparently willing to sacrifice the prospect of quick American troop withdrawal for ongoing Kurdish protection:
176. Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference.
177. Ibid.
178. Bush, Remarks Following Discussions With President Hassan Gouled Aptidon of Djibouti and an Exchange With Reporters.
179. Bush, Remarks at Maxwell Air Force Base War College in Montgomery, Alabama.
180. Ibid.
181. Bush, Remarks at the Yale University Commencement Ceremony in New Haven, Connecticut . 182. Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference.
We need to plan for the security of the Kurds over the long term. We cannot simply set up tent cities, move the Kurds in, and then leave without in some way safeguarding their lives against a renewed murderous rampage by Iraqi forces.183
Here Lieberman is saying the level of victory to be achieved before troops withdraw requires this longer-term moral obligation to be fulfilled.
The humanitarian situation undoubtedly improved in northern Iraq. With little effective Iraqi government resistance the safe zone grew, covering almost 4200 square kilometres.184 Encouraged by the foreign military presence Kurds began resettling in the safe zone. Coalition forces and non-government organisations (NGOs) improved housing, sanitation facilities, hospitals, roads, bridges and airfields. While the Iraqi government maintained its public opposition to the foreign intervention, there were only a handful of small-scale clashes between coalition and Iraqi soldiers.185 Nevertheless, using ground troops posed greater risk to US soldiers than the earlier aerial operation.
Successfully fulfilling America’s moral responsibility to protect the Kurds was also only assured with US troops present to effectively deter attacks, especially as the Iraq government remained unchanged. Bush’s commitment to protect the Kurds for “as long as it takes”186 and send “a strong, unmistakable signal to Saddam Hussein”,187 challenged the wisdom of not forcibly removing Hussein, especially as Bush maintained US humanitarian intervention was “a clear case of evil versus good – and [Hussein’s] the evil in this one”.188 Avoiding a quagmire meant not leaving US troops in an endless operation, but it also meant leaving after victory. As American troops cemented their position in northern Iraq, and Hussein remained in power, Bush talked openly about how regime change would create the level of success that
183. Joe Lieberman, “The Plight of the Kurds,” in Congressional Record 102nd Congress (1991–
1992) (April 25, 1991), S5321.
184. Jones, “Operation Provide Comfort: Humanitarian and Security Assistance in Northern Iraq.”
185. Rudd, Humanitarian Intervention: Assisting the Iraqi Kurds in Operation Provide Comfort, 1991 , 107–28.
186. Bush, Remarks at an Arbor Day Tree-Planting Ceremony and an Exchange With Reporters.
187. Bush, Remarks at a Dinner Hosted By President Turgut Ozal in Istanbul, Turkey.
188. Bush, The President’s News Conference With Turkish President Turgut Ozal in Ankara, Turkey.
would justify exit because now the Kurds would be sustainably protected without the need for US troops:
Do I think the answer is now for Saddam Hussein to be kicked out? Abso-lutely.189
I’ll tell you what’s the most important thing, however, and that is to get
I’ll tell you what’s the most important thing, however, and that is to get