What kind of Capabilities?

Having outlined Sen‟s reasons to focus on people‟s capability sets in development practice, the discussion will continue with the question which capabilities ought to be considered of relevance. So far the analysis has focused very much on Sen‟s notion of the CA, as he is not only the main architect and intellectual property holder of

it, but also because many considers his notion of the CA, this author included, to be of substantial advantage for the study of poverty than compared to some other authors working on the CA, foremost Martha Nussbaum. As she has closely cooperated with Sen in the development of the CA, she has achieved her valid place in any discussion of it. However, her very own understanding of the CA and her universal list of ten central

human functional capabilities is very distinct from what Sen considers the CA to be, as

a normative framework in development thinking. Whilst Martha Nussbaum‟s notion of the CA and the list will be discussed in chapter 4.9/Part I50, it is for now important, as the analysis approaches what exactly constitutes a capability, to draw attention to her work.

As previously stated, the removal of substantial unfreedoms in form of elementary or basic capabilities is constitutive of development for Sen. To differ between capabilities and basic capabilities in Sen‟s notion of the CA is thus intrinsically important. Basic capabilities are understood “as a subset of all capabilities; they refer to the freedom to do some basic things that are necessary for survival and to avoid or escape poverty” (Robeyns, 2003a: 18). In poverty analysis, we are thus very much concerned with these elementary capabilities, “not so much in ranking living standards, but in deciding on a cut-off point for the purpose of assessing poverty and deprivation” (Sen, 1987: 109 in Robeyns, 2003a: 18). Thus, the focus for the majority of people living in developing countries will be on basic capabilities, although, this depends on the evaluative issue at hand. Certainly, (advanced) capabilities can matter in poverty analysis, howbeit most often, elementary capability analysis will be sufficient in contexts of destitution.

50 _{The chapter will also discuss what to favour, Sen‟s notion of capability setting as a context specific}

exercise (which constitutes a deliberate incompleteness of the CA), or Nussbaum‟s endorsement of a fixed list.

This understanding of capabilities in Sen‟s writings is pretty basic/ two- dimensional. Much confusion in the readings on the CA stems from the very different understanding Martha Nussbaum has of capabilities in general, and of basic capabilities in particular. She distinguishes between basic, internal and combined capabilities, of which her understanding of basic capabilities is very distinct from the notion of basic capabilities in Sen‟s CA:

 Basic capabilities: ~ are the innate equipment of individuals that is the necessary basis for developing the more advanced capabilities and a ground of moral concern. These capabilities are sometimes more or less ready to function: the capability for seeing and hearing is usually like this. More often, however, they are very rudimentary, and cannot be directly converted into functioning. A newborn child has, in this sense, the capability for speech and language, a capability for love and gratitude, the capability for practical reason, the capacity for work (Nussbaum, 2000: 84).

Nussbaum‟s basic capabilities are thus focused on the agent herself, defined as

innate or natural capacities/ talents of the individual, and “have little to do with the cut-

off point for (…) deprivation analysis” as in Sen‟s notion of basic capabilities (Robeyns, 2003a: 20). Further, she distinguishes between:

 Internal capabilities: ~ are “developed states of the person herself that are, so far as the person herself is concerned, sufficient conditions for the exercise of requisite functions … mature conditions of readiness” (Nussbaum, 2000: 84). Internal capabilities, comprised of religious freedom, freedom of speech, sexual functioning, among others, are thus capabilities that a person can exercise

regardless of whether the circumstances allow this to do (Robeyns, 2005a: 104)

 Combined capabilities: ~ are “internal capabilities combined with suitable external conditions for the exercise of the function” (Nussbaum, 2000: 84-85)., i.e. expressing one‟s political point of view within a political and cultural system that allows the exercise of this action (if one is only able of developing a point of

view but is restricted externally of expressing it, then one has to speak of an internal capability only)

While Sen and Nussbaum‟s categories and terminologies clearly differ, both hold the view that politics should focus on combined capabilities. It is also combined capabilities which constitute her list of 10 central human functional capabilities (Robeyns, 2005a: 104), to be discussed at a later stage of the dissertation.

In addition to the categories of capabilities defined by Sen and Nussbaum is one which has been labelled in the literature mostly through empirical applications of the CA, namely those capabilities of general kind, such as “being sheltered, and living in a pleasant and safe environment; health and physiological well-being; safety and bodily integrity” (Robeyns, 2003: 20). This category, generally been thought of coined by Bernard Williams when referring to the difference which needs to be made between the capability to choose, for instance, “yet another new brand of washing powder”, from something intrinsically important as “Adam Smith‟s often referred to capability to appeare in public without shame” (Robeyns, 2003a: 20), came actually first about as yet another form of basic capabilities:

what you need, in order to appear without shame in public, differs depending on where you are, but there is an invariant capability here, namely that of appearing in public without shame. This underlying capability is more basic (1987: 101 in Robeyns, 2003a: 20).

However, in order to avoid further misunderstandings in regard to terminologies, especially with Sen‟s notion of basic capabilities, these “deeper, foundational, generic, fundamental, aggregated (not over persons but over different capabilities in a person) capabilities” (Robeyns, 2003a: 20) are labelled general capabilities.

This last category of capabilities is probably lesser discussed in the literature, as Sen usually covers this distinction by the phrase capabilities people value and have

reason to value, which excludes that increases in choices per se are ambitioned, and that

all choices hold the same value. In this regard, walking in public without shame is clearly a capability of value, whereas the choice of n-types of washing powder is obviously (at least for most people) a choice of lesser or non-value (although it can be assumed that most people would value one good washing powder, yet again, presumably this is something which is lesser valued than walking in public without shame). This point will be further elaborated when some misunderstandings of the CA are discussed (in chapters 3.12, 3.13/ Part I).

Another point necessary for clarification relates to the question whether something as a financial functioning exists, and thus the capability to financial functioning. While this has frequently appeared in empirical studies (Robeyns, 2003a: 21), it has to be stated howbeit, that from a clear human development understanding, this capability and functioning category does not exist. In this particular notion of development, financial means are only and exclusively important as instruments, as means to an end, without intrinsic importance whatsoever. While it is understandable that, especially in “quantitative empirical studies” and due to “data restrictions”, financial variables have been used as an “approximation of functionings that have intrinsic value”, they can only be proxies for achievements of value (Robeyns, 2003a: 21), and thus should not appear, from my personal point of view, in any list of (general) capabilities.

Clarifying these various understandings and terminologies of capabilities was important in regard to the subsequent references to capabilities in this dissertation,

which will be in line with Sen‟s notion of it, rather than in concordance with Nussbaum‟s or Williams‟.

3.6 A closer look at agency and well-being, freedom and achievements51

The analysis so far focused predominantly on the role of capabilities, freedoms and functionings in the CA, and to a lesser extent on the agent herself. As a liberal framework, the CA understands the person in an evaluative exercise as an active agent for change. Due to this perception, the CA is more concerned with the real opportunity freedoms granted to the agent than with the agent herself. However, it is worth to analyse the agent against its relationship with well-being freedom and achievements.

Agency or process freedom is exercised in two distinct ways, either personal (acting on one‟s own behalf) or systemic (acting as part of a community, institution, political group, and so on). In this understanding, and due to the internal plurality of the capability space, individual advantage can be assessed in at least four different spaces: well-being achievement, well-being freedom, agency achievement or agency freedom (Alkire, 2002: 9). Individual advantage can thus be assessed in relation to the standard of living, to one‟s personal well-being, whether defined in a basic fashion (nutritional status) or in a more complex understanding (self-respect) (Robeyns, 2003a: 15; Alkire, 2003: 7). The focus on well-being thus also comprises “altruistic” motives, such as helping other people to feel better about oneself.

If well-being is supplemented with goal-pursuing ambitions, such as securing funding for a university programme, or commitments, such as demonstrating against world hunger or other actions considered non-direct beneficial to the agent herself, then the focus is overall on agency (Robeyns, 2003a: 15-16). Moreover, the two concepts of

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advantage, well-being and agency, have to be further specified as being either achieved (well-being/ agency achievement) or in regard to the freedom people have to achieve these outcomes, “independent of whether they opt to achieve them or not” (Robeyns, 2005a: 102) (wellbeing/ agency freedom). Sen argues that none of these four possibilities should be ignored in an evaluative exercise, although the objectives might conflict in concrete situations, as Alkire exemplifies:

(i)f your riverside picnic is interrupted by the chance to rescue someone from drowning, then your agency freedom (and hopefully achievement) increases, because you can save someone‟s life; but your achieved well- being diminishes, as you emerge cold wet and hungry (2003: 7).

Another good example is given by Robeyns:

Suppose two sisters, Anna and Becca, live in peaceful village in England and have the same achieved well-being levels. Both of them believe that the power of global corporations is undermining democracy, and that governments should prioritise global justice and the fight against poverty in the South instead of taking care of the interests of global corporations. Anna decides to travel to an Italian town to demonstrate against the G8 meetings, while Becca stays home. At that moment Anna is using her agency freedom to voice some of her political concerns. However, the Italian police does not like the protesters and violates Anna‟s civil and political rights by beating her up in prison. Obviously Anna‟s achieved well-being has lowered considerably (as has her standard of living). Anna is offered to sign a piece of paper declaring that she committed violence organised by an extreme-left organisation (which will give her a criminal record and ban her from any further G8-demonstrations). If she does not sign, she will be kept in prison for a further unspecified time. At that moment, Anna has a (highly constrained) option to trade off her agency freedom for higher achieved well-being, which our heroine refuses. Becca had the same agency freedom to voice her concerns and protest against either the G8 itself or the way the Italian police officers abused their power, but chose not to do so. She is concerned about the hollowing of democracy, the protection of human rights and the fascist tendencies among some police officers, but does not want to sacrifice her well-being to achieve these agency goals (2003a: 16).

The questions which arise from these examples regard the focus of an evaluative exercise and the information deemed necessary to carry out this evaluation. Is the relevant dimension of advantage considered the standard of living, achieved well-being,

agency achievement, well-being freedom or agency freedom? While the distinction between achievements and freedoms is important for well-being and agency, evaluating the standard of living should primarily focus on achieved levels (Robeyns, 2003a: 16). Furthermore, the CA claims that regardless of whatever concept of advantage one opts to consider, “the informational base of this judgement must relate to the space of functionings and especially capabilities” (Robeyns, 2003a: 16). In regard to well-being achievement, the evaluative focus should be on functionings, whereas a person‟s capability set reflects well-being freedom. A focus on agency will always consider both, functionings and capabilities, and also takes agency goals into account (Robeyns, 2005a: 103).

While a full and rich life presumably comprises both, well-being and commitments (thus well-being and agency), the evaluative focus should be, from a normative perspective, on capabilities and functionings, a point further exemplified subsequently. This might confuse, because Sen authentically advocated that social arrangements should be evaluated with respect to freedom (and thus the capability space). This requires clarification.

When Sen argues that social arrangements should be evaluated in the capability space, he gives, nothing more, nothing less, a normative direction for general purposes, a proposition for the comparison of two states of affairs, a focus with limitations though if aimed to be used for the analysis and valuation of an individual human life, and, as shall be seen, when agency freedom is severely limited. As of this the CA is different to other rather more narrow concepts of well-being, such as classical utilitarianism, which has been criticised by Sen for its too restricted evaluative focus on utility, without taking into account rights, positive freedoms, commitments, creativity or actual living conditions, which constitute for him a great part of life though (Sen, 1999: 77). As he

outlines, to “insist on the mechanical comfort of having just one homogenous “good thing” would be to deny our humanity as reasoning creatures” (Sen, 1999: 77). As of this, the CA has to be moulded in regard to the evaluative task, and his proposition should be seen as a guide for comparisons only. Thus, a comparison of the two emancipated sisters from the above example should take place in the (opportunity) freedom space of both, well-being and agency. Such an evaluation would certainly propose to remove the identified unfreedom forced upon Anna by the Italian police of her civil and political rights. If security is guaranteed, her sister Becca might see enough incentive to abandon her well-being achievement to join Anna‟s reasonable protest in the future.

It is eminent that this thesis discusses the CA mostly as a proposition for the comparison of social arrangements, a logical choice if the CA is used to analyse multidimensional poverty. Due to the above distinction it becomes apparent though that freedom analyses in the capability space are characterised by a substantial degree of

internal plurality, which ought not to be ignored, ridiculed or reduced in any kind.

Therefore evaluations include looking and respecting a “medley of things like the social organizer‟s freedom to be an agent of social change in Arabsolangi, and the group members‟ capability to be nourished, and the women‟s capability to read and act on their own behalf” (Alkire, 2002 and 2003: 9/ 7). The capability perspective thus enriches the considerations that inform the analysis of social welfare and social choices by widening the informational base of such analysis.