given us benefi t. Naïve realism, although a rather unsound metaphysical position, is important and useful to knowledge construction in society.
Turning to Kantian phenomenalism, it is less perceptibly useful in knowledge construction in society, but not devoid of use. Kantian phenomenalism provides us with a viable viewpoint for questioning the truth of the world around us and gives us a method of doubt. By introducing the possibility that the world we see around us is in fact only real in our perception, it allows us to question the world. As a theory, Kantian phenomenalism also has important ramifi cations in philosophical inquiry. For example, Kantian aesthetics incorporates the tenets of phenomenalism – works of art are not to be judged, in any way, on the “truth” of the artwork or as representations of truth. Rather, they are simply to be considered as sensory, aesthetic objects judged on the responses that they provoke in human faculties. Although Kantian phenomenalism in itself seems useless in society, it has implications in areas that are valuable to society.
Furthermore, although the overriding concern for knowledge construction in society is usefulness, it is not limited to that. Society’s interest also plays a role in determining the value placed on certain kinds of knowledge. Interest in exploring the physical, philosophical and otherwise ‘theoretical’ implications of a system such as Kantian phenomenalism can also establish it as important. Although phenomenalism may not bring about as much tangible benefi t or usefulness as naïve realism seems to support, it has its benefi ts, and it would be incorrect to say that it has no place in society.
Phenomenalism is also not wholly incompatible with even the most profoundly empirical disciplines, like the natural sciences. One can accept and use the fruits of scientifi c inquiry without needing to reject Kantian phenomenalism – and its appeal – wholesale. If we accept the phenomenalist’s perspective, i.e. that the world we experience is not the ‘true’ world, neither the validity nor usefulness of scientifi c inquiry are diminished. What is affected is that science is removed from the realm of knowledge about the ‘real’ world, since the phenomenal world is not the ‘real’ world – but this does not dismiss it as a legitimate form of knowledge in society. The question is, how important is it that our knowledge is of the ‘true’, noumenal world? In the scope of usefulness, no matter whether the metaphysical conclusion is that “the external observable world is true” or “we can only access the phenomenal but not the noumenal world”, empirical knowledge can and does continue to be useful. When push comes to shove, knowledge in society does not exactly need to be of the ‘real’ world in any philosophically sound way in order to be useful. The value of knowledge in society is not solely epistemological or metaphysical.
Both Kantian phenomenalism and naïve realism are metaphysical frameworks that can give us useful knowledge about the world. However, knowledge in society is not defi ned completely by epistemological and metaphysical concerns, and can be of benefi t regardless of its metaphysical grounds. As naïve realism is simply the most intuitive way to comprehend the world, it must take primary place in our understanding of life as well as our understanding of useful knowledge.
My understanding of the “judgment” referred to in the statement is that it assumes a standard against which people’s responses can be evaluated. With this in mind, I take the claim that this “is not fruitful” to mean that attempting to evaluate an individual’s aesthetic claims against an external criterion will not produce conclusive answers. I agree, to a large extent, with this statement, due to the nature of any aesthetic knowledge. However, I also recognise that assuming a degree of objectivity is not completely without purpose, for the application of general aesthetic rules may be necessary in making an aesthetic claim, even if it is subjective.
Judging the appropriateness of people’s responses to art is not fruitful in the sense that it does not secure defi nitive conclusions as to whether a piece of art is aesthetically “good or bad”. This is because the standards assumed in such a judgment are general and supposedly objective, whereas responses to artworks are personal, emotional and subjective.
An individual’s response to an artwork is subjective, as it is an interaction between the perceived artwork and the individual’s beliefs and background knowledge (in other words, the way he perceives things). Much like the taste of coconut, a person can like an artwork, yet not be able to elucidate his experience, nor give objective grounds on which his preference can be judged as better than one of a person who dislikes it. To impose a general set of rules on subjective responses, to proclaim that a liking for Jackson Pollock’s abstract art is “wrong”, is sheer dogmatism. As Curt Ducasse says, the only difference between critics and amateurs is that critics can articulate reasons for their preferences – however, both make aesthetic claims favouring or denouncing a work of art which are no more objective than the other; in other words, they are matters of taste. Critics merely cite aesthetic standards as the ones they fi nd common to the artworks they like. Thus, even those who proclaim criteria for high art rely on circular justifi cation. As such, the appeal to a set of criteria against which to judge people’s responses does not hold credence, as these criteria are general and self-justifying reasons used to warrant the particular preferences of individuals. As taste is subjective and thus cannot be right or wrong, judging the appropriateness of people’s responses to art is not possible. Attempting to impose such a claim of objectivity on subjective judgments merely leads to two competing proclamations of taste impossible to choose between – thus, the attempt at a conclusive judgment will not be fruitful. Moreover, as most people respond to artworks emotionally or personally, it is not fruitful to judge the appropriateness of their responses, which requires an external criterion. This is because emotional responses cannot be quantifi ed or articulated, and each aesthetic response is intrinsically personal, inseparable from past experience and assumptions. Kant described the aesthetic attitude as detached, meaning the appreciation of an artwork is removed from the complications of an individual’s daily life. Therefore, an individual’s terms for appreciating an artwork are completely different from the terms used in their ordinary sense of daily life, not of utilitarian, nor rational considerations. For example, a spectator’s pure enjoyment of an orchestral symphony can be described as “sublime” or “evocatively tumultuous” and others can agree with this response. Yet so long as this response is attributed to a certain quality of the piece (for example, “the use of C major makes this work sublime”) this is at once individual speculation, and not applicable to all works of art. Moreover, the individual’s experience of the music may be shaped by a particular memory in his childhood that is distinct from other spectators’ experiences, hence his emotional response to the piece is particular and cannot be articulated, nor located as a quality of the work itself. It is impossible to arrive at a general rule making certain responses more appropriate than others, thus any judgment is fruitless in the sense that it is not objective and proves nothing.
“It is not fruitful to judge the appropriateness of people’s responses to art.” Discuss this view with reference to knowledge in the aesthetics.