2. Practical Identity: Who are you? 36
2.3. a Korsgaard and practical identity 60
In the previous section I outlined the reflective bi-perspectival nature of consciousness, arguing for the irreducibility of the first-personal perspective and the necessity of the practical standpoint. I outlined Korsgaard’s argument that we must conceive of ourselves as unified agents. Here I outline Korsgaard’s
normative concept of practical identity and what’s involved in acting on reasons, qua constituting our practical identities.
Korsgaard’s account of practical identity qua self-constitution aims to explain how we integrate the first- and third- personal perspectives through reflective agency. Korsgaard argues that the self is a self-constituting agent and compares this constitution making to the way a political entity constitutes itself, i.e. the agent constitutes/unifies herself through adopting normative reasons for action.135 What is normative about one’s reasons is that the actions they recommend unify the person both at a time and over time. Korsgaard writes: ‘[D]eliberative action by its very nature imposes unity on the will … whatever else you are doing when you chose a deliberative action, you are also unifying yourself into a person … action is self-constitution’.136 So, unity is a pre-condition for taking any action.
Korsgaard sets out her account of practical identity in the context of a theory of normativity (i.e. in terms of explaining the source of our reasons and
obligations). Korsgaard argues that the reflective nature of self-consciousness both sets up the problem of the normative, as well as providing a solution. The
reflective structure of consciousness both provides us with distance from our mental activities, such that we need a reason to act, as well as forcing on us to adopt a ‘conception of ourselves’. Korsgaard writes:
The reflective structure of the mind is a source of “self-consciousness” because it forces us to have a conception of ourselves. As Kant argued, this is a fact about what it is like to be reflectively conscious and it does not prove the existence of a metaphysical self. From a third-person point of view, outside of the deliberative standpoint, it may look as if what happens when someone makes a choice is that the strongest of his conflicting desires wins. But that isn’t the way it is for you
when you deliberate. When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all your desires, something which is you, and which chooses which desire to act on. This means that the principle or law by which you determine your actions is one that you regard as being expressive of yourself.137
On Korsgaard’s account, the reflective structure of human consciousness both forces us and enables us to make laws for ourselves and these give us authority over ourselves. ‘Reflection gives us a kind of distance from our impulses which
135 Korsgaard, “Self-constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant.” 136 Korsgaard, “Self-constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant,” 27. 137 Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 100.
forces us, and enables us, to make laws for ourselves, and it makes those laws normative’.138 Korsgaard argues that when we make a law for ourselves we at the same time invoke or give expression to a practical conception of ourselves.139 This practical conception of ourselves is what Korsgaard calls our ‘practical identity’. Our practical identity determines which of our impulses will count as reasons, in this way it is a normative self-conception.
Korsgaard describes practical identity as a normative self-conception, a description under which you value yourself and think the things you do are worth doing. These practical identities are complex and made up of and dependent on one’s abilities, commitments, relationships and embodied situation.140 This is contrasted with a theoretical conception of one’s identity - ‘a view about what as a matter of inescapable scientific fact you are’. Korsgaard writes:
The conception of one’s identity in question here is not a theoretical one, a view about what as a matter of inescapable scientific fact you are. It is better
understood as a description under which you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth
undertaking. So I will call this a conception of your practical identity. Practical identity is a complex matter and for the average person there will be a jumble of such conceptions, You are a human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, a member of a certain profession, someone’s lover or friend, and so on.141
On Korsgaard’s account, reasons are normative for us; this allows us to explain actions third-personally and also to justify them first-personally. For example, I am writing a thesis. I work evenings and weekends because I value the project of completing a thesis in philosophy. Writing a PhD is part of my identity and structures my time, as well as my discussions and interactions with others. Moreover it provides reasons for my actions.
Korsgaard explains that practical identities are both found and constructed. So, practical identity is both a condition for and a product of our agency. As Mackenzie writes:
[O]ne’s practical identity is both discovered and constructed. On the one hand, many aspects of one’s practical identity are not matters of choice but arise from the material and practical constraints that define one’s situation and the
nonvoluntary aspects of one’s identity, such as one’s individual bodily and intellectual capacities, one’s sexual, racial, linguistic and cultural or ethnic identity, one’s family relationships. … On the other hand, by virtue of the
reflective structure of human self-consciousness, as agents we have the capacity to
138 Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 129. 139 Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 129.
140 As Atkins notes: ‘A practical identity is composed of complex sets of subscriptions
pertaining to one’s physical and psychological abilities (and inabilities), occupation, ethnicity, gender, relations of family and friendship, religious and political convictions, and so on.’ Atkins,
Narrative Identity and Moral Identity - A Practical Perspective, 1.
call into question whether certain aspects of our identities, and the beliefs, desires, and motives to which they give raise, constitute reasons for us. So even if aspects of our identity may not be a matter of choice and even if the different aspects of our identity may give rise to conflicting demands and values, through processes of reflective endorsement we can construct a self-conception that then comes to have normative authority for us.142
Korsgaard argues that these practical identities give rise not only to reasons to act but are also a source of obligations.143 For Korsgaard ‘[a]n obligation always takes the form of a reaction against a threat of a loss of identity’.144
It is the conceptions of ourselves that are most important to us that give rise to unconditional obligations. For to violate them is to lose your integrity and so your identity, and to no longer be who you are. That is, it is to no longer be able to think of yourself under the description under which you value yourself and find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking. It is to be for all practical purposes dead or worse than dead. When an action cannot be performed without loss of some fundamental part of one’s identity, and an agent could just as well be dead, then the obligation not to do it is unconditional and complete. If reasons arise from reflective endorsement, then obligation arises from reflective rejection.145
This invokes an understanding of integrity in terms of living up to one’s standards, that is, by acting according to those reasons, by acting out of our practical identities.146
Further, Korsgaard argues that practical identities are mainly contingent; we can choose to drop or alter them. In her account however, practical identity depends on a conception of moral identity. Moral identity stands behind all our practical identities.147
Korsgaard’s account shows us that agency is reflective (integrated agency) and through the exercise of reflective endorsement, a person gives expression to their practical identity. A person constitutes her identity through living a life and acting; it is not given in a metaphysical account. Therefore identity is not given; rather identity is a project, one that takes work and that can fail. On Korsgaard’s account failure is not living up to one’s identity. This account draws out further the relationship between agency and identity and autonomy. Korsgaard’s account of practical identities is an autonomy-based view. For Korsgaard autonomy is our capacity to give ourselves obligations to act based on our practical identities. For my account of personal identity, the relationship between identity, agency and autonomy will be significant. I further discuss the relationship between autonomy and identity in the fourth and fifth chapters.
142 Mackenzie, “Practical Identity and Narrative Agency,” 11. 143 Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 101.
144Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 102. 145 Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 102. 146 Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 102. 147Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 129-30.
Here I identify two problems with Korsgaard’s account. First, Korsgaard’s conception of agency is overly rational, there’s not enough about the first-personal sense of embodiment and the importance of embodiment to our self-conception and practical identities. Whilst Korsgaard recognises the practical necessity that comes from being embodied, in one body, she does not develop an account of the impacts and constraints of embodiment on our practical identities. Second, the connection between our practical identities and normative commitments in Korsgaard’s account is overly strong, because on Korsgaard’s account if one doesn’t live up to one’s commitments, or acts against them, one is at risk of losing one’s identity. As Mackenzie and Walker recognize this suggests that Korsgaard’s conception of practical identities tends towards rigidity and as such is not as well suited to explaining personal change over time.148 Thus, Korsgaard’s account, while it recognises the role of others in generating a conception of our practical identities, does not develop an account of the role of others in the constitution and negotiation of our practical identities. Both these problems need to be addressed in order to adequately explain the accounts of apparent change in who a person feels she is after a neural implant.