Learning to write in step with Wittgenstein about language and meaning is a difficult process, and it is easy to be uncertain whether one has indeed succeeded in doing so. One aspect that makes for difficulties is Wittgenstein’s approach to explanation. With regard to language, the difficulty is that we must accept what is there as it is, to describe it and not to explain it.32 Insofar as we are concerned with meaning, we are concerned with ‘just’ language itself, and with the primacy of games highlighted in this understanding. As Wittgenstein says,
We are not interested in any empirical facts about language, considered as empirical facts. We are only concerned with the description of what happens and it is not the truth but the form of the description that interests us. What happens considered as a game. I am only describing language, not explaining anything. (PG §30)
That is Wittgenstein’s project. Is it reasonable, however, to resist in the case of language and meaning the explanatory impulse? Can one always follow in step with it? As Wittgenstein points out repeatedly, and as I have experienced, it is easy to go astray: “While thinking philosophically we see problems in places where there are none. It is for philosophy to show that there are no problems” (PG §9).
What gets ruled out in Wittgenstein’s discussion are hypothetical or theoretical causal explanations of meaning. To explain something in this way is to identify the cause(s) of its existence, that is, to show in this manner why it is, or why it is as it is. If we follow Leibnitz, for example, to explain and theorize about
32 As Wittgenstein says, “We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place” (PI §109). (Though Wittgenstein notes difficulties in ‘describing’ as well, i.e., in doing too much – e.g., see RPP §257.) Early in Philosophical Grammar, Wittgenstein says that “what is spoken can only be explained in language, and so in this sense language itself cannot be explained,” and that “language must speak for itself” (PG §2). This connects with Wittgenstein’s comment in the Investigations concerning the focus of his work: “Your questions refer to words; so I have to talk about words” (PI §120). Further, Wittgenstein says that, “An explanation of the operation of language as a psychological mechanism is of no interest to us. Such an explanation itself uses language to describe phenomena (associations, memory etc.); it is itself a linguistic act which stands outside the calculus; but we need an explanation which is part of the calculus” (PG §33). I take it that the explanations which are ‘part of the calculus’ are what Wittgenstein will later call “grammatical investigations.”
23 language and meaning would be to attempt to identify the efficient or final causes that (fully) account for why there is language and/or meaning, or to account for why there is just this particular meaning, attached, for example, to just these sounds, gestures, or marks.33 This rejection of causal explanation throws up a considerable difficulty for those trying to follow and make sense of Wittgenstein. For example, how does one account for the normativity of meaning without theorizing about it, without setting out general causal explanations of it? If one is forbidden from doing this, how does one talk about meaning?
As I have indicated earlier in this chapter, Wittgenstein affords us the possibility that we can talk about language and meaning on the basis of pictures that we can sketch of these ‘things.’ A picture so-called provides a way of looking at the phenomena, but do not explain the phenomena, do not attempt to account for why they are, in terms, for example, of Leibnitzian efficient or final causes. We apply
pictures in the sense that they lead us both to view and talk about things in certain ways. On the basis of the picture of pictures, one can go on to talk about things untroubled by the problems and dead-ends that plague other ways of going on which are characterized in terms of causal explanatory accounts.
To talk about language from our position within language requires a re-orientation of our approach to the ‘subject matter,’ and this is why Wittgenstein proposes that we employ the idea of pictures as necessarily tentative attempts to represent, outline, or sketch ‘aspects’ of language. Pictures, however, do not stand in a strict representing or corresponding relationship to their object. The pictures are what we have of the ‘object’ or ‘state of affairs,’ and the picture in terms of the whole and of its parts stand on their own to be considered, discussed, or modified, and where the satisfactory usefulness or value of a picture emerges in the unfolding agreements, similarities, and differences with what else we say. For example, pointing to the nature of the picture of language and meaning that he is sketching,
Wittgenstein says that “we look at games and language under the guise of a game played according to rules. That is, we are always comparing language with a procedure of that kind” (PG §26).34It is the use
33 This is a cursory look, at best, at the issue of kinds of explanations and causes. For example, Aristotle identifies material and formal causes in addition to efficient and final causes (i.e., as per Leibnitz), connecting these causes to different kinds of ‘why’ questions. Working these angles out is not so much my concern here, though nevertheless the range of kinds of explanation would be important to a more robust thinking-through what Wittgenstein has to say in this regard. For example, we can ask what kind of explanation Wittgenstein has in mind when he talks about ‘explanations of meaning’ (e.g., see PI §560).
34 For example, as Wittgenstein says, “What does it mean to understand a picture, a drawing? Here too there is understanding and failure to understand. And here too these expressions may mean various kinds of thing. A picture is perhaps a still life; but I don’t understand one part of it; I cannot see solid objects there, but only patches of colour on the canvas. – Or I see everything as solid but there are objects that I am not acquainted with (they
24 of the picture – its ‘application,’ as Wittgenstein puts it – and not the ‘sketch’ in itself (as reified,
perhaps, in a more or less fundamental way) that is the most important thing. Finally, in terms of how we use a picture, Wittgenstein says of the picture of language-games, that they are “set up as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities” (PI §130).35
For Wittgenstein, we discuss and examine language and meaning in terms of the pictures we sketch of it. We must not take the parts or elements of the sketch as theoretical entities, as Frege does, for example, or the picture as a theoretical explanation of how meaning works, or how a person can mean something by an utterance in language (or, to put it otherwise, how an utterance can mean something). Wittgenstein does not explain how language happens, but rather describes its happening. And he describes language by drawing up, in words, pictures of language. All of this is a source of considerable trouble in writing with Wittgenstein.
To end this chapter, let me reiterate that what I want to explore is how insights about language and meaning drawn from Wittgenstein offer us a purchase on how we might go on to talk and think about professional learning. To put it otherwise, what I do in this thesis is first to work to get clear on the picture of language and meaning sketched by Wittgenstein, and then to apply it in drawing another picture, a picture of professional learning. In this thesis project I do not identify, describe, and apply a methodology per se; that, in a sense, would run afoul of Wittgenstein’s aversion to theory-based investigation in matters of meaning and language. Rather, by drawing and applying a particular picture of professional learning, I replace strict methodological procedure set up as the (theoretical) means to developing responses to some question, problem, or phenomenon, with a way (or a perspective from
look like implements, but I don’t know their use). – Perhaps, however, I am acquainted with the objects, but in another sense do not understand the way they are arranged.”(PI §526). Wittgenstein addressed this issue of ‘picture parts’ in his earlier Philosophical Grammar as well. For example, he says there: “So what the picture tells me is itself. Its telling me something will consist in my recognizing in it objects in some sort of characteristic arrangement” (PG §115), and “”What the picture tells me is itself” is what I want to say. That is, its telling me something consists in its own structure, in its own forms and colours” (PG §121).
35 I take Wittgenstein’s point here to be about the role of language-games as one part of the picture of language, and not about anything ‘real’ having explanatory force and which we refer to as “language-games.” The point is a tricky one, however, as I will go on to talk about language-games (and grammar and rules) as if these were ‘real’ things arrived at in the analytic decomposition of signs and meaning. But it is important to recall always that these ‘items’ are parts of a picture of language that Wittgenstein is sketching (or are different pictures Wittgenstein is sketching of language), and thus are to be discussed in terms of their application, i.e., what we can do with them in our talk about language, what they highlight, or ‘bring into’ clear view (which itself can be a potentially misleading expression, implying that there is something beyond language which we are trying to reach and see better – see PI §104 as one of the ways Wittgenstein cautions us against going down such roads).
25 which) to view and talk about how we talk about things – in this case, how professionals talk about things in learning about them.36 If, however, it is suggested that we can indeed appropriately speak of a methodology being applied here, it would be something along the lines of Wittgenstein’s idea of the descriptively-oriented ‘grammatical investigation’ that one employs from this standpoint. The result of such investigations are ‘perspicuous’ overviews (i.e., an Übersicht) of how we, the relevant persons, actually do talk about some thing(s), i.e., in terms of the signs we do use, the connexions between signs we make in our talk and our action, and the ways in which we make those connexions. In other words, in performing a grammatical investigation we end up with a clearer, more perspicuous overview of what signs we use and how we use them.37 An important part of grammatical investigation will also be discernment of the pictures that are operative in our talk, i.e., those pictures around which our talk gets oriented. Note that I add in later chapters important caveats to the possibility of my own employment of grammatical investigation per se in thinking about and being active in professional learning initiatives. Regardless, the approach I follow out and which is the principal theme of this thesis, is to draw and apply a picture of professional learning on the basis of an application of the picture of language and meaning drawn by Wittgenstein.38
I suggest that it is this that captures what is of the most significant value of Wittgenstein to educators, viz., the drawing of such a picture of learning on the basis of his picture of language and meaning. For my own part, I resist attempting to draw out a theory or picture of learning from Wittgenstein’s many ‘educationally’ oriented remarks having to do with learning, teaching, training, instruction, etc., or from his employment of a varied set of pedagogical techniques, such as question-and-answer remarks, examples both real and outlandish (see his many ‘anthropological’ and fantastical examples – e.g., see RFM I 143ff, for the case of wood cutters with strange measuring practices), dialogues, humour, and so on. My own view is that Wittgenstein employs these remarks (and techniques) in service of bringing into clearer view the developing picture of language and meaning he is sketching. We can, of course, take
36 One might even suggest here some affinity with Donald Schön’s emphasis on the creative framing of problems of practice through the artistry of the reflective practitioner’s unfettered expertise. (See Chapter 2 for more on Schön.)
37 At the same time I am not suggesting here that we end up with an ‘objective,’ value-free, theoretically-neutral analysis of talk. Rather, we do simply end up with more talk, which itself can be grammatically investigated for its ‘what and how’ of sign use. However, all of what I am suggesting be done here is still situated on the plane of meaning.
38 I would suggest as well that my use of some of the provocative ideas of Sudnow in gaining a perspective on Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning (see Chapter 3), is also interesting, useful, and contentious. Note that my employment of Sudnow’s thinking concerns linguistic meaning, and represents a considerable departure from the Fregean, representationalist approach to meaning.
26 and develop from Wittgenstein the method of the ‘grammatical investigation,’ and apply it to various important terms used within educational circles, perhaps with an eye to versions of deconstructive results, and such efforts would be both revealing and useful (e.g., see Winch, 2017).
Thus, from the perspective I build in this thesis project, what I take to be most salient for both the philosophy of education and the field of professional learning and development lies in the application of Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning to drawing a picture of professional learning. And so bringing to bear a picture of language and meaning on the development of a picture of professional learning is my focus here. As Wittgenstein asks and answers in a paragraph from Zettel: “Am I doing child psychology [i.e., in discussing children’s learning language]? – I am making a connexion between the concept of teaching and the concept of meaning” (Z §412). Similarly, in my thesis project I am working to ‘make a connexion’ between a picture of language and meaning and a picture of professional learning. Further, cued by this assertion by Wittgenstein from Zettel, I take here a line from Deborah Britzman (2003) as illuminating something of my own purposes in this thesis. She says:
So readers will meet the conflicted narratives made from teacher education. And it is here that the research will take the narrative turn. The reason we engage with narratives of learning is to create a different conversation on the problem of experience in education. (p. 23)
This seems to me a fair representation as well, mutatis mutandis, of what I am trying to do, i.e., create a different conversation with regard to the situations of professionals learning in situ through a reading of Wittgenstein on language and meaning. Those situations I have begun to describe in the opening pages of this chapter, and go on to consider how others have considered them through the literature reviews I conduct in Chapters 2 and 3. In Chapters 4 and 5 I further consider those situations of professional learning – the conflictual aspects and the struggles – in light of the perspective afforded us by
Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning and by the picture of professional learning I have begun to sketch myself, influenced by the major gestures and lines of Wittgenstein’s picture.
Finally, with the background context set out in this chapter now in place and situating my discussion, I can usefully begin to sketch out a picture of professional learning in terms of Wittgenstein’s notions of grammar, language-games, and having ‘places to go’ in one’s professional talk. In the next chapter, I briefly look at some of the more important pieces in the literature on professional learning, in part to set further the context for my move to Wittgenstein and his picture of language and meaning, but also in
27 part to seek out what is valuable and useful there for me in my work to talk better, in fundamental terms, about professional learning.
28 Chapter Two
Some Theorists of Professional Learning
2.1 Preamble
My aim in this section is to provide a reasonable path into the rather substantial literature on
professional learning. I have selected particular thinkers for this brief literature review on the basis of several factors, and my selections have not been made in order to obtain a representative sample. The first factor concerns the seminal nature of the work – these are, for the most part, key and influential documents in the field. The second factor is my interest to show some of the contrast both within the literature and to my own developing way of thinking and talking about professional learning. As will become evident, guided by my reading of Wittgenstein I break away from the cognitivist and
epistemological assumptions which frame many of these thinkers’ investigations. Third, several of these pieces were chosen because they focus on dialogue, conversation, and relationship as important to the course of professional learning, a point which will strongly echo the thinking I do later about
professional learning. Last, I have selected certain thinkers because their work provides rich descriptions of professional working life; from these characterizations of working life these authors develop
inferences about the kind of learning that makes possible and supports just those kinds of practice. These descriptions and associated inferential moves are, of themselves, valuable to have in hand when thinking about professional learning.
By giving a sense of the sweep of the literature on professional learning we can begin to observe how different theorists talk about professional learning and how they frame their talk. As a negative kind of finding this chapter will also serve to show that, despite the range of the literature, no one has chosen to consider these issues about professional learning from the perspective of a theory or picture of language and meaning. In the context of my thesis, then, this scan of the literature serves to indicate something of the space that is available for the treatment I propose, viz., to explore professional learning in light of the view afforded by Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning (i.e., see Chapter 3). Thus there is some need for a deeper look at the arguments and themes of the thought of
29 each thinker, to ascertain whether they do treat language and meaning in their discussions of
professional learning.39
There has been a longstanding and rich history of academic interest on professional learning, and, as just noted, it is a substantial literature.40 A considerable amount of this literature is located within the education sector, focusing on the learning and cognitive life of education professionals. There has been as well over the last two decades an explosion of interest in the new fields of ‘knowledge
mobilization/transfer’ and ‘research use/utilization/translation’; in the health sciences there has also been much interest in how professionals and organizations manage the rapidly changing bodies of pertinent relevant research, research syntheses, ‘official’ guidelines,’ etc., and changing health care