The legacy of the League of Nations

The United Nations, particularly the Security Council, is the institutional embodiment of the present collective security system. The UN was created in the

82 _{Karns and Mingst (International Organizations) (supra) 45.}

83 _{See comments by Richard Steinberg ‘Overview: Realism in International law’, ASIL Proceedings (2002) 260 –}

262.

84 _{For a realist critique on the role of international law, specifically in terms of American responses to acts of}

terrorism and humanitarian intervention, see Edwin D Williamson ‘Realism versus legalism in international relations’ ASIL Proceedings (2002) 262 – 265.

wake of the Second World War. This war shook the international system to the core and exposed the failures of its institutional predecessor, the League of Nations.

The League of Nations was created as a result of the liberal ideal that the horrors of the First World War should never be repeated. Apart from the peace treaty that was signed at Versailles to end hostilities, the League of Nations was created to serve the ideal of collective security and to prevent war. The Covenant of the League of Nations took effect on 10 January 1920, the date on which Germany deposited its instrument of ratification of the Treaty of Versailles.86 Despite the fact that the League in many respects represented the ideals of liberal internationalists like President Woodrow Wilson of the US, it is ironic that the US declined to become a member of the League.87 The reasoning of the US at the time seemed to be that some provisions in the Covenant of the League would diminish or bring an end to an important aspect of US foreign policy which had at that time been in place for almost a century: The Monroe Doctrine. This political doctrine was essentially a policy statement that the US would not tolerate interference or colonial projects in its ‘sphere of influence’, namely the continents of North and South America. The US considered some of the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations to form a basis for possible European influence and interference in the American continents. Higgins pointed out that part of the reason of American refusal to become a member of the League was the provisions of Article 10 of the Covenant.88 This article contained the general principle that aggression was unlawful.89 It imposed a legal obligation on states to respect the territorial

86 _{Pearce Higgins (ed) Hall’s A Treatise on International Law 8}th _{(1924) Clarendon Press Oxford 71.} 87 _{Pearce Higgins (International Law) (supra) 72.}

88 _{Pearce Higgins (International Law) (supra) 79.}

integrity and political independence of all members of the League. The crucial political problem for the US seemed to lie in the fact that the Council of the League could decide on measures to be taken in cases where the political independence or territorial integrity of states was violated as a result of aggression. This dispensation created tension with the Monroe Doctrine which provided that the US (and by implication not other countries or international bodies or alliances) would be the guarantor of political independence and territorial integrity in the American continents. Although the wording of Article 10 of the Covenant were criticised as being too vague, authors like Ian Brownlie regarded the principle contained in the article as a clear and important declaration on the illegality of aggression.90 _{However, geopolitical considerations of the US trumped}

the normative impact of Article 10, and the emerging superpower was not willing to partake in the collective security regime of the League of Nations.

Ultimately, neither the legal provision in Article 10, nor the working of the League of Nations could prevent the disastrous war of aggression that became the Second World War. Inis Claude, who viewed the League of Nations as the embodiment of the liberal ideal of collective security, concluded the following on the nature of the Covenant of the League:

‘[All] the basic concepts of nineteenth-century liberalism – democracy, nationalism, natural harmony, law, limited government, rationalism, discussion, consent – made their imprint upon the Covenant of the League of Nations.’91

90 _{Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 65. Other commentators, like Hans Kelsen, pointed out that the}

prohibition of the use of force was much weaker under the Covenant of the League of Nations than it is under the UN Charter. See Hans Kelsen (Collective Security) (supra) 787-788.

The fact that these ideals were shattered by the Second World War obviously called into question not only the practical impact of the League, but also the ideal of a collective security regime based on international law. Authors like Inis Claude, however, seemed to have had a more optimistic prognosis for collective security after the Second World War. Claude viewed the United Nations as ‘a revised version of the League’, and not a radically new concept. Of course, for tactical and political reasons, the resemblances between the League and the UN were understated. Essentially, Inis Claude regarded the UN as a continuation of the ‘progressive trends’ of the period between the two world wars.92 In other words, the idea of collective security was not dead, but the organisational aspects were certainly in need of adjustment and reform. Hans Kelsen pointed out that decentralisation and self-help were key features (and weaknesses!) of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Thus, it ‘was for the members, and not for a central organ of the League to decide whether a violation of the Covenant by illegal resort to war had occurred, and to decide what enforcement action had to be taken.’93 _{Members were also not legally bound by the recommendations of the}

Council of the League. According to commentators like Kelsen, these features of the Covenant of the League led to the League’s ultimate ineffectiveness.94