The local actors level is the heart of the conflict since it is the level where the disputants are deeply embedded in waging the conflict. Therefore, it is the level at which power-sharing should be agreed and where certain conditions should exist in order to make a power-sharing settlement possible. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are a number of conditions identified as conducive for power-sharing, which have generated a fierce debate in the literature (See Section 2.5.10.). Most of those favourable conditions were not present in the Cyprus and Northern Ireland cases, and in Bosnia six out of the eleven conditions were present (See the table below). However, it is also arguable that the full blown civil war in Bosnia was largely offsetting the positive value of some of the existent favourable conditions there. For instance, although there was the tradition of elite accommodation in Bosnia during most of the multinational Yugoslav federation’s existence, this tradition was substantially undermined during the Bosnian war as the multi-ethnic Yugoslav elite of Bosnia became bitterly divided along ethnic lines. Likewise, the socioeconomic conditions in Bosnia were almost totally distorted during the war for all the three ethnic groups. In other words, most of the favourable conditions were not present in the three deeply divided societies studied, mostly because of the very recent memories of civil war or inter-communal political violence in the past. There were only two favourable conditions which existed across all the three cases;
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those were small population size and small number of segments, both semi-permanent conditions determined by the structure of the conflict.
Favourable Conditions for Power-sharing288 Cyprus Bosnia N. Ireland
1
Geographical concentration of segments or federalism 2
No majority segment plus segments of equal size (i.e. balance of power)
3 External Threats (as a unifying factor)
4 Small Population Size
5 Overarching Loyalties
6 Small number of segments
7 Tradition of Elite Accommodation
8 Socioeconomic equality
9
The inexistence of a solid majority that prefers majority rule to consociationalism
10
Intra-group political stability289
11
The Existence of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate
Table 2 – Favourable Conditions for Power-sharing in Cyprus, Bosnia and Northern Ireland
However, through a comparative analysis of the Cypriot, Bosnian, and Northern Irish cases, I suggest that there are three conditions essential for power-sharing in deeply divided societies which should exist at the level of local contestation. First, there should be intra-group political stability in each ethnic group; particularly, the ethnic political elite should be rather consistent with regard to its position on power-sharing with the other ethnic group/s. In each of the three cases studied at least one of the communities seems to be lacking internal political stability at earlier stages of the process and a settlement did become possible only after a relatively cohesive political leadership emerged. In the case of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots went
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The first nine conditions are drawn from Lijphart (1996); for a detailed discussion on them, see Section 2.5. The ones written in italics are those which are identified as most essential ones.
289 Intra-group political stability is deemed non-existent where at least one of the groups is ridden with political instability.
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through a rebalancing act and a pro-settlement coalition (though still somewhat restrained by its minor pro-status-quo partner) emerged and positively contributed to the negotiation process; the Greek Cypriots, meanwhile, replaced their pro-settlement leader with a hardliner who refused to enter into substantive negotiations. In the case of Bosnia, the Bosnian Muslim leadership was mostly stable, but the Bosnian Serb and Croat leaderships were usually fraught with internal divisions, and only their respective kin-state’s forceful interferences in the politics of these two communities brought about the relative stability which made the Dayton settlement possible. The Northern Irish process was essentially different, because all the main political factions were participants in the formal negotiation process; however, in fact, the UUP, the SDLP and Sinn Féin were the key players, and the Catholic community’s internal political instability due to the nationalist-republican rivalry was a severe obstacle until the SDLP and Sinn Féin managed to forge some form of political alliance in the early 1990s, which happened largely thanks to the Irish and British intergovernmental cooperation over the conflict’s management. As internal political stability provides a communal group’s leadership with more flexibility regarding its negotiation positions, it should be regarded as a necessary condition for achieving a power-sharing settlement. This internal cohesion, however, cannot be maintained throughout negotiations, even at the very least common denominator basis (for instance, the second largest Unionist party UDP left the Northern Irish process protesting Sinn Féin’s entry into the all-party negotiations); but if there is still a substantial political majority backing the process within the community (as was the case in Northern Ireland), the process could still move on and succeed.
The second essential condition for power-sharing settlement is the existence of a power balance or a tendency towards parity between rival ethnic communities. As discussed in Chapter 2, a balance of power is pointed out by Lijphart as a favourable condition. I will argue that a tendency towards parity between the communities should also be seen as a favourable condition. The Northern Irish case is a particularly relevant example on this point. As the Northern Irish nationalist community’s political, economic conditions and even demographic status relatively improved over the years, the unionist community did become gradually more conciliatory towards them. The political and economic conditions for the nationalist community mainly improved due to the British intervention (particularly under the direct rule); at the same time the unionist community’s political dominance was eradicated, again as the direct rule replaced the unionist dominated government of Northern Ireland. In the Bosnian case, on the other hand, there was essentially a balance of power between the groups. Although the Bosnian Muslims were the largest group (though not a majority), the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats had the backing of
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their respective kin-states. The case of Cyprus, however, is a prime example of power imbalances, which are obviously likely to hinder a power-sharing settlement. The Turkish Cypriots were demographically a minority with around 18-20 % of the population, while the Greek Cypriots were a much larger group with around almost 80% of the population. The Greek Cypriots were also the more prosperous of the two and had the sole internationally recognised government on the island since 1963. The only substantial factor favouring the Turkish Cypriots in this quite imbalanced conflict was the support they were getting from their kin state Turkey, which is a powerful regional actor in the Eastern Mediterranean. In sum, the tendency towards power parity seems to have substantially improved the chances for power-sharing in Northern Ireland, whereas in Cyprus the power imbalance appears to have worked against a power-sharing settlement.
The third essential condition for power-sharing is the existence of a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS). As discussed in Chapter 3, Zartman (2001) argues that the timing of peace initiatives is crucial and an MHS constitutes a ripe moment for third party intervention. The case studies indicate that an MHS is also essential for power-sharing settlements. In the cases of Bosnia and Northern Ireland, a mutually hurting stalemate was largely in place as the substantial negotiations begun, but in Cyprus, though the stalemate was in place for decades, it does not seem to be operating as a mutually hurting one. By 1995 all the groups in Bosnia were weary of the war and the conditions on the battlefield could be described as a stalemate. In Northern Ireland, the stalemate had been long in the making, and by the mid-1990s it was firmly in place: the unionist community was weary of the conflict and its political leadership was also concerned as the Anglo-Irish initiatives were bypassing and denying them any meaningful exercise of political power at the local level. Again, the Cyprus conflict appears different in this respect as well. For the Turkish Cypriots, it can be argued that their long running political isolation and its accompanying economic difficulties meant that they were regarding the stalemate as hurting them. But for the Greek Cypriots this was hardly the case, although many Greek Cypriots, alike their Turkish Cypriot compatriots, were suffering from the fact that a substantial amount of their private properties were now inaccessible as they ended up in the wrong side of the de facto divide; this was probably their only major concern resulting from the stalemate and this concern’s effect was also diminishing as there has been almost three decades past since the de facto partition. Moreover, with the impending EU membership, the Greek Cypriots were anticipating that the stalemate would be improving in their favour. In short, the Cypriot stalemate was not mutually hurting, or at least it was not perceived as such by the Greek Cypriots.
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It should be underlined that these three conditions as well as the small population size and small number of segments do not necessarily lead to a power-sharing settlement. Instead, I would argue that the existence of these conditions is very likely to improve the chances of such settlement, and that third party interveners and other international actors should take into account the status quo regarding these favourable conditions in order to structure their interventions in a way which does not, in the least, harm the chances of power-sharing settlement. Although most of these conditions are inherently embedded in the local context, some could be improved through third party and/or kin-state intervention, as I will seek to point out below.