56 at the level of presenting reasons for being rational in the first

instance but not in the second* It would be Incumbent upon an individual adopting position (B) to find reasons for being rational in the first instance and irrational :ln the second, whereas a person embracing positiai

(A) would have the relatively easier task of finding reasons for being rational in the first case and proceeding beyond the rational in the Asecond. An attempt could be made to justify the apparent difficulties

in both position (A) and (B) by reference to the revelation of God’s vdH tdiieh made the Irrational or si^ra-ratlonal leap mandator^^. For

Kierkegaard doesn’t maintain that God specifically instructed man to completely hold reason in abeyance, but he does claim that God tells us to perfom an unreasonable act, e.g. "Take now thy son, thine only son Isaac, Wiom thou lovost, and get thee into the land of Moriah; and offer him there for a burnt-offering upon one of the mountains which I will tell thee of.”

However, Kierkegaai'd’s position, (B), is not only weaker than (A) by relying extremely heavily upon rovolation for its sanctions but la, I maintain, untenable for epistemoXogicaX conaiderationa concerning this

supporting revelation.

To begin vdth, when we epealc of an Individual standing immediately before God and receiving a divine revelation of His will, particularly Wien we claim that deity has availed himself of human speech to make His commande known as in the case of Abraham and other instances of verbal inspiration mentioned in the Bible, we must always remember that those perceptions have necessarily been channelled through one or more of our senses. Whether we say that the individual concerned has received a

57

;

revelation which is publia and general or private and esoteric, this revelation occurs to finite individuals located in space and taka; it is legitimate, therefore, to regard it

m

a ‘massage’ mediated thikugb our sense of hearing or seeing.

It has been argued that exceptions to this general rule are revela­ tions of God’s purpose in nature and history, e.g. thK Hebrew conceptions of divine providence arising from contemplation of nature and a sense of

12

divine protection* Althou^ it rai^t be strongly argued that these are revelations of God’s will in the sense of signs by means of tiildi God has hietorloally indicated righteous pathways or 3.eft conspicuous traces of his handiwoxic (as cosmological and teleological ‘proofs‘ maintain) they are not revelations in Kierkegamxi’s sense of direct, divinely inspired messages. Therefore, altlioug^ it might prove interesting to analyse the way in which historical events or the construction of the world are

‘perceived’ revelations,

\m

need not concern ourselves to do so.

Since all ’Immediacy’ of the sort Kierkegaard deals with is filtered through our senses, the belief that we have an absolute duty to obey the voice of God must also mean that we have an absolute duty to trust

dictates transmitted through our faculties - to have complete faith in the infallibility of our oenees to transmit authentic revelsMons* Kierkegaard would prevent us from questioning the validity of a claim mediated through relatively unreliable senses on the grounds that the

claim. God’s will, must bs unquestionably accepted on faith. %e stress Kierkegaard places upon the absolute duty man owes to hie Creator imuld exclude the assessing of one’s perception (and understanding) of the Absolute voice, on the supposition that we are doubting the tdedàn of

5Ô GkKi*s commande# But surely this need not be so# Doubting tliat a commnd was issued by God on epistemoXoglcal grounds does not mean doubting the omniscience of deity or the absolute duty which man owes to God# Although we must entertain a high degree of confidence concerning the reliability of our faculties as a presupposition of knowledge, it is precisely at a moment of paradox Such as that to which Kierkegaard alludes that the witness of our senses must be rigorously examined - when one believes to have heard the voice of God saying, ’Kill your son#’ Surely this is not the moment for absolute obedience but for extrme caution* It is at this moment that the dangerous subjectivity of private revelation becomes apparent, and in order to avoid a misguided dogmatism or an insulated

t

eccentricity we must question our ability to reliably discern a revela­ tion of God’s will# It is only after we are thoroughly convinced of the authenticity of a revelation, i.e. that a particular revelation has in fact been made by God, that we are (perhaps) justified in acting upon it# (#ether this is a sufficient condition for action or at least a necessaiy condition is a crucial dilema as we shall see#)

I said, above, that to doubt on epistemological grounds that a command was issued by God does not entail doubting the supreme wisdom of deity* I should like to elaborate upon this sentence and say that it Is quite the contrary in our experience of revelation* Our belief in the s%erlative nature of God forces us to doubt the validity of the evidence transmitted by our senses. This is my second point* l%en we doubt that God issued a coismand we usually do so on moral and/or theological grounds as well as epistemological grounds - the sort of touchstone which

59

individuals reject the authenticity of a revelation it is as mqch on the grounds that God would not issue such a command as it is that our sense perception has mal-ihnctioned* In most oases, in fact, the reliability of our senses and the authenticity of a revelation would be disputed in the first instance on moral/theological grounds* We would usually say, ’Our knowledge of God’s nature achieved, for example, through the teach­ ings of Jesus, indicates that "kill thy neighbour” cannot be a true revelation of His %&11# Therefore, it did not proceed from God and our

senses have proved unreliable in persuading us that it did#’ Althou#% the direction from Wiich our knowledge of God issues remains that of GreatoaS'to-creature, a salutary moral, theological and epistmologioal

check is maintained on the authenticity of utterances attributed to God. Kierkegaard’s system would not exert any controls over a self-convinced

bigot# deviant# or fanatic*

In ec^haslaiag that revelations must be judged in the light of moral Judgments# theological doctrine and epistmological considerations# we need not go as far as Catholicism does and proclaim that our revelation

"should be submitted to tlie opinion of a prudent priest” before we allow it "pious credence#” but at the same time we cannot carry Protestant individuality to the point of absurdity as Kierkegaard wcuCld have us do* And Kierkegaard’s individualism cannot evade the charge of idiosyncratic

subjectivism by saying It is ’the Individual naked before God’ or the Individual in relation to the Absolute rather than privately mmufactming truths# if he will not cm elder public interpretations of God’s will or the judgments of conscience or reason itself to count against his concep­ tion of the divine voice

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I might add in this connection that Kierkegaard uses a Biblical example to epitomise his point; however# the primary function of Biblical

I.

I criticism (particularly Higher Criticism) is to apply critical, scientific tests of philology, archaeology and history to each of the books coi%)oWng the Bible in order to separate true revelations of God’s will from the ; .myths, legends and strictly human productions deeply rooted in the time

; and circumstances of their compilation* In addition to these scientific criteria of authenticity, if man’s conscimco condemns the acts reported and justified in the

nmm

of God’s revelation, then these passages are dismissed as apocry^al on moral grounds* Occasionally interpretation occurs in accordance with oontcK^orary conceptions of the moral nature of deity. (VJhether one judges an individual reprehensible for ccmmittiiig unjust or ciniel actions with the unselfish motives of obeying God’s will depends upon one’s moral viewpoint# Intmtionalists ivould absolve him

of blame, teleologists %#uld condemn him.)

A more philosophically interesting dilemma which Kierkegaard doesn’t pose is one In which a private revelation is received which is morally abhorrent yet the epistemological understructure of which survives strin­ gent scrutiny»-» That is to say, a thorough questioniïig of the sense perception involved in the reception of a divine revelation fails to reveal significant doubts as to its validity and hence the genuine nature of the sense data# Kierkegaard’s paradox centres upon a creature’s

absolute obedience to God’s commands even when these commands are morally repugnant* Me can slip through the horns of this dilemma by questioning the reliability of our auditory and visual senses - by lowing that our absolute duty may be to obey the true voice of (W but it surely is not

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In document The naturalistic fallacy and theological naturalism (Page 64-69)