Jiang, 10. 111
William E. Studwell, Hong Wu, and Rui Wang, “Ideological influences on book classification schemes in the People’s Republic of China” Cataloging & Classification Quarterly, 19 (1994), 61-62.
warrant to the forefront. As discussed earlier, most classification systems are predicated on particular theoretical constructs, even, as in the case of Hulme, if they are trying to be anti- theoretical. The classification systems identified by Studwell, Wu and Wang, were created based on Mao’s classification of knowledge, which was a political understanding of the world.
Frohmann, in his “Social Construction of Knowledge Organization: the Case of Melvil Dewey” analyzes the social and political issues of classification.112 A fundamental aspect of his thesis is that Dewey presented a new construction of knowledge organization and that it was the interaction between context and content that illuminates the underlying currents of warrant. Frohmann’s argument is important in two ways. First, he argues that the construction of the Dewey Decimal Classification system was due to contextual influences: “Social analyses of SKOs [Systems of Knowledge Organization] that assume clear
distinctions between an autonomous realm of knowledge organization and social, economic, or political factors limit the analysis of the DDC to enumeration of the ‘manifestations’ or ‘reflections’ in Dewey’s system of the knowledge and culture of his time.”113 This first argument can be considered his attempt at exploiting, exploring, and supporting the concept of warrant as a valuable tool for analysis of classification systems (and other textual evidence from the past). The second argument has two aspects: first that there was a durable system and second that in order to accept such a change as DDC, “large scale social transformations” had to be not only amenable but also subject to dynamic situation.114 For his purposes,
112
Bernd Frohmann, “The Social Construction of Knowledge Organization: The Case of Melvil Dewey”
Advances in Knowledge Organization, 4, (1994), 109-117. 113
Frohmann, “The Social Construction of Knowledge Organization,” 111. 114
Frohmann uses the DDC to discuss the larger implications of discursive structures for systems of the organization of knowledge. In his analysis, he asserts that Dewey disavowed any underlying theoretical principles for classification and relied solely on the warrant of his notation system, which Frohmann connects directly to technobureaucratic social structures. For instance, in contrasting Dewey and Cutter, Frohmann states,
Since for Cutter, mind, society, and SKO stand one behind the other, each supporting each, all manifesting the same structure, his discursive
construction of subjects invites connections with discourses of mind, education, and society. The DDC, by contrast, severs those connections. Dewey emphasized more than once that his system maps no structure beyond its own; there is neither a ‘transcendental deduction’ of its categories nor any reference to Cutter’s objective structure of social consensus. It is content-free: Dewey disdained any philosophical excogitation of the meaning of his class symbols, leaving the job of finding verbal equivalents to others. His
innovation and the essence of his system lay in the notation.115
He continues by discussing William Fletcher’s critique of Dewey on the grounds that he “exercised his expertise in a stable moral, cultural, and social order whose authorized
categories constituted the basis of a properly constructed SKO,” and that Dewey’s invention negated those principles “in favor of mechanical procedures and operatives.”116 Frohmann’s analysis is a window into the notion of warrant, while not using that specific terminology. Frohmann’s analysis provides explicit connections between post-structuralist concepts of discourse using the realm of classificatory warrant as a testing ground.
There are other ways in which warrant can affect the process of classifying. For example, Coleman, in “A Code for Classifiers: Whatever Happened to Merrill’s Code?” documents the construction of a set of guidelines to assist the classifier’s task in assigning classification despite the system in use. Coleman asserts that William Stetson Merrill, in his
115
Frohmann, “The Social Construction of Knowledge Organization,” 112-113. 116
work (1912-1927) clearly “emphasized that differences between general problems
(theoretical principles) of classification,” but “practical principles that would help promote consistency in the art of classifying books in libraries, irrespective of the classification used by the library, was the focus of the code.”117 In the critique that Coleman documents
throughout her rendition of the history of the code, we see that conceptions of warrant
become apparent. For instance, in accounting for one of the most debated aspects of Merrill’s code, Coleman recounts Dorkas Fellows’ reservations: “she questioned Merrill’s advocacy of the ‘intent of the author’ as the primary principle to be used by classifiers in determining what the book is about and cites Wyer as the authority with whom she agrees. Wyer and she felt that the Code over-emphasized the principle of authorial intention in determining the subject of the book (aboutness).”118
More telling is the conceptual analysis that Coleman conducts in treating her subject historically. She compares and contrasts the various editions of the Code and identifies influences on future classification systems. Two of these comparisons speak directly to the concept of warrant, while the others provide a glimpse at the historical process. First, she looks at the process of classifying versus classification – it is clear from Merrill’s words that he makes a clear distinction between the two:
Classification of books differs from classification of knowledge. The latter is the science of drawing up a scheme or system in which the various subjects of human inquiry, or human life in its varied aspects, are grouped according to their likeness or relations to one another. Classification of books, on the other hand, while making use of a scheme of knowledge, may be considered the art of assigning books to their proper places in a system of classification.119
117
Anita S. Coleman, “A Code for Classifiers: Whatever Happened to Merrill’s Code?” Knowledge Organization, 31 (2004), 162.
118
Coleman, 164. 119
This language is reminiscent of Hulme’s own concentration on the distinction between classification of books and classification of ideas.
Studwell, Wu and Wang, in their analysis of ideological influences on library
classification in China do a subtle but admirable job of counteracting Merrill’s assertion that classifying and classification can be differentiated. In uncovering and analyzing classification systems in China before and after the Cultural Revolution, Studwell, Wu and Wang argue persuasively for a concrete connection between the impulse to apply and the system itself. For example, in discussing the Wuhan Classification Scheme, the authors assert “the relationship between theoretical and applied sciences seems to be emphasized. This, of course, was done to follow Mao’s instruction. Mao was believed to have said: ‘Application is the basis of theory, in return, theory serves application.’”120 In comparing this kind of
analysis to the evidence present in Coleman’s analysis of entries from Merrill’s Code, one fails to see the difference. For instance, Coleman replicates Merrill’s Definition and Scope of this class for Art (Fine Arts): “The term art as used by the classifications is restricted to the ‘fine arts.’ Both the fine arts and the practical arts deal with the methods of putting into concrete form ideas which are practically useful or esthetically pleasing to man, and the line between the two cannot be very sharply drawn. The fine arts cover the material relating to the sculpture, the graphic arts, drawing, design, painting, carving, engraving, architecture, and the decorative arts.“121 The way the term is defined restricts it. The comparison to the Maoist placement due to definition brings to light the pervasive quality of the concept of warrant to the fundamental structures and semantic meanings of classification systems.
120
Studwell, Wu, Wang, 69. 121
Research into warrant extends beyond the intellectual exercise of identifying guiding principles. The impact that a warrant has on the classification of materials and the message that classification systems convey is an area of intense research. Ndakotsu, for example, provides an indictment of literary warrant in looking at the way in which Africa is
represented in classification systems such as the Library of Congress. Ndakotsu identifies a post-colonial and racial bias in the treatment of Africa.122
In a similar vein, Nelson analyzes the representations inherent in Art History text books, library classification, and dissertations. Of classification, Nelson notes: “with the spread of open-stack policies, the classification of libraries became an important aspect of [the] educational mission, for classification served to indicate the basic structure of knowledge.”123 In looking at the treatment of art history specifically, Nelson provides a critique of the Library of Congress classification: “the classification of art history books, first by media and then by a certain gerrymandered map, thereby orders the browsing of open stacks, that serendipity of discovering an unknown but related book, the rationale for all classificatory systems, is thus hardly accidental.”124 Nelson’s article seeks to uncover the biases inherent in the discipline as a whole, and the analysis of the library classification provides a useful component of his overall objective. As he states, “as a discipline, art history acquired and has been accorded the ability and power to control and judge its borders, to admit or reject people and objects, and to teach and thus transmit values to others.”125
122
Tsuzom M. Ndakotsu, ”Classifying Africa” African Research & Documentation, no. 101 (2006), 40. 123 Nelson, 30. 124 Nelson, 32. 125 Nelson, 28.
Olson explores the issues of warrant by examining the role of sameness and
difference in the construction of classification systems to uncover bias. By using sameness (and thus difference) as an area for analysis, Olson relies upon disciplinary warrant as the framework for classification: “Discipline – as the primary facet in our classifications – is fundamental sameness. Within each discipline in a classification the subdivision reflects the discourse of specialists.”126 It is this disciplinary framework (or warrant) that causes
problems for Olson as she uncovers bias, and she contradicts Beghtol’s call for viewpoint warrant, which relies heavily on disciplinary structures to construct viable categories for classification. Olson, however, does not directly consider the concept of warrant, or at least does not refer to it as such. Her study does bring to light the legitimacy of extending the concept of warrant to include the frameworks of bias or discourse. Should that concept be limited to explicit statements of intention in the construction of classification systems (or SKOs so named by Frohmann) as referred to by Hulme or can the concept be the framework in which to highlight the very issues that Olson, Frohmann, and Studwell, Wu and Wang are exploring?
In her analysis, Olson focuses on a cultural milieu to examine concepts of sameness and difference. As an example, she discusses the treatment of Literature and Folk Literature in the DDC in the context of Western values, particularly that of the role and importance of individual creation.127 For Olson, the emphasis on authorship displayed in the literature (800) class contrasts directly with that for folk lore (390), crediting anonymity and social nature as