Limitations of this Study

This study has been executed to the best of the authors’ abilities and with the greatest care for the truthfulness and reliability of the information and analysis presented. However, as in every study, it also has its limitations. First of all, the research field of intelligence agencies is a difficult one. First hand information, in the form of interviews, is difficult to come by. Therefore, this research has been conducted through the use of a report that was written seven years after the events in Srebrenica by Cees Wiebes. The disadvantage is that only one report was used for the main empirical analysis section of this study. Although Wiebes has doubtlessly done his best to be as impartial as possible, it is not unlikely that some personal opinion and preference have been present is his report. Another report would probably represent another author’s opinion or preference, this would probably have given a more well- rounded analysis about the case because of the differences in views these authors might have. However, this limitation has been countered by careful use of multiple sources throughout the study, especially in answering the second and third sub- question. This multitude of sources has aimed to contextualize and support the

conclusion drawn by Wiebes. Another limitation is that this author did not have any influence on the way the interviews that Wiebes did for his report, were conducted. Although there were many (hundreds) interviews conducted, making the outcome and analysis more reliable, this research is only based on the finished analyzed product (the report), not on the raw information and the transcripts of the interviews.

Thirdly, in many instances, Wiebes himself was also not completely sure about the conclusion he makes after consulting his many resources. The secretiveness of the topic ensures that there will always be some information that was held back because of restriction and classified material. Using the concept of intelligence culture, it therefore remains difficult to draw strong conclusions. Another reason for this is the secretiveness of intelligence agencies and because of the contested concepts of culture and intelligence. This limitation has been mitigated by carefully operationalizing the concept into practical indicators and using all information that is available at the time of this study. The fourth limitation is the lack of definitions of intelligence by the intelligence agencies during the war in Bosnia. However, as has been told, this limitation has been countered by using a definition from 2012 by the MIS, drawing information from the tasks of the intelligence services, and using definitions of Dutch scholars. Lastly, it is possible that the indicators and codes used for this analysis have missed certain information. Although human errors and misinterpretations can always be present in a study, reliability in this study has been strengthened by being transparent about the methods used and describing every step that has been taken. Despite the limitations listed for this study a conscious effort has been made to overcome them or at least make their influence as small as possible. Examples are the transparency and the effort to find solutions for limitations, such as the use of multiple sources to contextualize and verify. Although it is difficult to draw strong conclusions in this field of research, the findings of this research are both interesting and new. The struggle for recognition the intelligence services in The Netherlands had in the years of the war in Bosnia shed a new light on the failure of the mission. It shows that the use of a new concept, intelligence culture, can give interesting new insights into a case that has been studied often. This research has also provided a way to make the concept of intelligence culture operational. It shows that a theoretical concept can turn

into a practical and usable concept for research and that real and useful results can be found using concepts that were mostly theoretical before.

As said, although the concept of intelligence culture has not been used in research often, this research has shown that, given the right operationalization, conclusions can be drawn with the help of the concept of intelligence culture. However, this is one way to use the concept, doubtlessly there are many more ways to operationalize the concept and use it to explain cases or to compare intelligence cultures around the world. Not only to explain intelligence cultures connected to countries, but also to international organizations, intergovernmental institutions and business. There is a whole new world to discover using the concept of intelligence cultures before we can decide what the best way is to use and operationalize this concept. A concrete idea for future research is a study about the intelligence culture of the UN. This research has shown that the UN has a dislike for the use of intelligence while it is obviously vital in many instances, even in peacekeeping operations. The dislike of intelligence is something that could be defined as a part of the (intelligence) culture of the UN. It would be interesting in further research to find out more about this culture and how this dislike has been developed.

Another recommendation for future research would be a case study about a more recent case in The Netherlands. Although this case study of Bosnia has provided valuable results, it does not say much about the current intelligence culture. An interesting question could be if the Dutch intelligence services are still struggling for recognition nowadays or if they have gained more recognition. It would be specifically interesting how the attack on the Twin Towers in New York has influenced the importance and recognition of the intelligence services. Lastly, an interesting research idea is what the events were in Dutch history that has shaped and influenced the intelligence culture in The Netherlands. As written in this study, the Boer War largely influenced the intelligence culture of the UK while the intelligence culture in the US was influenced by the attack on Pearl Harbor. It would be interesting to see what events have influenced the development of the Dutch intelligence culture.