g involvement in purely state affairs.
14 'first line of defence and attack' merited mere support.
The party did little to encourage potential members:
Too many branches meet in ill-lit, shabby and depressing surroundings. Too much time is
strong heart is needed to remain. Too many chairmen and too many secretaries are ill- equipped to run meetings. This is not their fault but the fault of the Party in that it has never provided training for them.
Wyndham believed electoral success depended on branch revitalisation. Federal Secretariat servicing, especially in party education, could improve branch input. His remedy for boring meetings and low branch morale was rather simple -
education for key local personnel,^ plus better communication with the federal bodies. The obvious organisational level where federal/local communications could be improved was the
FEC, often neglected in state Branches.
Wyndham's concern with membership development and his belief in the organisational importance of local branches were long-standing. Attempts to rejuvenate local branches were central to his 1962 study for the Victorian ALP ( 'Labor Party Talks on Rule Changes to Strengthen Movement', Age, 7 April 1 9 6 2 ) . ^ Just before his report was ready, Wyndham told the 1965 Victorian country conference that branch members had wide networks of contacts in factories, offices, neighbourhoods and social clubs (ALP Federal Secretariat, Information Release No. 7/65). Given adequate information, they could push Labor
arguments in these networks. Lines of communication between 'the highest councils of the party' and ordinary members had to be 'streamlined', a favourite word of Wyndham, the
administrator (ALP Federal Secretariat, Information Release No. 7/65).17
The Wyndham Report argued direct access for FECs to the federal bodies would raise their status in the party. They would feel their views were being considered. The same applied
to federal unions. Wyndham's concern for party
professionalisation qualified his support for these 'party democracy' measures. FECs and federal unions might clutter up the agenda 'with items that should not be there'. Wyndham had strong doubts about how the FECs use 'this privilege'. While he complained that FECs were treated like 'Cinderellas1 , his own assessment of what the 'rank-and-file' could contribute to Labor decision-making was rather harsh (electioneering was another matter altogether, as was spreading the word at work and across the back fence). Wyndham consoled himself with the hope that the task of formulating a strictly limited number of Federal Conference items would educate local branches beyond parochial concerns. FEC and federal union Federal Conference items could be on federal matters only. They could have no more than three items each. The- agenda could not be:
... cluttered up with the petty grievances of members affecting the location of a public convenience on the corner of a street. 18
Wyndham suggested various party education programmes, with strong Federal Secretariat involvement. They included summer schools and correspondence colleges for local officials, partly modelled on British Labour practice. The Secretariat's role in co-ordinating party education would further boost its status. Circulated discussion notes might help drag branches away from parochial concerns.
Generous provision of educational resources was something party reformers had hoped for from the Secretariat, serving the general membership as well as the Executive and the FPLP. They deplored the way internal education had always been relegated to the bottom end of Labor's priorities. John Burton
(1957:26), for example, in his attempt to rekindle idealistic Labor radicalism by means other than the reassertion of the
'socialisation objective', stressed the importance of local- level revitalisation. A Federal Secretariat could facilitate such a process, by developing internal education programmes:
Even in a fully developed democratic movement, in which authority and control are spread, and great responsibilities are placed on the local branches, strong higher levels are still needed.
Labor needed a Secretariat, which would supply research and initiative:
Local branches require something to chew on ... The Federal Organisation more than any other level of the structure can take advantage of the studies of specialists subjecting these
studies to the examination of the rank-and-file ...
Wyndham appears to have agreed with this conception of Secretariat activity. He tried to develop communications with FECs and branches. Encouraging discussion on party aims, objectives and policy would not always run in harness with increasing the party's efficiency as a vote-gathering machine. Here, as in other areas, there was potential for conflict
between party democratisation and party professionalisation.-9 The effects of internal education would depend on whether the programmes would encourage discussion on policy and philosophy or have a narrower campaign focus (on matters such as
scrutineering and electoral law). Whether branch members and FEC delegates wanted to be 'educated' and if so, by whom and on what topics, would also be crucial. There were many
imponderables. Wyndham believed teaching local officials how to run meetings and conduct branch business was the key to local revitalisation. Wyndham-style party education would be about equipping ordinary members to be better 'ambassadors' for
the party. He saw the local branch as the party's first line of defence and attack, but failed to consider whether there was much enthusiasm in the branches for his kind of party
education.
If the party wanted its members to be 'ambassadors', the overall low level of direct membership was an obvious
problem. In her sympathetic discussion Overacker (1968:108) notes that the Wyndham Report saw lack of branch and affiliate vitality as 'the party's basic weakness'. Wyndham bluntly commented that individual membership was 'appalling'; less than one percent of the Labor vote. He made some suggestions for a recruitment drive. 1966 was to be declared 'membership year', with a target of 100,000 individual members (five
percent of the Labor vote). Professional and 'other'
(presumably related) social strata were singled out for special recruitment efforts. This was in tune with Whitlam's 'wooing
20
the white collars' strategy.
The Wyndham Report was a wide-ranging document. Its primary concern was improving the party's electoral 'image' by a series of internal reforms that would have the incidental
effect of making the Secretariat a considerably more significant body. Short-term Conference and Executive reform would
strengthen the hands of the FPLP leaders and banish the 'faceless men' taunt for once and for all. Some of his recommendations were pertinent to the ALP as a 'reform movement', as well as an
'electoral machine'. His membership development suggestions could be looked at in this light, although they were mainly justified on the grounds that branch revitalisation would enhance the party's vote-gathering capacities.^
7C Commentary
James Jupp strongly endorsed the report ('The Wyndham Report - Changing the Old Guard', Canberra Times, 1 June 1965). He had advocated similar measures himself. Jupp saw the higher profile for the FPLP as the most important part of the Wyndham package. Parliamentarians would be able to have more influence at Federal Conference. Parliamentarians and expert advisers could work together to give the ALP better researched and more professionally presented policies. Steps in this direction had
22
already been taken. Wyndham's proposals would consolidate the process. They were likely to be resisted by the left, which preferred 'its banners, demonstrations and slogans', to
'this kind of quiet fact accumulation'. Party professional- isation challenged the unions' veto 'on all matters from arbitration to atomic energy'. The left wanted to leave
the federal politicians 'in their current condition of formal servitude'. The unions, however, were by no means unambiguously left-wing, although Australian union
officials maintained 'an unusual, if not unique' combination of 'ideological self-reliance, radicalism and political
(in the sense of partisan) action' (Rawson, 1964b:18).
Jupp noted that while Wyndham suggested increased FPLP influence on the Federal Executive, his proposals
maintained the 'essential balance' of the federal structure (Canberra Times, 1 June 1965). State variations and
idiosyncrasies would survive. At least in the short term. Wyndham hoped to iron out many variations eventually.
Wyndham's very acceptance of Labor federalism, while it was essential to his incrementalism, may have meant many of his
recommendations were unlikely to be implemented; Jupp concluded;
Building up the individual membership, diversifying the sources of income and of recruits, polishing up the public image must all be done in the
Trades Halls of the capital cities rather than in Canberra. And very little stirs in some of them. Wyndham was likely to be frustrated by state Branch
r e a l v o l i t i k.
Rawson (1965:34) noted that federal reorganisation raised 'some fundamental questions' about Labor's priorities. He queried Wyndham's assumption that reorganisation was
essential for electoral success (Rawson, 1965:25).
Organisational efficiency was prized by people like Wyndham: ... whose life and profession are the production
of an efficient machine rather than its direction towards particular ends.
Yet Tasmanian Labor, electorally strong, had one of the weakest organisations. Here, we could note comments made by the NSW Press, Radio and TV Committee on 30 October 1959:
The whole question of publicity is complicated by the fact that, in NSW, the Party continues to achieve substantial electoral success without a publicity policy and, in fact, with almost -total lack of planning in this important field (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/454/1181). 23
Anyway, even if Wyndham could have unambiguously shown that his proposals would lift Labor's electoral prospects, some groups in the party would have remained hostile. The degree to which electoral success was the main priority was always a matter of internal dispute. Organisational proposals could not be seen in isolation:
They are always associated, even if unintentionally, with particular tendencies in policy and in
factional control and this, of course, is largely what explains resistance to them (Rawson, 1965:25).
'Rationalistic idealist' proposals always have internal
Realpolitik implications. Even when the priority of electoral success is accepted:
It is always difficult to discover motives and to distinguish between the organisation-maintenance necessary to win elections and that which
preserves oligarchy ... (D. Stephens, 1979:486).
While sceptical about their electoral importance, Rawson (1965:33) thought Wyndham's recommendations were worthwhile for other reasons. They were not simply about
24
improving the position of the FPLP. Labor's federal machine w a s :
... satisfactory neither for the determination of policy nor for the conduct of election campaigns and still less for maintaining long-term
campaigns between elections.
It would be ironic if the federal structure was left unchanged, because Labor 'radicals' wanted to keep politicians in their place:
... since its inadequacies make inevitable the predominance of the politicians in the
formulation of election policy and the heavy dependence upon a single advertising agency for
the conduct of election campaigns (Rawson, 1965:33-4). If Wyndham's plan failed, it would probably only be because of sheer organisational conservatism, combined with 'an
unwillingness of one faction to appear to give another a
victory', even if both stood to gain (Rawson, 1965:34). Such considerations were quite important in organisations like the ALP.
Rawson thought Wyndham's recommendations would benefit the ALP as a whole. Humphrey McQueen disagreed
(letter, Australian, 20 December 1965). He saw a right-wing factional agenda at work in the proposals. They arose out of
'counter-criticisms made by the Press and other opponents' rather than 'any investigation of the ALP's structure'.
Wyndham did not prove Federal Conference was inefficient. His worry was it was 'unrepresentative ... of his right-wing
opinion'. Wyndham, for all his professional organiser's pride in his practicality, had misunderstood factional realpolitzk and demonstrated ignorance about the 'grass roots' party:
Mr Wyndham is particularly fond of efficiency and organisational rationality as concepts. This is not surprising as it is symptomatic of the right
to look for causes of its failure in the only area of politics in which it has an interest - namely the purely administrative. 25
This made Wyndham 'the greatest utopian of them all'. The
left would not vote itself out of power to satisfy his 'orderly mind'. The proposals were naive if Wyndham expected them to work. They were devious if he did not, and was trying 'to cause trouble and/or frustrate more realistic reforms'.
Unfortunately, McQueen did not specify any 'realistic reforms' himself.
Press praise for the Wyndham Report concentrated on 26
FPLP representation at Federal Conference. The Mercury
suggested politicians were more attuned to public opinion than delegates who lived in 'an atmosphere of fervid party support
and economic theories' ('ALP Seeks New Face', 27 May 1965). The good press Wyndham's proposals received was not surprising. Leader writers were always advising Labor to 'reform' and
'modernise' itself. There was, however, some concern that 27
7D After the Report : 'Machine' Manoeuvres in New South Wales, New Faction in Victoria
The May 1965 Federal Executive meeting postponed consideration of Wyndham's proposals but opened the 1965
Federal Conference to the press. The NOPC was due to consider the report in July. The holiday weekend, 12-14 June, saw state conferences in NSW, Victoria and SA. Responses to the report
2 8
could be aired. Brian Johns thought the Federal Executive's referral of the Wyndham Report to the states was not a defeat
for the federal secretary ('Changing from White to Grey',
Bulletin, 5 June 1965). It kept debate on the document alive. The NSW conference was expected to be testing for the ruling faction. Labor had just lost state government, which it had held since 1941. A manifesto from 14 'out' unions called on NSW Labor to reassert its socialist objective and its
'traditional radical approach' ('Labor Postmortem', Canberra Times, 8 June 1965). Labor's thinking was being paralysed by
'a pathological fear of the word socialism'. The manifesto went on to attack the NSW executive for failing to keep pace with 'world-shaking social and political change' ('Strong Attack on State ALP in Unions' Manifesto', Sydney Morning Herald, 8 June 1965). The left could turn its hand to
'modernisation' rhetoric on appropriate occasions, but it was decidedly cool on the Wyndham Report. Socialist and Industrial Labor thought Wyndham's 'highly controversial' proposals could only be considered if direct representation was given to
federal unions ('Unions Must Be Represented', June 1965). The 'faceless men' charge was a malevolent and misleading
2 9
the NSW conference would be 'an organisational field par excellence' ('Pressure from the Left', 11 June 1965). There would be complex plots, counter-plots, tickets, counter-tickets
30