Links with other Styles of Reasoning

Immediately after the constructivist turn, scholars tried to demonstrate the differences between constructivism and more traditional approaches to international relations theory. These theories were divided between rationalist and interpretive epistemologies - the former including (neo)realists and neoliberal institutionalists; the latter consisting of postmodernist and poststructuralist theories, critical theory and feminist theories (Adler, 1997: 319-320). More recently, scholars have argued against this paradigmatic castle-building (Barkin, 2011). Instead, they started offering suggestions to overcome the gaps between those paradigms by stressing their similarities. Earlier, Price and Reus-Smit (1998) had already argued that the division between critical theory and constructivism is not so deep as traditionally assumed. Their argument amounts to the claim that constructivism is not contradictory to key findings of Third Debate critical theory and that constructivism even has its roots

in that critical theory, using its conceptual and theoretical as well as its methodological findings to design a distinct approach to international relations (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998: 260). Price and Reus-Smit (1998: 260) even go one step further, elucidating the contribution of constructivism to the development of critical international theory, in particular regarding the “sociology of moral community in world politics”. These authors (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998: 264) argue that constructivism can be considered a new phase in the development of critical theory, taking up conceptual elaboration and empirical analysis often neglected in critical theory. Price and Reus-Smit (1998: 270-283) examine how constructivists cope with meta-theoretical insights of critical theory and how they translate these insights into empirical claims. The first insight concerns the use of evidence and the limits of interpretation. In this respect, the authors claim that constructivists are not violating the interpretive ethos of critical international theory more than those theorists themselves are doing.

Given the fact that constructivists maintain it is impossible to escape the interpretive moment; they reject ‘Big-T’ Truth claims, while nevertheless making

‘small-t’ truth claims, or “logical and empirically plausible interpretations of actions, events or processes” (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998: 272). In line with Pouliot’s conceptualisation of constructivism as a post-foundationalist style of reasoning, these interpretations are always partial and contingent and thus do not violate critical theory’s interpretive ethos (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998: 272).

Regarding law-like generalisations, secondly, Price and Reus-Smit (1998: 275) make a similar point, claiming that a rejection of law-like generalisations does not prevent the formulation of more contingent generalisations. These are not contradictory to those made by critical theorists. Thirdly, Price and Reus-Smit (1998: 280) address the question of alternative explanations and interpretations.

They assert that, independent of the theoretical framework underlying an account of the world, these accounts are all partial and can only clarify “aspects of an event or phenomena that are required for an adequate understanding of the explanandum in question”. In short, Price and Reus-Smit (1998: 288-289) do not fully accept the term ‘constructivist turn’, but instead argue for a conceptualization of constructivism that is a “logical continuation” of Third debate critical theory. By engaging the mainstream, and by addressing the four above-mentioned issues, constructivists have distanced themselves from their origins in critical international theory; but their epistemological, ontological and

methodological foundations are not inconsistent with that origin.

Price and Reus-Smit have concentrated on the compatibility of constructivism with the meta-theoretical foundations of critical international theory. Sørensen (2008: 6), in turn, maps the debate between neorealism and social constructivism. He proposes an analytical eclecticism in which both material and ideational factors are included in the study of international relations. Doing this, Sørensen (2008: 10) responds to the assertion by Kowert and Legro (1996) that intersubjective knowledge and the norms resulting from that knowledge do not exist in a material vacuum. I agree with Sørensen (2008: 13) that, even in light of the foregoing debate, an account combining material and ideational factors should not necessarily be ontologically or epistemologically inconsistent. Several authors have taken up this challenge (Zacher and Matthew, 1995, Buzan, 2004). For his own proposal, Sørensen uses Cox’s (1996) NeoGramscian notion of historical structures as a conceptual starting point. To the neorealist notion of international structure (being the relative distribution of material and military capabilities) and to the constructivist notion of international structure (emphasizing ideas and shared knowledge); Sørensen (2008: 14) adds a third notion consisting of economic power, or “the capability to design, construct, finance, and distribute economic goods”. Taken together, these three structures represent an historical structure, as defined by Cox (1981: 135) as a “picture of a particular configuration of forces”. Similarly, the previous chapter clarified how the explanation of change in military practice depends on changes in the material environment as well as in the (inter)national division of power determining the interpretation of those changes. The final chapter will demonstrate that normative power is facilitated by the availability of economic power.

However, in this text, I will not adopt the position of a Coxian critical theory analysis, but I will draw on Barkin’s (2003, 2011) conceptualisation of a realist constructivism. Let me first clarify the relation between realist constructivism and critical theory before discussing realist constructivism in depth. Realist constructivism does show significant similarities with critical theory, but differs from it in one aspect: it does not contain the “element of utopianism” (Cox, 1981: 130) of critical theory. That is, it does not present an alternative to the

current world order. This fits my purpose since my aim is to uncover the power and interests distorting communication; but I do not take a “privileged”

emancipatory position directed at the “removal or correction of these distortions”

(Shapcott, 2008: 329-330). The major difference with a Coxian critical theory analysis is therefore meta-theoretical in that the claim of emancipation is absent in realist constructivism. Realist constructivism lacks the “commitment” to reconstruct the world and does not aim to use social theory as a “weapon for waging war on inequality and injustice in world politics” (Farrell, 2002: 59). For (realist) constructivists, the individual cannot be freed from the social structure, because only social interaction gives meaning to the world. The constructivist conception of social reality, in other words, “does not allow for the emancipation of the individual from social structures” (Barkin, 2011: 78-79). Emancipation is at the core of critical theory, but it also involves withdrawing the individual from the social structure, because to emancipate is to transcend power relationships inherent in social interaction - which is impossible for constructivists.

Furthermore, there is no inherent predisposition in constructivism towards one particular social construction at the expense of another (Barkin, 2011: 79).

Barkin (2003: 326, 337) goes one step further than Sørensen. Not only does he argue that constructivist research is not incompatible with a realist worldview, but also that political change can not be explained by drawing exclusively on realist or idealist factors. In Barkin’s (2003: 327-329) argument power is the central concept in classical realist theory and the other central concepts in this theory ultimately derive from this core. Realist constructivism is also concerned with this core since it scrutinises “the way in which power structures affect patterns of normative change in international relations and, conversely, the way in which a particular set of norms affect power structures” (Barkin, 2003: 337).

Barkin’s proposal of a realist constructivism has instigated a debate on the compatibility of realism and constructivism. Most of Barkin’s critics agreed on the possibility of a realist constructivism, but contended that Barkin’s original proposal needed some refinement. Barkin (2011: 169) has taken these critiques into account in his refined version of realist constructivism but retains relational power politics as a central element. Realism offers a more comprehensive conceptualisation of power than is currently present in constructivism as well as another view on the relationship between empirical research and policy (Barkin,

2011: 169). Realist constructivism thus problematizes the relationship between political morality and power politics (Barkin, 2011: 170). More specifically, Barkin (2011: 171) states:

[Realist constructivism] is well placed to see that not only do discursive and normative structures tend to be constantly recreated, but that they often must be recreated against opposition, and that to recreate them to reflect a particular political morality can require the application of power as well as reason.

Realist constructivism differs from realism mainly because it considers self-interest and public self-interest, not as given a priori, but as intersubjectively constituted phenomena and subject to empirical investigation (Barkin, 2011: 69-70). Thus, contrary to realism, realist constructivism does not posit an egoistic human nature as the foundation of human behaviour. Realism and constructivism agree that human beings are a “social species” (Sterling-Folker, 2004: 342). For the former, this is why we form groups; for the latter, this is why we can only make sense of the world through interaction (Sterling-Folker, 2004:

342). Realist-constructivism, however, admits that, even if morality is socially constructed within a group, relative power relationships do shape ethical issues within and between groups (Sterling-Folker, 2004: 342). Power, in realist constructivism, can appear in a variety of ways. Economic power, for instance, differs from moral authority; as well as power “can be expressed in a multiplicity of fashions – for instance through material, symbolic, and linguistic means”

(Mattern, 2004: 345). Depending on the “sociopolitical circumstances”, power can assume a different form and does not a priori structure reality (Jackson and Nexon, 2004: 340). Different forms of power exercise a different influence on international politics. As a result, the researcher should analyse how actors use these different forms of power to construct alternative social realities (Mattern, 2004: 345).

In general terms, social power is an actor’s ability to intentionally steer the conduct of other subjects in the social world, through the use of causal mechanisms he/she has at his/her disposal (cf. Scot, 2001: 1-2). For Lukes

(2005: 27) the “supreme exercise of power [is] to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have”. Likewise, I consider the potential to shape intersubjective understandings as the ultimate dimension of power. Power, in the realist-constructivist sense used in this text, refers to this ability to shape intersubjective meanings and understandings, including norms. Realist constructivist power corresponds to what Barnett and Duval (2005: 3) call

“productive power”.²⁰ Productive power is the “constitution of all social subjects with various social powers” and is exercised through the discursive production of meaning (Barnett and Duval, 2005: 20-21). This discursive production not only results in various identities, interests and capacities, but also defines what counts as possible or impossible, legitimate or illegitimate paths of action (Barnett and Duval, 2005: 20-21). Norms and discursive structures thus shape and generate “differential social capacities” (Barnett and Duval, 2005: 3), but are themselves (re)created by social agents. As part of a broader episteme, norms both constitute and are produced by agents and by their social interaction (Adler and Bernstein, 2005: 297-298). However, the exploration of this theme will be postponed to the last section of this chapter.