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Nigeria is a nation that is richly blessed with both human and natural resources but has recently become growingly unsafe due to its mounting cases of internal security crisis, especially since 1999. Security is an impor-tant component of a state which naturally determines its pace of develop-ment and progress. Security is an important requiredevelop-ment in the existence or sustenance of every modern state in the international political system.

This is based on the need for states recognised as independent to maintain their territorial integrity without the control of their territories by other states. In fact, security remains one of the most critical aspects of a nation’s existence that ensure social order in the society and should never be over-looked. This is because the development and survival of any nation is hinged on it. In essence, a country that cannot secure its territory from both internal and external threats in modern times is bound to fail. Internal security is one of the criteria for the survival of modern democracy, espe-cially among the current African countries. It is based on the foregoing

R. I. Okolie-Osemene (^*)

Department of History, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria

that Onodugo et  al. (2015, p.  27) described national security as “the podium upon which democracy stands and its values for the people.” It then means that such security guarantees stability, which determines the success of politics and all sectors of the economy.

Although Nigeria’s national security goal since attaining independence has been focused on deterring external aggression and containment of internal security threats (Pogoson 2013), the country started becoming insecure after the Nigerian-Biafran War in 1970 when the proliferation of arms became the order of the day (Fourchard 2003). Nigeria continued to witness increased rate of crime and insecurity, which unfortunately offered people the opportunity to learn how to kill themselves after the war (Onibokun 2003). Most youths have become experts in murdering people to the extent that some are now being used to assassinate political oppo-nents, or even engage in bank robberies among others.

The year 1999 is remarkable in the history of Nigeria democratically.

Specifically, it represented the end of military authoritarian rule and also the re-establishment of democratic rule under the Fourth Republic. The return to democratic rule in Nigeria was greeted by much hope for speedy development, which would avert the growing nature of poverty among its populace and promote internal peace and security. But this great hope which initially characterised the minds of the Nigerian populace in 1999 is rapidly disappearing owing to several developments that have contributed to the intensification of internal security problems. In essence, the Nigerian state has recently been characterised by mounting cases of internal security crisis, which has escalated the economic and security challenges in the country, that has threatened the peace and unity of the nation at different points in time since the beginning of the Fourth Republic. Such internal security crises range from the Niger Delta crisis, insurgencies, militancy, kidnapping, political assassinations, armed robbery, ritual killings, com-munal conflicts to terrorism, to mention but a few, and have since become part of the daily life issue within the country since this period.

Furthermore, Nwagboso (2016) argued that the internal security prob-lems affecting most areas in Nigeria can be grouped into violent and non- violent internal security challenges. The latter include the outbreak of diseases like Ebola, HIV/AIDS, and yellow fever. As such, the country has continually experienced several security challenges in its different geopo-litical zones which overstretched the security agencies due to govern-ment’s oversight, delayed action and even corruption. For instance, Nwogwugwu and Oluranti (2015, p. 47), argued that “militant activities

generated to the extent of it affecting the nation’s economy, before the adoption of amnesty policy.” Likewise, kidnapping in the southeast was allowed to escalate to the level of secondary school children as well as members of the Nigerian Union of Journalist (NUJ) being kidnapped in Abia state, before the situation was managed by military intervention that resulted in raids across various communities in some local governments within Abia south.

The lopsided federalism witnessed in the country manifests in the cen-tralisation of the police which limits oversight of state governments (Matfess 2016). This has made it difficult for the police to swiftly respond to internal security threats as required by current realities. Boko Haram has been carrying out insurgency activities since 2009 unabated. The rea-son for this increase in internal security is due to failed government and mounting poverty amongst the populace in the face of endemic corrup-tion within the political class. Therefore, the chapter argues that the wide-spread nature of corruption amongst the elite and even the security agents in Nigeria accounts for the increasing nature of internal security crisis in the country since 1999. This study is basically qualitative in nature. It combines the historical methodology with trend analysis in analysing major events within the period in other established cogent facts. The method has been helpful in tracking major efforts by the state in enhanc-ing national security.

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Security is a term that brings to the fore the need for survival of the state and the protection of individual and group rights within a state (Albert 2003). For Nwolise (2014, p. 47), “security connotes protection, mean-ing the safety of men, groups, nationals and the entire world from harm.

In other words, when people are not threatened by any danger or disaster, they are said to be safe, while they are unsafe in vulnerable conditions.” In his attempt to categorise security, Okodoloh (2011, p.  319) maintains that “active security means the practical measures taken in security opera-tions involving the use of visible objects such as weapons, security acces-sories, security equipment most of which are usually capital intensive, while passive security is social, psychological and economic measures taken to protect lives and property.”

According to Tsuwa and Okoh (2016), we talk about national security when the issue of protecting the people and political conditions are given

priority. This protection is aimed at saving the state and citizens from threats. In essence, a state that lacks the capacity to prevent danger to its territorial integrity can hardly guarantee the well-being of her people.

Nwolise (2009) posits that the relevance of national security explains why the government puts measures to make the security sector effective to prevent people from losing confidence in the ability of the state from pro-tecting them. In the context of Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution, the nation is expected to maintain a standing army, air force, navy, as well as other para-military forces and the police, with the aim of defending against any form of aggression to maintain the nation’s territorial integrity (see Pogoson 2013).

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Historically, internal security has remained a primary duty of the state. In Nigeria, it dates back to the colonial period when the colonial agents mobilised all the machinery of cohesion (police and army) in their bid to suppress the indigenous people into total submission to the colonial state and also maintain order for the swift running of their regime. According to Malasowe (2016, p. 46), most people in the country were in need of adequate security, despite the indirect rule introduced by colonial admin-istrators, and indigenous people became threatened by the security lapses during that period (Malasowe 2016). The chiefs became agents of law enforcement instead of protecting their own people. Being a colonial cre-ation, the Nigerian state at independence inherited the state-centric nature of colonial internal security measures.

Internal security has remained an important area of concern in Nigeria prior to 1999 owing to its place in the enhancement of peace and develop-ment. The intra-party political crisis that erupted within the Action Group (AG), as well as the ethno-religious crisis which invited the military into politics where series of critical internal crisis within the nation’s first repub-lic that not only shook the unity of the country but contributed in drag-ging the newly independent nation into a deadly civil war which lasted for about 30 months. Decades of dictatorship, especially from the 1970s, wit-nessed mass suppression and violation of human rights under the various military governments. This, among other things, instigated series of inter-nal security challenges in Nigeria, which made violent conflicts to become a little much rampart within the nation’s environs. For instance, the series

of coups propelled more coups from 1966 when the first coup was exe-cuted and promoted some form of political killings and instabilities. Other crises included the Maitatsine crisis of 1980s, Zango Kataf crisis of 1992 and June 12 crisis, to mention only a few. In fact, Elaigwu (2005; cited in Alumona 2016) noted that between 1980 and 2005, there were 145 cases of violent conflicts in Nigeria.

However, it is important to state here that during the Nigerian Civil War, there was a mass mobilisation of the security agencies particularly the army in the war against the Biafran forces. At the end of the war, which ended in 1970, the majority of the Nigerian peace enforcement agencies particularly the military were redeployed and relocated to the barracks, and so they became relatively underused internally except in extreme cases or on foreign missions due to the scanty nature of internal crisis before 1999. Since the end of the war, most of the internal crises that occurred in the country before 1999 were very minimal and limited in both scope and effects.

Moreover, the rebirth of democracy in 1999 was supposedly thought to guarantee peace, security and development, which would ensure the fundamental rights of the Nigerian nationals. But the unfolding develop-ments since 1999 in Nigeria have proven this popular expectation to be very wrong. This is due to the fact that there has been a multiplicity of internal tensions within the country from the Fourth Republic. The nascent democracy has not translated to the safety of people, as the capa-bility of the state to sustain the maintenance of law and order remains questionable, considering the disturbances across the country (Malasowe 2016). The disappointments faced by Nigerians from the governing cir-cles as a result of gross corruption and political neglect, coupled with rapid increase in poverty and unemployment among the majority of the citizens since the dawn of the Fourth Republic also worsened the problem.

The foregoing has contributed to an increase in internal security chal-lenges in the country, which, in most cases, the security agencies like the police and other sister security agencies fail to handle. The prevalence of such internal crisis is rapidly overstretching the army. Rapid increase of intolerance and violence characterised the early years of democratic dis-pensation in the late 1990s (Hazen and Horner 2008). The transforma-tion of Nigeria into democratic rule created new challenges, particularly internal tension within the country. Internal security challenges in recent times can be classified under the following: militancy; Boko Haram

insurgency; Fulani herdsmen-farmers crisis; Shiites-Army crisis; humani-tarian crisis; food insecurity; and crimes such as kidnapping, cultism and ritual killing.

Militancy is one of the intractable internal security crises that have become a common phenomenon since 1999. The emergence of militancy in the Niger Delta created new sources of security challenges, which gave a new dimension to internal security challenges facing the nation. The manifestations of its effects have been far too detrimental on the nation’s economy and internal security. The appearance of militancy reveals long periods of political marginalisation, economic exploitation/victimisation they had suffered in the region over the years due to oil exploration since 1956. Government’s lack of political will needed for ensuring equitable resource allocation, coupled with political corruption, marginalisation and the sense of neglect and alienation on the part of Niger Delta people cul-minated into high levels of militancy in the Fourth Republic (Akpan 2010). It is noteworthy that demands by the people of Niger Delta are people-oriented, focusing on the well-being of the communities that have suffered government neglect for years.

The failure of the government to respond promptly motivated prolif-eration groups that became restive. This group of youth not only adopted the violent processes such as pipeline vandalisation, they also engaged in bombing of oil facilities and kidnapping of oil expatriates so as to scare away the workers. In spite of military task force that was sent into the area, militancy continued to wax stronger by the day as new militants continued to emerge on daily basis. The prevalence of this situation thereby made the region very unsafe for both the inhabitants and also foreign officials. In fact many countries had to recall back their citizens for safety reasons.

The incessant attacks on oil facilities caused the country’s oil produc-tion to drop drastically. The attack on Atlas Cove Jetty/Depot, a major petroleum distribution on July 12, 2009, which was highly securitised on a 24-hour basis, resulted in the suspension of oil operation activities by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) for the time being.

Atlas Cove jetty supplies products through pipeline network to NNPC’s depots in some parts of the country (Lawal et al. 2009). As a result of such activities, petroleum reception was transferred to Apapa depot. The mili-tant attack on this facility made it difficult for foreign vessels to easily bring in imported fuel through NNPC and other companies with great implica-tions for domestic supply. This incident equally prompted the former US President Barak Obama’s decision to visit Ghana instead of Nigeria during his African countries’ tour for security reasons.

The attack on Atlas Cove came with a shocking surprise on the Nigerian government. In fact it was the last straw that forced the Nigerian government under President Yar’Adua to extend the presidential amnesty programme, which involves a free vocational training and a monthly cash payment of about 30,000 militants to douse the militant anger. Several ex-militant commanders such as Asari Dokubo, Government Ekpumopolo and others were rewarded with the contract of guarding pipelines against vandals (Onuoha 2016). However, the issue of militancy, which was already a time bomb waiting to explode, resurfaced when the present gov-ernment in an inaugural speech in 2015 revealed an intention to terminate the amnesty programme. This has probably resulted in resurgence of more deadly restive gangs within the region who had since resumed bombing pipelines since January 2016 till date. As a matter of fact, oil militancy has also spread the militant’s activities into other states like Lagos and Ogun, where there have been reported cases of pipeline vandalisation and other nefarious activities of the groups. It is important to mention here that the proliferation of militant groups made it difficult for the state to provide adequate security for the citizens for past two decades. As a result, such crimes, armed robbery, rape, kidnapping and cultism have recently become a daily occurrence.

Kidnapping for ransom remains one of the most dangerous internal security crimes that are spreading rapidly across the whole country. The rate of kidnapping incidence in both the rural and urban areas in Nigeria has become very alarming to the point that she ranks a third position in the rating of high-risk areas of kidnapping globally (This Day Live 2013).

A recent Freedom House report indicates that Nigeria recorded kidnap-pings, which heightened insecurity (Ogunbiyi 2017). Moreover, it can be argued that the recent manifestation of kidnappings remains a spillover of the Niger Delta crisis. The militant groups had adopted the strategy of kidnapping expatriate workers in the petroleum industry and government functionaries as a way of attracting global attention and pressing their demands on the Nigerian government through the restriction of further oil exploration within the Niger Delta (Nwobueze et al. 2016). The scope of kidnappings has since been expanded from the Niger Delta creeks to other geographical areas in the country by some unscrupulous youth for the monetary gains attached to it. In essence, this menace is no longer limited to targeting oil workers alone, as the scope of its victims now includes school children, monarchs, community leaders, market women and even farmers.

This new development has increased the fear and suspicions amongst Nigerian citizens as no one knows who the next victim might be. For instance, the incessant attacks of kidnappers and armed robbers in Aba in 2010 compelled most of the existing financial institutions within the metropolis to stop operations (Nwagboso 2016, pp. 55–56). The high rate of insecurity occasioned by kidnapping also made certain manufacturing companies like the Nigerian Breweries Plc, Guinness Nigerian Plc Seven-Up Bottling Ltd and PZ PLC, to mention just a few, to relocate to other nearby states with less security tension like Enugu, while Guinness Nigeria Plc was relocated to Edo (Nwagboso 2016). Likewise, about five workers of a farm and two Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) members employed as security personnel on the facility at Igbodu community in Epe were abducted on February 17, 2017 (Ogunbiyi 2017). A more recent case was the abduction of the staff and six students of the Nigerian Turkish International College, Isheri by unknown gunmen, who demanded for a total of about ₦1.2 billion as ransom on January 16, 2017 (Rockcity Fm 101.9).

Another critical source of internal security which has remained a thorn in the flesh of the nation is the outbreak of insurgency since 2009. Boko Haram has continually launched very brutal and disastrous attacks on both government security agencies’ buildings, such as barracks, and police sta-tions, markets, farms, villages and so on since 2009 (Omodia and Aliu 2013). According to Matfess (2016), the heavy-handed state response to the insurgency led to more than 50,000 deaths since 2009, with more than 2.8 million people already displaced from their homes. The unrelent-ing brutal attacks of this dangerous group have created an atmosphere of fear and chaos. This has reduced life expectancy in the region. The trend of Boko Haram’s insurgency attained a more sophisticated, dangerous and international dimension when the UN compound in Abuja was bombed in August 2011, killing about 23 people and wounding scores (Nwogwugwu and Oluranti 2015). In fact, it was in a bid to curb the excesses of this dreaded group within the northeastern states that prompted Goodluck Jonathan administration to deploy troops to volatile areas (Sodipo 2013).

Arguably, the Boko Haram insurgency is the most lethal internal rity challenge facing the nation’s northeast, which has multiplied the secu-rity problems combating the nation at large. It has led to rapid conscription, particularly into the army and other military agencies in recent years, in order to keep up with maintaining internal peace. The violent attacks of this insurgent group across the northeastern states have not only created

humanitarian challenges through its widespread displacement of innocent citizens but also created negative peace and forced some businesses to shut down. The record of the International Organization for Migration reveals that by April 9, 2015, the number of people affected by the attacks in the north is in millions (Winsor 2015). It has also brought about food security challenges and crippled the economy within the area as well as the south-ern region, which depends on this geographical area for certain supplies like onions, tomatoes, beans and cattle, to mention but a few. It was reported in 2014 that Boko Haram’s crisis and the outbreak of Ebola virus disease had adversely affected business and economic activities, slashing the nation’s projected economic growth rate for the year from 7 to 6.5 per cent (Nigerian Bulletin 2014).

The northeastern crisis has been further compounded by the violence caused by herdsmen attacks which has spread even to the southern part of the country. The mounting security challenge in the country has resulted in the establishment of joint task forces with the aim of restoring law and order. This has further overstretched the security sector as most security operatives have been sent on counterterrorism trainings. Similarly, Bamidele (2012, p.  33) noted that “concerns with Boko Haram cata-strophic terrorism and related challenges have led to the proliferation of security management policies, laws and programmes.” These policies are initiated to regulate the activities of non-state actors and to discourage people from sponsoring terrorism or militancy.

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Events have shown that insecurity affects all citizens, and that securing the state is everybody’s business. It should be noted that both the elites and ordinary citizens have been affected by security threats. The Fourth Republic has recorded numerous threats like insurgency, militancy, kid-napping, cult clashes, political assassinations and other violent crimes.

Since 1999, the government has responded to the problems of internal security in different ways. The need to promote internal security and foster the protection of lives and property led to the formation of joint task forces as a response to insecurity. This is characterised by deployment of security forces to volatile areas either before or after declaration of state of emergency.

For instance, militarism has remained one of the ways of managing internal security threats in the Fourth Republic. Militarism is the deploy-ment of coercive instrudeploy-ments of a state to restore law and order through the Ministry of Defence with implications for human rights (Okolie- Osemene 2015). Through militarism, state violence becomes a necessity and approved act of violence to forestall breakdown of law and order.

Since then, joint security patrols and mounting of road blocks have char-acterised internal security. With the military option, the state makes vio-lence a legitimate response to insecurity aimed at routing non-state actors, and this led to the formation of the joint task force to prevent internal aggression and protect Nigeria’s territory from being divided by non-state actors (Okolie-Osemene 2016). Most of the members of the military task force based in the northeast are members of the security sector among other stakeholders.

It is noteworthy that while the Niger Delta militancy was attributed to the politics of oil revenues, that of Boko Haram insurgency which esca-lated during former President Jonathan’s administration was attributed to politics and religion, considering how some political elites demonstrated their lack of will to confront the security challenge to avoid losing political patronage. The foregoing may have contributed to the escalation of the insurgency with attendant humanitarian crisis and fatalities recorded (Abolurin 2012). Most militants have accused both the government and security forces of being responsible for their restiveness, particularly in the mismanagement of the oil revenues and abuse of human rights, respec-tively. Also, the delay in taming the Boko Haram insurgency at the begin-ning stage made it possible for the group to gain and control some parts of Nigeria’s territory. In order to counter actors that threatened the state’s monopoly of violence, the government established joint security outfits to curb the activities of ethnic militias and thugs who became agents of inse-curity in most parts of the country (Matfess 2016). Managing such threats began with the police and the military and later expanded to accommo-date other security agencies due to the activities of criminals and drug traffickers, whose access to small arms and light weapons usually equips them to challenge security agencies.

It should be recalled that the need to promote national security led to the establishment of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) in 2002, based on various security lapses. Since then, the NSCDC has demonstrated its capacity to complement the role of other security agencies in protecting lives and critical infrastructure, including